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ARTICLE
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: THE TAKING OF
JOE DOHERTY
JAMES T KELLY*
In this Article, Mr. Kelly summarizes the eight year diplomatic and legal effort to
return Joe Doherty, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, from
the United States to the United Kingdom, where he was wanted for his role in the
death of a British soldier and for his escape from prison. The Article begins by
considering the British-Irish conflict over the partition of Ireland and the political
and diplomatic role the United States has played in mediating that conflicL It
then recounts the unsuccessful efforts of the United States and the United King-
dom to extradite Doherty, and the two governments' renegotiation of their ex-
isting extradition treaty so as to have adverse retroactive application to Doherty.
This Article then examines the successful effort of the United States Justice De-
partment to deport Doherty to the United Kingdom: including a review of
Doherty's initial pleas for asylum and withholding of deportation, his subsequent
request-in the face of the revised extradition treaty-.for deportation to the Re-
public of Ireland, and the judicially-affirmed decisions of two Attorneys General
to refuse such request and then to bar Doherty from presenting his claims for
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INTRODUCTION
HnE United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in INS v. Doherty'
X ended the extended litigation of one of the most troubling extradition
and deportation cases in the past decade, the "Doherty Case." Over its
protracted life, the Doherty Case took a number of surprising twists and
turns, and raised a host of nettlesome diplomatic, legal, and policy ques-
tions. This Article reviews the history of the Doherty Case and considers
whether those questions were answered properly.
The Doherty Case concerned a Provisional Irish Republican Army
volunteer, Joe Doherty, who shot and killed a British soldier in Northern
Ireland in May 1980. Doherty was captured, tried, and convicted for the
killing. He later escaped from custody and eventually fled to the United
1. 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
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States, where he was rearrested in June 1983. Strenuous efforts to extra-
dite him failed, but administrative deportation proceedings later accom-
plished what extradition had not. The United States returned Doherty to
the United Kingdom in February 1992.
Like the differing views of ink blots in a Rorschach test, differing per-
ceptions exist as to the culpability of Doherty's acts; the diplomatic, legal
and policy implications of the Doherty Case stem from the clash of these
differing perceptions. Doherty's supporters believe he was a soldier who
killed in combat and a prisoner of war who escaped from enemy captivity
while defending his homeland against an occupying army. They point to
the federal district judge who denied extradition, stating that the judge
understood Doherty's offenses to be part of the ongoing British-Irish
conflict in Northern Ireland and, thus, "political" and non-extraditable.
Although Doherty was never charged with or convicted of any offenses
in the United States, he was held without bail in American prisons for
eight years and eight months. He was eventually euchred into withdraw-
ing his request for an asylum hearing because of a supplementary extradi-
tion treaty that, his supporters argue, operated as an unconstitutional bill
of attainder. Doherty's supporters present his case as one of the more
flagrant human rights violations of the decade, and argue that the
Supreme Court's ruling sends a dangerous message to the Justice Depart-
ment-i.e., that it is permissible, without a hearing, to deport an alien to
a country where extradition has been denied and persecution is feared.
Doherty's opponents maintain a different view of the facts. To them,
Doherty was no soldier. Rather, he was a terrorist gunman, a murderer
who escaped from lawful custody, an illegal alien, and a fugitive from
justice in a friendly democratic nation. They argue that homicide is not
and cannot be regarded as a reasonable political tool. Accordingly, the
denial of Doherty's extradition was a grievous mistake which was caused
by a federal district judge's misinterpretation of the relevant treaty provi-
sion, and which impliedly sanctioned terrorist killings of police and
members of the military. Doherty's opponents note that the State
Department has long considered the Provisional Irish Republican Army
a terrorist organization, and argue that European nations will only
cooperate with American anti-terrorist initiatives if the United States
shows a willingness to reciprocate with its own anti-terrorist actions. To
Doherty's adversaries, two successive Attorneys General were well
within their broad discretion to order that Doherty be deported to the
United Kingdom and to reject his pleas for asylum.
I. BACKGROUND
The struggle for Irish independence and unity has involved a long-
standing dispute between Great Britain and Ireland, a dispute which pre-
dates present concerns about international terrorism. Thus, this Article
begins with a review of the events that led to the struggle and the reasons
why the conflict has proven intractable.
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Ireland was originally settled by Celtic tribes who converted to
Christianity in the Fifth Century. From the time of Saint Patrick (c.
A.D. 450), the majority of Ireland's citizens have been Catholic.
England has exercised an ongoing role in Irish affairs since 1171, when
King Henry II successfully invaded Dublin and thereafter controlled the
surrounding area. The British presence in the northern province of
Ulster dates from 1610, when King James I encouraged Scottish
Presbyterians-and to a lesser extent, English Episcopalians-to settle
there on confiscated lands, as a means of ensuring the region's loyalty to
the crown. These Protestant colonists eventually formed a majority of
the population in Ulster, the part of Ireland that lies closest to Scotland.'
During the twentieth century, Ireland's two religious cultures have
clashed repeatedly over the issue of partition.3 In sectarian terms, the
dilemma is whether the Catholics in the north of the island should be the
minority in a partitioned and Protestant-controlled state, or whether the
northern Protestants should be the minority in a unified and Catholic-
dominated state. In political terms, the dispute has pitted the descend-
ants of the native Irish, who favor an undivided Ireland and are known
as "nationalists" and "republicans," against the descendants of the sev-
enteenth century colonists whose cultural roots lie in Scotland or
England, and who are known as "loyalists" and "unionists." Each side
fears discrimination if labeled the minority. Violence has erupted as the
parties have been unable to resolve the impasse through peaceful means.4
A. Partition, 1912-1925
The Kingdoms of England and Ireland were formally joined in 1801
through the Act of Union.5 Following unsuccessful efforts in 1886 and
2. [T~he figure of eight hundred years [of Irish oppression by the English]-
dating the beginning of suffering from the Norman Conquest of Ireland toward
the end of the twelfth century-is a hollow piece of propaganda. The medieval
Irish probably suffered no more and no less from the Norman Conquest than
the medieval English did. Ireland's real and special troubles began in the late-
sixteenth century, when the native Irish began to pay the price of backing the
Counter-Reformation-and the deposition of heretic princes-against the
Reformation sovereigns of England and Scotland.
Conor C. O'Brien, The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism 329 (1986).
3. For our purposes, partition refers to a religious community's demand for a polit-
ical entity in which it will be dominant. In addition to Northern Ireland, partition was
imposed in two other instances where British colonial presence had been withdrawn: In-
dia was partitioned to create Pakistan in 1947, and Palestine was partitioned to create
Israel in 1948. A high level of political violence has been a common denominator in all
three cases.
4. See Thomas P. Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom: The Dilemma of
Northern Ireland, 8 Yale J. World Pub. Ord. 284, 285-86 (1981-1982).
5. Following the defeat of Wolfe Tone's Rebellion in 1798, Great Britain was forced
to tighten its ties with Ireland in the name of strategic security and political efficiency.
The Act of Union, which took effect on January 1, 1801, joined Great Britain and Ireland
"forever" in one United Kingdom. It also abolished the Irish Parliament and gave
Ireland a representation of 100 members in the British Parliament. See 15 Encyclopedia
Americana 414 (1991) ("[Flewj] foresaw what a weapon this measure would be in the
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1893, Irish nationalists finally persuaded Parliament, in 1912, to enact a
limited form of home rule legislation.6 Protestant unionists from
Ireland's northern counties opposed the law and threatened civil war un-
less the legislation was amended to exclude them. The British Army
balked at enforcing the legislation, and Parliament was unable to agree
on whether or how to revise it. Parliament found a convenient excuse for
postponing the law's implementation in the 1914 outbreak of World War1.7
Irish nationalists nevertheless desired full independence from Britain,
rather than mere home rule, and thus became impatient with the delay.
Their first rebellion, the Easter Rising of 1916, was swiftly crushed. Be-
ginning in 1919, the Irish nationalists fought a fierce guerrilla war against
the British security forces. A truce was declared in July 1921.
In December 1920, pursuant to the Government of Ireland Act (the
"GIA"), the British Parliament formally partitioned Ireland. The GIA
set up a mechanism for home rule through two Irish parliaments (north-
ern and southern), which were to be subordinate to Westminster. The
southern parliament, to be located in Dublin, was to govern twenty-six
counties, and the northern parliament, to be located in Belfast, was to
govern six counties. The GIA allowed for the possibility of Irish reunifi-
cation upon agreement by the two parliaments. Yet, only the northern
parliament became a reality, as the rest of Ireland went its own way to-
wards independence.'
Late in 1921, Irish representatives were invited to London to discuss
hands of Wolfe Tone's heirs. The act of union carried Ireland's political, economic, so-
cial, and religious problems into the heart of British political life, and Irish issues [and]
. . . Irish members of parliament helped to defeat numerous ministries in the 19th
century.").
6. The Irish nationalists were joined by British Liberals but opposed by British
Conservatives.
7. See Robert Kee, Ireland, A History 145-51 (1980); J. J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985:
Politics and Society 6-24 (1989).
8. See Lee, supra note 7, at 43-47. "The border was chosen explicitly to provide
unionists with as much territory as they could safely control. Its objective was not to
separate unionists and nationalists in order to enable them to live peaceably apart],] [but]
... was instead to ensure Protestant supremacy over Catholics even in predominantly
Catholic areas." Id. at 45-46.
The Irish found it difficult to agree on a name for the gerrymandered territory. ("Ger-
rymandering" is defined as the act of dividing a state, county, etc., "into voting districts
to give unfair advantage to one party in elections." The American Heritage Dictionary
553 (1981)). As the territory embraced only six of the nine counties in the ancient prov-
ince of Ulster, it could not correctly be called Ulster. Nor was "Northern" Ireland a
truly accurate name, as County Donegal, the northernmost part of Ireland, remained
with the 26 southern counties. Therefore, nationalists referred to the area as "the six
counties," "the north," "the north of Ireland," or "occupied Ireland," and continue to do
so today.
Note that Scotland and Wales, the other parts of the United Kingdom, have never had
their own home rule parliaments, although the demand for such autonomy recently arose
during the 1992 British national election campaign. The Labor party favored devolution
while the Tories opposed it as Balkanization.
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how Irish national aspirations could best be harmonized with British in-
terests. After lengthy negotiations, the Irish were given an ultimatum:
sign an agreement or face war with England in three days.9 This ultima-
tum resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on December 6, 1921,
which recognized the internal sovereignty of the twenty-six southern
counties in return for their acceptance of partition for the six northern
counties. The twenty-six southern counties became the Irish Free State,
a member of the British Commonwealth, which held dominion status
then equivalent to Canada and Australia. The six northern counties that
opted out of the Irish Free State remained with Britain as Northern
Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom with its own home rule govern-
ment. A strong nationalist minority in the south opposed the Anglo-
Irish Treaty and waged an unsuccessful civil war against the Irish Free
State from 1922 until 1923.10
In December 1925, a boundary agreement (the "Boundary Agree-
ment") among the Irish Free State, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland
legitimized partition as an accomplished fact. The Boundary Agreement
was subsequently filed with the League of Nations as an international
treaty, and the partition issue, which until then had been in dispute, be-
came settled as a matter of law.11
On a practical level, however, partition has remained unacceptable to
Irish nationalists. Notwithstanding the Boundary Agreement, articles 2
and 3 of the 1937 Constitution of the Irish Free State (the "Irish Consti-
tution") proclaim sovereignty over the whole of Ireland. 12 In addition,
the Irish Constitution regards every person born in Ireland, north and
south, as an Irish citizen.
13
In 1949, the Irish Free State declared itself the Republic of Ireland and
9. See Sean Cronin, Washington's Irish Policy: 1916-1986, at 39-40 (1987); Lee,
supra note 7, at 50.
10. See Kee, supra note 7, at 191-93; Lee, supra note 7, at 47-55.
11. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 46; Kee, supra note 7, at 202; Lee, supra note 7, at
140-50.
Northern Ireland encompasses one-sixth of the island of Ireland. Its population is
approximately 60% Protestant and 40% Catholic. In contrast, the Republic of Ireland,
which occupies the remaining five-sixths of the island, is currently about 93% Catholic
and 7% Protestant.
12. Article 3 of the 1937 Constitution, however, confines the exercise of power to the
26 southern counties of Ireland "[p]ending the reintegration of the national territory."
Ir. Const. art. III.
13. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 53; Kee, supra note 7, at 217; Lee, supra note 7, at
202. The Irish Republic's assertion of sovereignty over the entire island would come to
play a key role in Doherty's deportation case. Although born a British subject in
Northern Ireland, Doherty also had the right to claim citizenship in the Republic of
Ireland. See infra part IV.A.
According to Irish nationalists, Britain's claim to sovereignty over Ireland has been
steadfastly rejected by the Irish for centuries; the British have always been viewed by the
Irish as an occupying force; Britain was compelled to relinquish military and political
occupation of the greater part of Ireland by force of arms (1916-1921); and partition-
which was imposed by Britain, not negotiated-has never been sanctioned or accepted by
the Irish. See Sean MacBride, Remarks to National Press Club, Nov. 2, 1985, reprinted
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left the British Commonwealth. Britain recognized its independence
through the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949, but cautioned that "'in no
event [would] Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part... of
the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern
Ireland.' ,,14
B. The Troubles
In the decades that followed partition, the north's sizeable Catholic
minority became second-class citizens in a Protestant enclave run for
Protestants."5 As a result, the minority began a non-violent civil rights
movement in the late 1960s. Its principal grievances were that the
Protestant majority was gerrymandering, 16 and discriminating in the al-
location of housing and job opportunities.
The government of Northern Ireland equated the call for civil rights
with "republicanism," asserting that the movement was aimed at under-
mining its constitutional position within the United Kingdom. Thus, the
government refused most of the movement's demands. To make matters
worse, the overwhelmingly Protestant security forces did little to shield
the Catholic demonstrators from violent attacks by elements of the
Protestant majority.
By August 1969, the government of Northern Ireland could no longer
control the streets. It asked the British government for military assist-
ance to restore order. British troops were initially welcomed in the
Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast. However, this enthusiasm waned
over the next two years, as British troops began conducting widespread
general house searches, and as "internment without trial" was intro-
duced under the Special Powers Act."7 On January 30, 1972 ("Bloody
Sunday"), British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed demonstrators
during a civil rights march. Bloody Sunday effectively put an end to
peaceful protest.
As Catholic reaction to the British troops turned from welcome to sus-
in 131 Cong. Rec. E4987 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1985) (extension of remarks by Congressman
Biaggi).
14. Lee, supra note 7, at 300-01 (quoting from the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949);
see Cronin, supra note 9, at 218.
15. See Kee, supra note 7, at 237, 239; Lee, supra note 7, at 433. In 1922, the Special
Powers Act was adopted as emergency legislation in order to deal with political violence
in Northern Ireland. The Act provided police with broad powers to search and arrest, to
intern suspects without trial, to seize property, and to bar publications and demonstra-
tions. It remained in effect until 1973, and, throughout the years it was in effect, it was
employed principally against the Catholic minority.
16. See supra note 8.
17. As a result of British mistreatment of internees, the Republic of Ireland success-
fully prosecuted the United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. In 1978, the Court found the United Kingdom guilty of inflicting "inhuman
and degrading treatment" on the internees in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67
(1978).
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picion, and then to hatred, the Irish Republican Army (the "IRA") was
reborn. The IRA had been an active protagonist in the early years of the
armed conflict for a unified Ireland," s and had reemerged from time to
time thereafter. 9 The IRA had been dormant as a military force since
1962, when it shifted its emphasis towards social policy and even consid-
ered participation in electoral politics.20 In January 1970, the IRA split
into two factions: the "official" IRA, which advocated a united socialist
Ireland but disavowed terrorism, and the "provisional" IRA (the
"PIRA"), which went underground and endorsed attacks on the
Northern Ireland and British security forces as a necessary step to
achieving unification.2 Before long, the PIRA was engaging in guerrilla
warfare against the British security forces and the Protestant paramili-
tary groups of Northern Ireland.22 This conflict eventually spread to
18. The "early years" of the conflict spanned from 1919 through 1923.
19. In 1949, the IRA was little more than a bogey to mobilize Unionist voters in
the North .... In 1954, the raids on British Army barracks began. On 12
December 1956, a military campaign opened in the North. These activities
grew out of the [Republic of] Ireland Act [of 1949]. They could not have oc-
curred otherwise. The political climate made them possible. The [Republic of]
Ireland Act made them inevitable.
Cronin, supra note 9, at 272, 274; see also Jack Holland, The American Connection: U.S.
Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland 75-76 (1987):
By 1960 the IRA's border campaign was petering out .... A combination of
factors contributed to its failure. The Unionist government [in the north] intro-
duced internment ... [and] the Dublin government [in the south did] likewise,
rounding up almost the entire [IRA] leadership .... Added to this was the
obvious indifference of Northern Ireland's Catholics to the proclaimed struggle
for freedom. Though the attacks continued for another two years, they were
little more than an irritant to the authorities .... Finally, in 1962, the IRA
command called a halt.
20. See Lee, supra note 7, at 432-33.
21. The PIRA is committed to fighting a long war and aims to sicken Britain into
withdrawing from Northern Ireland. In addition to reunification of the north and south
of Ireland, the PIRA "advocate[s] the overthrow of the Government of the [Irish]
Republic and the establishment of an extreme leftist socialist state for the entire island."
Francis W. O'Brien, Irish Terrorists and Extradition: The Tuite Case, 18 Tex. Int'l L.J.
249, 254 n.22 (1983).
The PIRA's plans strike some observers as nebulous:
[The PIRA] is fighting more for its own ascendancy than for the reunification of
Ireland or even for the redress of grievances for the minority of Northern
Ireland. It provides no solution and no program for a new republic, only a
mishmash of Marxism, romanticized nationalism, a selective reading of history
and utter disregard for life.
Ireland's Outlaw Army, America, Nov. 3, 1984, at 265 (editorial). However, in support of
its notion that terrorism against the British will eventually work, the PIRA points to the
Jewish extremists of the mid-1940s, who believed that the shortest route to persuading
the demoralized British to abandon their mandate over Palestine, to expelling Palestine's
Arabs, and to establishing a Jewish state was through violence. See Cronin, supra note 9,
at 272; O'Brien, supra note 2, at 267-68, 275, 281-82.
22. Although the PIRA is the best known paramilitary group in Northern Ireland,
with several hundred members and several thousand sympathizers, it is not the only ac-
tive paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. A second, smaller republican organization,
known as the Irish National Liberation Army, is also committed to achieving a united
socialist Ireland through violence. The largest and most widely known unionist paramili-
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other parts of the United Kingdom and to British targets on the Euro-
pean mainland. As a result, civilians have suffered heavy casualties.
In March 1972, Britain effectively suspended parliamentary govern-
ment within Northern Ireland. From that time to the present, the
British government has administered Northern Ireland from London, as
it had done prior to 1921. The British Parliament has also enacted sev-
eral pieces of emergency legislation that radically altered the criminal
justice system in Northern Ireland.' 3
At the Sunningdale Conference, in 1973, the British and Irish govern-
ments tried, once again, to resolve their political and diplomatic differ-
ences over Northern Ireland. Among other things, the Sunningdale
Agreement of December 9, 1973, called for the Protestant and Catholics
in the north to begin power-sharing; it also provided for a north-south
dialogue through a Council of Ireland. 4 The Irish Republic pledged to
accept Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom until a
majority of the north's population desired a change in that status. In
return, the British promised support if, in the future, a majority in the
tary groups are the Ulster Defense Association, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the
Ulster Freedom Fighters.
At its high point in 1972, the British Army had 22,000 soldiers stationed in Northern
Ireland. As of January 31, 1991, some 10,600 regular army troops remained in service in
Northern Ireland. See Human Rights in Northern Ireland, Helsinki Watch Rep., 1991, at
45 [hereinafter Human Rights in Northern Ireland].
23. In 1973, the British Parliament replaced the Special Powers Act in Northern
Ireland with the Emergency Provisions Act, and in 1974, it adopted the Prevention of
Terrorism Act, which is effective throughout the United Kingdom. These emergency
acts provide the authorities with extensive powers to deal with the unrest in Northern
Ireland, including: (1) the power to stop and search people; (2) the power to arrest,
detain, and interrogate suspects for up to seven days without a criminal charge and with-
out an appearance before a judge; (3) the power to search residences without prior judi-
cial authorization; and (4) the power to detain people by executive order-also known as
internment-which was utilized from 1971 to 1976. The legislation also declared certain
paramilitary organizations illegal and made membership in them a criminal offense, sus-
pended trial by jury for certain scheduled offenses, and set a lower-than-normal standard
for the admissibility of confessions. See Human Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note
22, at 2-4. For Doherty, the most important change involved non-jury trials in so-called
"Diplock" courts.
When, in 1985, members of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee
inquired about the emergency provisions, British apologists defended by pointing to Pres-
ident Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil War,
see Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), and to the internment of Japanese-
American citizens during World War II. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
24. The notion of a Council of Ireland, permitting representatives of the two Irish
parliaments to discuss common problems, first surfaced in the GOI Act of 1920 and
carried over to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. But see Cronin, supra note 9, at 47 ("The
Unionists did not want it... [and] [i]t never met."). The Sunningdale Agreement also
provided for a Council of Ireland, but "[i]t was quickly discarded, of course, as a sop to
Unionism." Id at 326; see also Lee, supra note 7, at 447 (characterizing as "misguided"
the Council of Ireland clause in the Sunningdale Agreement).
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north wished to become part of a united Ireland." Yet, as was the case
from 1912 through 1914, the northern unionists refused to take any steps
that might lead to a united Ireland. Election returns in February 1974
emboldened the Protestant community into resisting the Sunningdale
Agreement, and a unionist general strike in May 1974 effectively ended
the experiment in power-sharing.
C. The American Perspective
The United States has consistently maintained friendly diplomatic re-
lations with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
When called upon to "choose sides" in British-Irish conflicts, however,
American administrations tend to view Irish issues through British
eyes.
26
The United States' tendency to side with the United Kingdom is
rooted in a strong alliance that exists between the two countries on a
wide range of issues27 and in the Irish Republic's reluctance to align itself
with the two countries on significant matters.28 To a lesser degree, the
American affinity for the British point of view also stems from an ab-
sence of any significant solidarity on "Irish" issues among the thirty to
forty million Americans who claim Irish ancestry.29 At best, Irish-
Americans have generated a modest degree of support for particular ini-
tiatives in Congress but have ceded the inside track at the White House
and the State Department to the British Foreign Office. Further, Irish-
Americans are aware that the United States is a nation of Anglophiles,
and thus they are divided over whether a moderate posture on "Irish"
issues will produce more favorable results than an aggressive stance.30
25. Both governments also pledged to cooperate against terrorism with border secur-
ity initiatives and the punishment of fugitive offenders.
26. See 138 Cong. Rec. H451 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1992) (extension of remarks by Con-
gressman Engel) ("When it comes to Ireland, American policy is made in London, not at
the State Department."); Cronin, supra note 9, at 12.
27. See Holland, supra note 19, at 116 ("Two world wars and a host of common
global interests have fastened the Anglo-American partnership with stronger bonds than
most Irish or Irish Americans care to admit."); Ronald Reagan, An American Life 357
(1990) ("Throughout the eight years of my presidency, no alliance we had was stronger
than the one between the United States and the United Kingdom.").
28. Ireland's neutrality during World War II and its post-war refusal to join the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization are two obvious examples.
29. In fact, on behalf of "Irish" issues, the Irish-American community has never been
able to muster the same domestic political clout that African-Americans have brought to
bear on issues relating to South African apartheid, or that Jewish-Americans have
demonstrated on core issues affecting Israel.
30. On the "aggressive" end of the spectrum are groups like the Irish Northern Aid
Committee ("NORAID"), lobbies like the Irish National Caucus, and legislative
caucuses like the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee on Irish Affairs. Their agenda in-
cludes a campaign to reverse the State Department policy banning IRA and Sinn Fein
representatives from visiting the United States, and to persuade Congress to hold open
hearings on British rule in Northern Ireland. More recently, they have advocated the
MacBride Fair Employment Principles for American companies doing business in
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From the beginning of the troubles in 1969, United States policy has
focused on American neutrality, stressing the need for the Irish and
British governments to work out a solution on their own. For example,
in 1972-following Bloody Sunday-the Foreign Minister of the Irish
Republic came to Washington seeking help. Yet, United States Secretary
of State William Rogers refused to become involved, even though scat-
tered voices on Capitol Hill called for hearings on the matter."1
In 1977, American policy added a new dimension. In an effort to iso-
late the IRA's American supporters and to stem the flow of money and
weapons across the Atlantic, several United States officials spoke out
against the violence in Northern Ireland. On March 17, 1977, four
United States politicians of Irish descent-House Speaker Thomas A.
("Tip") O'Neill, Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, and New York Governor Hugh Carey-issued a statement
appealing for an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, condemning
funding by Americans for the IRA, and urging American government
financial aid for peace. 32
Northern Ireland, and they have monitored the expenditure of funds under the Anglo-
Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986.
The "moderates" favor the same approach as the government of the Republic of
Ireland. Its strategy is: first, to counteract any pro-IRA influence in Washington; and,
second, to use the United States government as an intermediary to persuade the British
government to adopt a more conciliatory stance in Northern Ireland. See Holland, supra
note 19, at 131 ("To the Irish authorities it was more important that the IRA be given no
opportunity to enhance its credibility than that the British be criticized for their viola-
tions of human rights."). From 1977 through 1986, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, was most receptive to this approach. The
Speaker's group (see infra note 32 and accompanying text, referring to the "Four Horse-
men of the Apocalypse") began in 1977 and expanded its membership in 1981 to become
the Friends of Ireland in Congress. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 318, 320, 322; Holland,
supra note 19, at 123, 142-43.
More often than not, the moderates have outmaneuvered their more aggressive coun-
terparts, who have proven vulnerable to allegations that the IRA is duping them into
supporting the cause of violence.
31. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 303-06; Tad Szulc, U.S Bars Intenention In ULster,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1972, at A2.
32. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 313; Bernard Weinraub, Four Top Democrats Urge
Halt in SupportforLR.A, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1977, at A22. Opponents who favored a
more aggressive strategy promptly dubbed these politicians "the Four Horsemen [of the
Apocalypse]."
In the years that followed, it was determined that the Irish Northern Aid Committee
(NORAID) was the IRA's "agent" within the meaning of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended. See 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1988); Attorney Gen. v.
Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241, 255-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 159 (2d
Cir. 1982); see also Attorney Gen. v. Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(remanding to District Court for determination of whether Irish-oriented publication was
so aligned with Irish Northern Aid Committee as to require registration as a foreign
agent); Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp 1384 (S.D.N.Y.) (enjoining
and directing agent of foreign principal to produce books and records for inspection,
holding that such inspection did not abridge agent's First Amendment rights), aff'd
mer., 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
American donations to the PIRA through NORAID have been estimated at less than
$250,000 a year. See John Brecher, The IRA's Angels, Newsweek, May 18, 1981, at 53;
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On August 30, 1977, United States President Jimmy Carter followed
up with a policy statement, noting America's close ties with "both parts
of Ireland and with Great Britain," and emphasizing that "[v]iolence
cannot resolve Northern Ireland's problems. ' 33 President Carter urged
Americans "to refrain from supporting with financial or other aid" any
organizations that were involved in the violence, and he placed the
United States "firmly on the side of those who seek peace and reject vio-
lence in Northern Ireland."34 Ronald Reagan voiced similar themes,
both as a presidential candidate in 1980"s and as President in 1983.36
Thus, for Doherty, the political and diplomatic climate in which the
Doherty Case arose could hardly have been less favorable. Although
Irish nationalists were concerned about partition, their grievances were
poorly understood within the United States; 37 American policy concern-
ing British-Irish conflicts often favored the British; and American presi-
dents, regardless of their political affiliations, had unequivocally
condemned the violence in Northern Ireland. Notwithstanding his Irish
heritage, President Reagan supported Prime Minister Margaret
Does U.S. Money Finance IRA Terror?, U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 26, 1981, at 5;
Passing the Hat for the Provos, Time, Nov. 26, 1979, at 92; Steven Strasser et al., The
IRA's Money Crisis, Newsweek, July 31, 1978, at 33. Moreover, three Supreme Court
Justices have characterized NORAID as "a shoestring operation." Irish N. Aid Comm.
v. Attorney Gen., 409 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Nevertheless, condemnation of NORAID has guided America's Northern
Ireland policy for 15 years.
33. Northern Ireland: Statement on U.S. Policy, 1977 Pub. Papers 1524 (1978) [here-
inafter Statement on U.S. Policy].
34. Id.; see Cronin, supra note 9, at 312-13. President Carter stated that American
policy on Northern Ireland "ha[d] long been one of impartiality" and would not change,
adding that "[tihe only permanent solution will come from the people who live [in
Northern Ireland]." Statement on U.S. Policy, supra note 33, at 1524. The President
pledged, however, that "the U.S. Government would be prepared to join with others to
see how additional job-creating investment could be encouraged, to the benefit of all the
people of Northern Ireland," in the event of a peaceful solution. Id.
President Carter's emphasis on job creation aptly recognizes that financial considera-
tions, as opposed to ideological concerns, may now be the key to solving the troubles in
Northern Ireland. The Belfast area is no longer economically robust, as it was from 1912
through 1914, and Northern Ireland now represents a net drain on the British economy.
Yet, if the British were to withdraw from Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic would be
in no position to match the British financial commitment. Thus, the cry for unification in
the Irish Republic has been muted, and the prospect of American foreign aid looms large.
See infra notes 162, 204, and accompanying text.
35. See Cronin, supra note 9, at 319-20 (attributing to the presidential campaign of
candidate Ronald Reagan the statement that "extradition procedures should not be re-
laxed on the grounds that these are 'political' prisoners," and quoting Mr. Reagan as
having "no views on Irish unity").
36. President Reagan stated: "Those who advocate or engage in violence and terror-
ism should find no welcome in the United States. We condemn all such acts and oppose
the forces of discord in Northern Ireland." Statement on St. Patrick's Day and the Situa-
tion in Northern Ireland, 1983 Pub. Papers 405 (1984).
37. The Department of State viewed the partition of Ireland as being settled since
1925.
THE DOHERTY CASE
Thatcher's anti-terrorist initiatives against the PIRA.38 That Doherty
was able to carry on an extradition and deportation struggle in the Amer-
ican courts for close to nine years should be evaluated in this context.
D. Underlying Events
Joe Doherty was born in Belfast in 1955, and joined the PIRA at age
seventeen. In the mid-1970s, Doherty was convicted for possession of
firearms, possession of eighty pounds of explosives, and prison-breaking
with intent to escape. He served six years in custody and was released in
December 1979.
1. May 2, 1980: Murder or Death in Combat?39
In 1980, convoys of military vehicles frequently travelled Antrim
Road in North Belfast, a road that connected the sites of two large
British Army installations. Their activity made the convoys a target for
38. On his 1984 "roots" pilgrimage to Ireland, President Reagan spoke out against
violence and terrorism on several occasions. See eg., Visit to Ireland, the United
Kingdom, and France, Dep't St. Bull., August 1984, at 8 ("IT]hose who advocate violence
or engage in terrorism in North[ern] Ireland will never be welcome in the United States."
(quoting President Reagan's June 1, 1984 arrival remarks at Shannon Airport)); Id. at 16:
[Tihere is no place for the crude, cowardly violence of terrorism-not in
Britain, not in Ireland, not in Northern Ireland. All sides should have one goal
before them, and let us state it simply and directly: to end the violence, to end it
completely, and to end it now.
(quoting President Reagan's June 4, 1984 Address to the Irish Parliament); see also
Holland, supra note 19, at 240 (asserting that Reagan's ideological identification with
Margaret Thatcher "was a particularly touchy matter for Reagan's Irish-American sup-
porters, especially those who regarded themselves as pro-nationalist. To even suggest to
such people that Reagan and Thatcher were ideological partners was tantamount to
treason.").
Thatcher's attitude toward 'The Troubles' is rooted in her own strong unionist
sentiment and, to a lesser extent, her childhood training as a conservative
Methodist. Her attitude has also been shaped by an abhorrence of terrorism
and, in particular, the painful murder of Airey Neave [shadow minister who
would have been Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in Thatcher's govern-
ment] in March 1979. His killing instilled an absolute hatred of the IRA in her,
which the Brighton bombing [of October 1984] only intensified. . . . For
Thatcher, the debate [about Northern Ireland] is mechanistic unless her soldiers
are being blown up. She is not affected by the marshalling of historical argu-
ment as it is applied to Ireland. She has little feel for history generally and even
less for Irish history.... The nuances and cultural aspects of the debate have
thus never been part of her ken, nor the rights and wrongs of the Reformation
period, nor the civil war that resulted in partition.
Chris Ogden, Maggie, An Intimate Portrait Of a Woman In Power 217, 219 (1990); see
also Hugo Young, The Iron Lady, A Biography of Margaret Thatcher 464-75 (1989)
(discussing Thatcher's personal influence over Irish foreign policy).
39. This section summarizes facts that were drawn from Doherty's testimony at his
extradition hearing. See Transcript of Hearing (Apr. 2, 1984) at 636-46, 783-818, In re
Doherty, No. 83 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Extradition Transcript].
Except for minor details, Doherty's account was not seriously disputed by the
government. See also Martin Dillon, Killer in Clowntown: Joe Doherty, The IRA, and
the Special Relationship 83-104 (1992) (describing events of May 2, 1980).
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the PIRA's snipers, who planned to ambush the convoys at a traffic sig-
nal along the way. A three-story apartment building that overlooked the
intersection was chosen as the site of the engagement. Although a family
resided on the first floor of the building, the upper two stories were
vacant.
A PIRA active service unit, comprised of Doherty and three other
men, attempted to carry out the planned attack on May 2, 1980. One
member of the unit was armed with a pistol and remained in the first-
floor apartment with its four occupants.'4  The other three men-armed
with a rifle, an American-made M-60 machine gun,4" and other weap-
ons-prepared for the attack from the top two floors. A hijacked van,
intended for use as a getaway vehicle, was parked at the rear of the
building.42
After several hours had passed and no British convoys had been spot-
ted on Antrim Road, the PIRA unit became concerned. But, as the unit
considered abandoning the operation, a car pulled to a sudden stop in
front of the building and five men, dressed in civilian clothing, quickly
emerged.4 3 Several were carrying automatic weapons and one had a
sledge hammer. All were wearing fluorescent arm bands. These men
were members of the Special Air Service ("SAS"), an elite commando
unit of the British Army, and they had been tipped-off to the PIRA's
plan. As the British assault team stormed the building, the two sides
began firing. British Army Captain Herbert Richard Westmacott was
shot and killed in the exchange. 4"
40. Doherty stated that the members of the family occupying the first floor of the
building were in no way involved with the purpose of the operation, were not mistreated,
and were not used as shields. See Extradition Transcript, supra note 39, at 638, 794.
Although these individuals were held against their will and exposed to considerable risk
in the gun battle that followed, Doherty was never charged with any offenses relating to
them. See infra note 86.
41. The machine gun was one of seven that had been smuggled to the PIRA in
Northern Ireland after being stolen, in August 1976, from the National Guard Armory in
Danvers, Massachusetts. See Andrew Blake, U.S. Judge Bars Use Of Extradition Pact On
Ex-IRA Member, Boston Globe, July 24, 1991, at 9.
Efforts to stem the flow of weapons to Northern Ireland have long been a cornerstone
in America's policy towards Northern Ireland. See Andrew Blake, The Guns of Ireland
and the American Connection, Boston Globe, Nov. 26, 1978, Magazine, at 10, 60. In fact,
participants in the smuggling of arms to Northern Ireland have consistently been prose-
cuted by the United States. See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989);
United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Cahalane, 560 F.2d
601 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
42. See Extradition Transcript, supra note 39, at 792-93. The van's owner was de-
tained by the PIRA at another location for most of the day. See id. at 793.
43. A government attorney at Doherty's extradition hearing expressed some skepti-
cism that experienced British troops would foolishly park their car underneath a window
where the PIRA could shoot at them with a machine gun. Doherty explained: "[W]hen
[the British troops] got their information that morning about the house, they must have
underestimated the fire power." Id. at 807. Doherty also testified that the British ini-
tially attacked the wrong house. See id. at 811.
44. Captain Westmacott, age 28, was from Chichester, Sussex, England. He was a
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The British commandos then attempted to enter the building, but the
PIRA volunteers fired shots through the front door. As the PIRA unit
scrambled upstairs to defend against an expected second assault, the
British sought cover behind a stone wall separating the yard from the
street and awaited further assistance.
More SAS commandos appeared at the rear of the building. Eventu-
ally, the entire block was surrounded by more than 100 soldiers and po-
licemen. After a lengthy standoff, the PIRA hung a white flag out the
window and negotiated terms of surrender.45 The four members of the
PIRA unit were arrested as they emerged from the building."
Doherty and the other three members of the PIRA unit were taken to
an interrogation center and questioned three times a day for seven days.47
They were then charged with murdering the British officer, attempted
murder, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and illegal mem-
bership in the PIRA, a proscribed organization. The non-jury trial was
held in Belfast Crown Court and lasted for six weeks. Within the United
Kingdom, the case was dubbed the "M-60 Machine-Gun Case," because
the same weapon that had been used to kill Captain Westmacott had also
been involved in PIRA attacks on other members of the security forces in
February and April 1980.48 In early June 1981, the trial was completed
graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, and his parent regiment was the
Grenadier Guards. He left behind a widow and a seven-month old daughter. Captain
Westmacott was posthumously awarded the Military Cross for his actions on May 2,
1980.
British newspapers, bound by the strictures of the Official Secrets Act, reported with-
out elaboration that Captain Westmacott had been shot while engaging in "undercover
work." Niedermayer: 3 Charged, The Times (London), May 4, 1980, at 1. The
Captain's SAS affiliation was not acknowledged until later. Further, the record did not
establish which side fired first or which member of the PIRA unit fired the fatal shot.
45. See Extradition Transcript, supra note 39, at 642-44. Doherty testified that, in
exchange for their surrender, the PIRA officer in command requested that a priest be
brought "'round to the house ... to be a witness in case we were assassinated."' Id at
644. According to Doherty, the police and the army agreed to comply with this request,
but said "it would take about 15 minutes." Id
46. Doherty's description of the scene outside the building was as follows:
There was [sic] armored personnel carriers, there was [sic] jeeps, and whatnot.
Behind that there was a very large crowd which seemed to be a nationalist and
republican crowd, with neighbors singing and cheering and sort of trying to get
our morale up.... I put my fist up and I said "up the IRA."
Id at 645.
47. See id. at 646. Under the British emergency laws, authorities have the right to
interrogate suspects for up to seven days without filing criminal charges and without an
appearance before a judge. See Human Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note 22, at 3.
48. There was no evidence that Doherty had personally participated in the February
or April 1980 attacks, and he was not charged with those offenses. In fact, there was no
evidence that Doherty had violated any laws at all during the period from December
1979 (when he was released from prison) until May 2, 1980.
One of the factors that made Doherty's case a difficult one for the American courts was
that he did not fit neatly into the definition of a modem terrorist. See Dillon, supra note
39, at 243. "[Doherty] was not known to be guilty of shooting or bombing civilians,
attacks on economic targets or the murder of politicians.... The soldier he killed was no
ordinary soldier, but an officer in a highly efficient counter-terrorist regiment with a dubi-
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and the proceedings were adjourned to allow the judge time to review the
evidence.
2. June 10, 1981: Doherty Escapes
The spring of 1981 was a period of considerable tension inside the
northern prison system. This was the time of the hunger strikes, when
ten prisoners would starve themselves to death to protest a British deci-
sion stripping republican inmates of the "special category" (i.e., prisoner
of war) status that had been previously accorded them.49 On April 10,
1981, Bobby Sands, the first of the hunger strikers, had been elected to
the British House of Commons amid considerable international public-
ity.50 Moreover, national elections in the Irish Republic had been called
for June 11, 1981, and several prisoners in northern jails were on the
Irish Republic's ballot.5 By mid-May 1981, four hunger strikers had
died within sixteen days. In the midst of this volatile political climate,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Belfast and opined
that the PIRA might well be playing its "last card."52
The Prime Minister's prediction proved inaccurate. On June 10, 1981,
after the M-60 Machine-Gun trial was completed, but before a verdict
had been handed down by the court, Doherty and seven other republican
prisoners broke out of the Crumlin Road Jail. 53 The escape began at
ous history." Id. According to Dillon, "[t]he SAS frequently ambushed IRA active ser-
vice units and rarely took prisoners." Id at 81. For more information about the
controversial role of the SAS in Northern Ireland, see generally Raymond Murray, The
SAS in Ireland (1990).
49. See generally David Beresford, Ten Men Dead, The Story of the 1981 Irish
Hunger Strike (1987) (detailing the hunger strike). The hunger strike began on March 1,
1981, and continued until October 3, 1981. See Lee, supra note 7, at 454. One author
characterized the British response to the hunger strike as "inept to the point of criminal-
ity" and noted that "[the strike] threatened to endanger the political stability not only of
Northern Ireland, but [also] of the Republic [of Ireland], where emotions ran high." Id.
50. See Beresford, supra note 49, at 84-85.
51. John Conroy, Belfast Diary: War as a Way of Life 186 (1987).
52. Id. at 181.
That spring, Margaret Thatcher replaced Ian Paisley as the greatest recruiter
the IRA had ever known. Seemingly oblivious to her role as the great ag-
gravator, she breezed into Belfast on a surprise visit on Thursday, May 28. She
strolled around the demilitarized shopping zone, had lunch at Stormont Castle,
talked with government ministers, gave interviews to television reporters, and
flew back to London in early evening.
In her wake, she left a furious people.
Id.
53. The summary of Doherty's escape is drawn from the following books and news
reports: Beresford, supra note 49, at 191-93; Dillon, supra note 39, at 124-47; Atkins
Stresses Gravity Of Ulster Gaol Break-Out And Sets Up Top-Level Inquiry, Manchester
Guardian, June 12, 1981, at 19 [hereinafterAtkins]; Colin Brown & Paul Keel, Solicitors
Still Held After IRA Escape, Manchester Guardian, June 12, 1991, at 1; Richard Ford,
Guns Blaze As Eight Burst From Belfast Jail, The Times (London), June 11, 1981, at 1;
Richard Ford, Solicitors Held Under Terrorism Act After Belfast Jailbreak, The Times
(London), June 12, 1981, at 2 [hereinafter Solicitors Held]; Paul Keel, Top IRA Men
Shoot Their Way Out Of High Security Gaol, Manchester Guardian, June 11, 1981, at 1;
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approximately 4:15 P.M.-when afternoon visiting hours were ending-
in an interview room where the eight prisoners had been meeting with
their solicitors. The prisoners had divided themselves into small groups
and were occupying three cubicles. Three prisoners, using handguns that
had somehow been smuggled into the jail, forced ten unarmed guards
and the solicitors into a corner. While one armed prisoner stood vigil,
four others forced the guards to turn over their uniforms.
The escapees then split into two groups and began to make their way
from the interview room to the main gate. Four wore the guards'
uniforms they had appropriated; the others were holding guards as hos-
tages or shields. The first group encountered few problems. They bluffed
their way through three interior check points, out the main gate, and into
a parking lot where PIRA drivers were waiting. But the second group of
four met more resistance. They were challenged in the prison yard by
fifteen to twenty unarmed guards, and a skirmish ensued. Some of the
guards were beaten, and eventually retreated once the prisoners fired
shots at them. Two guards were later hospitalized with head and hand
injuries from the beatings.
The commotion in the prison yard alerted members of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (the "RUC") and the British Army, who were lo-
cated just across Crumlin Road at the courthouse, to the escape. A wild
gun battle erupted outside the prison's main gate. No deaths were re-
ported, in part because Doherty duped the RUC and the British soldiers
into restricting their fire by shouting that he was a guard.
Some of the escapees piled into waiting cars and sped away in the
heavy afternoon traffic. Others fled on foot. PIRA decoy cars also
pulled out at the same time, assuring maximum confusion. The getaway
cars, riddled with bullet holes, were abandoned nearby, as the prisoners
switched to other vehicles and perfected their escape.
The police and the British Army immediately began a large-scale man-
hunt. They set up roadblocks in the Catholic areas of Belfast and
throughout Northern Ireland. They also tightened security at airports,
harbors, and border crossings between Northern Ireland and the Repub-
lic of Ireland. Finally, they printed 20,000 "wanted" posters and distrib-
uted them to motorists as they were stopped at checkpoints.5
3. The Aftermath
The jailbreak was humiliating to the security forces, for the escape was
heavily publicized in the United Kingdom. It prompted debate in
Parliament and compelled the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to
order an "immediate and urgent" inquiry into security conditions at the
and Hugh Noyes, Urgent Inquiry On Belfast Jail Break, The Times (London), June 12,
1981, at 1.




On June 11, 1981, two republican prisoners in northern jails were
elected to the Irish parliament.56 On June 12, 1981, Mr. Justice Hutton
of the Belfast Crown Court issued his verdict in the M-60 Machine-Gun
Case. Doherty was sentenced to life in prison, with a thirty-year recom-
mended minimum stay, for his role in the events of May 2, 1980.5
With the help of the PIRA, Doherty successfully eluded the British
authorities. He fled to the Republic of Ireland, where he remained in
hiding for some time. Following the rearrest in Ireland of several of
Doherty's fellow escapees, the PIRA ordered Doherty to go to the
United States. In February 1982, Doherty entered the United States
under an assumed name and with an altered Irish passport. For the next
sixteen months, he lived in Brooklyn, New York, and in Kearney, New
Jersey, and was employed as a construction worker and a part-time bar-
tender. He was arrested on June 18, 1983, while working at a bar in New
York City.58
II. EXTRADITION
On June 21, 1983, the United Kingdom requested Doherty's provi-
sional arrest for the purpose of extradition to the United Kingdom. On
June 27, 1983, a federal district judge issued the provisional arrest war-
rant, and on August 16, 1983, the United Kingdom made a formal re-
quest under the extradition treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom (the "1977 Treaty") 9 to extradite Doherty.6'
55. Noyes, supra note 53, at 1. Ian Paisley expressed the unionist view of the escape
when he advised the House of Commons that "[t]his matter has appalled the people of
Northern Ireland." Id. (quoting Paisley). Other perspectives were offered by writers for
the Manchester Guardian, who described the incident as "one of the most audacious
Republican operations mounted in Northern Ireland" and "meticulously planned," Keel,
supra note 53, at 1, and the London Times, which stated that "to many it was clear that
the eight men were quickly becoming folk heroes." Solicitors Held, supra note 53, at 2.
56. See Beresford, supra note 49, at 194 ("The euphoria over the breakout carried
over to the election, the results of which astonished observers, if not the prisoners them-
selves. Two of the nine prisoners, Kieran Doherty [(a hunger striker not related to Joe
Doherty)] ... and Paddy Agnew, found they were full-blooded Irish MPs.").
57. See Richard Ford, Life Sentences Await Four Ulster Escapers, The Times
(London), June 13, 1981, at I. Since Doherty's absence from the proceeding was volun-
tary, the court maintained jurisdiction to enter a verdict and impose a sentence. Cf. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 43(b)(1) (United States rule also provides that, where a defendant who was
initially present at his trial voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced, it
shall be implied that the defendant waived his right to be present and a return of verdict
shall not be prevented).
58. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI") had targeted the New York City
bar where Doherty was captured as one frequented by PIRA supporters. Doherty's iden-
tity was established from an informer's tip. Doherty's arrest was coordinated by the same
FBI agent who had investigated the theft of the M-60 machine guns in Danvers,
Massachusetts, several years earlier. See Dillon, supra note 39, at 175-76, 236-38.
59. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. VII, 28 U.S.T. 227, 231. See
infra note 75.
60. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). At about the same
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From June 1983 through June 1986, Doherty would rarely lose a
courtroom battle. In large measure, these courtroom victories would re-
flect a judicial acceptance of the merits of Doherty's arguments. But
Doherty's success during this period would also be aided by a second
factor: judicial aversion to government overreaching.
In their zeal to assist the British Government, the Justice Department
and, more particularly, the Office of the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York pursued a highly combative litigation
strategy against Doherty; it was a strategy that prompted the courts on
three separate occasions to admonish the government for the extreme
nature of its arguments. The government's tenacity in opposing
Doherty's request for records under the Freedom of Information Act
(the "FOIA"),6 1 as described below, is illustrative of this strategy.
A. A Preliminary Skirmish. Doherty's FOIA Request
On July 5, 1983, Doherty requested that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (the "FBI") provide him with copies of the documents in his file.
Following the FBI's decision to withhold all such materials, Doherty
sought de novo judicial consideration in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. In defense, the government ar-
gued that an undocumented alien has no right to sue for access to infor-
mation under the FOIA, and thus moved to dismiss for lack of
standing. 62
On October 30, 1984, Judge Charles L. Brieant denied the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss. He held that: (1) "[n]othing in the literal lan-
guage of the [FOIA] statute suggests that disclosure depends upon the
... citizenship or residency of the person requesting information;" 63 and
time as the filing of the United Kingdom's request, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (the "INS") issued a deportation warrant. In response, Doherty sought asylum.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1992), Doherty's asylum request was deemed to include
a petition for withholding of deportation. The administrative deportation hearing was
held in abeyance during the extradition proceeding.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
62. See Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 596 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Considering that the courts had already rejected the notion that a foreigner is not
a "person" within the meaning of the FOIA, see Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the
United States, 552 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978), and
that the government had an entirely respectable defense to non-disclosure based on the
merits of the case, it is odd that the government made this argument.
63. Doherty, 596 F. Supp. at 425. In comparing the FOIA clause, which requires
disclosure to "any person" who requests it, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. U 1990),
with the Privacy Act clause, which authorizes disclosure to "individuals"-a narrower
class defined as United States citizens and lawfilly-admitted aliens, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)
(1988 & Supp. II 1990), Judge Brieant held that Congress had intentionally chosen differ-
ent terms for the two statutes. See Doherty, 596 F. Supp. at 425-26. Furthermore, Judge
Brieant dismissed as irrelevant the government's "lurid" characterization of Doherty as
"a foreign terrorist [who] seeks to rummage through Government files," id. at 424, 428,
stating that "the court is perplexed as to how (Doherty's] prior acts become relevant
upon the construction of the FOIA." Id at 424.
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(2) the FOIA's legislative history did not support "a clear legislative in-
tention to grant a right to sue [under the FOIA] to citizens [only]."'
The government next raised a policy objection: if Doherty had stand-
ing to sue for the release of FOIA materials, the Soviet Union's KGB
could sue for FBI counterintelligence files. Judge Brieant rejected this
policy argument, stating: "[T]he KGB... presumably has or will obtain
the information referred to through normal channels of espionage and
leaks. It seems to have no need to rely on the FOIA."'65 Moreover,
Judge Brieant admonished that the government not waste any more time:
[I]t is the duty of the bureaucrats holding non-exempt information to
comply with [the FOIA's] provisions promptly and cheerfully unless
and until the statute is revised by Congress .... The legislative goals
will not be served by engrafting on the statute's plain meaningol a judi-
cial exception of the sort urged here; an exception which leads to delay
and will require litigation of facts having nothing to do with the merits,
such as the citizenship of a complainant or the validity of his green
card.66
Faced with the prospect of defending the FBI's full denial of access
with an argument based only on the merits, the Justice Department then
released 168 pages of documents to Doherty-some of which contained
substantial redactions. 67
B. United States Extradition Procedures
The right of a foreign sovereign to obtain the extradition of an individ-
ual is created by treaty and the procedures are governed by statute.68
64. Id. at 426-27. Having determined that the statutory text of the FOIA was clear
on its face, Judge Brieant might well have ended the inquiry there. Where resolution of a
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intent of Congress, a reviewing court
must look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history only if the
statutory language is unclear. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). At the
government's insistence, however, the court went on to review the FOIA's legislative
history, which the government had also invoked in support of its position. See Doherty,
596 F. Supp. at 426-27.
65. Id. at 428.
66. Id.
67. The government continued to deny Doherty access to 128 more pages pursuant to
various FOIA exemptions. The district court sustained this partial denial (in an unre-
ported opinion), and the Second Circuit affirmed on the merits without addressing the
government's alternate argument-i.e., that Doherty lacked standing to sue under FOIA.
See Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1985). Buoyed by
the Second Circuit's decision not to reach the standing issue, the government has reliti-
gated the issue against other aliens in other jurisdictions. Those efforts have also been
unsuccessful. See Arevalo-Franco v. United States INS, 889 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir.
1989); O'Rourke v. United States Dep't of Justice, 684 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.D.C. 1988).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 287 (1933). Under the reasoning of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992), extradition merely provides one optional method for a government that
seeks to take an individual back across international borders. Where the applicable treaty(such as the United States/United Kingdom treaty) does not expressly forbid otherwise,
another option is the forcible abduction of the individual on the other country's territory
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The prevalent practice is for a foreign government first to submit an ex-
tradition request through diplomatic channels to the United States
Department of State. The request must establish that: (1) an offense was
committed within the jurisdiction of the requesting state; (2) the offense
also violates American law; (3) the offense is extraditable under the appli-
cable treaty; and (4) the accused is the person sought. This request is
then forwarded to the United States Attorney, who files a complaint on
behalf of the requesting government and seeks an arrest warrant from a
judge or magistrate (the "extradition magistrate") in the district where
the accused is found.69
Next, the extradition magistrate holds a hearing to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence under the treaty to sustain the charge. The
hearing is limited in scope. It is not a full trial on the merits, and neither
the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure applies.7" If the extradition magistrate determines that the alleged
offense is within the scope of the applicable treaty and that there is prob-
able cause, the case must be certified to the United States Secretary of
State, who has discretion on whether to surrender the individual to the
requesting nation.7'
Judicial review of an extradition magistrate's determination is limited,
and the procedures are cumbersome. If a magistrate declines to certify
an extradition request, the government may not pursue a direct appeal.
Rather, it must refile the request before a second magistrate.72 The ac-
cused individual is likewise barred from pursuing a direct appeal of an
adverse ruling. Instead, the individual must either seek a writ of habeas
corpus or persuade the Secretary of State to refuse to extradite.73
(assuming the kidnapping country is willing to endure the adverse public relations that
will result). Thus, the United Kingdom was presumably free to kidnap Doherty (as
Israel did to Adolf Eichmann in Argentina). But see Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201
n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor of the State De-
partment, who resisted the notion that such seizures were acceptable).
69. See In re United States, 713 F.2d 105, 108 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983); Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
70. See In re United States, 713 F.2d at 108 n.1; Eain, 641 F.2d at 508, 511; Steven
Lubet, Taking The Terror Out Of Political Terrorism: The Supplementary Treaty of Ex-
tradition Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 866-
67 (1987); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to
proceedings for extradition); Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5) (Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure "are not applicable to extradition"). Accordingly, the accused has the limited right
to explain the evidence introduced by the Attorney General, but cannot offier contra-
dicting evidence. Moreover, the accused does not have the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-17 (1922).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Eain, 641 F.2d at 508.
72. SeeIn re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). Traditional double jeopardy stan-
dards do not apply to multiple extradition applications. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S.
426, 429-30 (1923). The only limitation on the number of successive extradition requests
is that each request must be based on a good faith determination that extradition is war-
ranted. See Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932
(1978).
73. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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C. The "Political Offense" Exception
The United States is party to approximately 100 bilateral extradition
treaties,74 each of which contains a "political offense" exception to extra-
dition.75 The exceptions are designed to allow a signatory to maintain a
neutral position in another signatory's internal political disputes.76
"Political offense" exceptions are based upon a belief that individuals
should have a right to resort to political activism in order to foster polit-
ical change, and a concern that political activists-particularly, unsuc-
cessful rebels-should not be returned to a country which may subject
them to unfair trials and punishments based on their political opinions."
74. The treaties to which the United States is a party are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3181
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990). For a statutory example of a "political offense" exception to
extradition, see 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1988).
75. At the time of Doherty's arrest, the governing treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom was the Extradition Treaty, 28 U.S.T. 227, signed on June 8,
1972, and put into force on January 21, 1977 [hereinafter 1977 Treaty]. Article V(1)(c)(i)
of the 1977 Treaty contains the "political offense" exception. It states that extradition
"shall not be granted" if the offense "is regarded by the requested party as one of a
political character." 1977 Treaty, supra, 28 U.S.T. at 227. Where the United States is
the requested party, the judiciary, rather than the executive, determines whether this
"political offense" exception applies. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 517-18 (7th Cir.
1981); Mackin, 668 F.2d at 132-33.
76. Neutrality is prudent because today's armed revolutionary may be tomorrow's
ruler and today's ruler may be tomorrow's fugitive. See Steven Lubet, Extradition Un-
bound: A Reply to Professors Blakesley and Bassiouni, 24 Tex. Int'l L.J. 47, 51 (1989); see
also Duane K. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of
Modern Political Violence, 9 Yale J. World Pub. Ord. 315, 340-41 (1983):
Neutrality in foreign rebellions, to the extent of refusing to deliver belligerents
into the hands of their enemies, remains sound policy .... The political offense
exception does not require a determination of which party in a political contro-
versy is more just; rather, it preserves the integrity of international extradition
as a mechanism to bring common criminals to justice.
In practice, however, extradition neutrality is elusive. A country that grants extradi-
tion for a political offender is often accused of siding with the requesting government and
denying the legitimacy of the revolutionary's claims. In contrast, where a country denies
extradition pursuant to a "political offense" exception, the requesting government will
often accuse it of siding with the revolutionary-a hostile act.
The recent relationship between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
is illustrative. President Ferdinand Marcos ruled the Philippines under martial law from
1972 to 1981. Nonetheless, on a June 30, 1981 visit to Manila, Vice President George
Bush toasted President Marcos for his "adherence to democratic principles and to demo-
cratic processes," and on November 27, 1981, the two governments signed an extradition
treaty which would ease the return of anti-Marcos Filipino rebels based in the United
States. Within six months, however, the political and diplomatic climate had changed
sufficiently that the Department of State withheld formal submission of the treaty from
the Senate.
77. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986); see also Mackin, 668 F.2d at 135 ("[T]he perception that extradition without
judicial oversight was 'highly dangerous to liberty and ought never to be allowed in this
country,' strongly suggests that it was precisely the political offense question that was of
the greatest concern to Congress in passing the [Extradition Act of 1848]." (quoting In re
Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113 (1852))).
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D. Doherty's Extradition Hearing
Pursuant to the United Kingdom's request, an eight-day extradition
hearing was held before United States District Court Judge John E.
Sprizzo in March and April 1984 (the "Extradition Hearing"). On
December 12, 1984, Judge Sprizzo found that the United Kingdom had
established probable cause for extradition. However, he concluded that
the death of Captain Westmacott and Doherty's subsequent escape from
prison were "political offenses" within the meaning of the exception in
the 1977 Treaty. On that basis, he declined to issue an extradition
certificate.
78
Judge Sprizzo's opinion briefly examined the history of British-Irish
relations and observed that "the centuries old hatreds and political divi-
sions which were spawned by England's conquest of Ireland in medieval
times continue to resist any permanent resolution. '79 His opinion noted
that the PIRA, a violent group that was claiming to be "a contemporary
protagonist in that ancient struggle,"8 0 had become dormant after losing
much public support; yet, the PIRA had ironically resurged, along with
violent loyalist groups in Northern Ireland, after the collapse of peaceful
efforts to resolve Northern Ireland's political and economic issues. Judge
Sprizzo acknowledged that the PIRA's methods and objectives were not
supported by a majority of the people in Northern Ireland, or even by a
majority of the Catholics in that region. Nevertheless, he refused to con-
clude that "the absence of a political consensus for armed resistance in
itself deprives such resistance of its political character."8 "
1. Judge Sprizzo's Five-Part Test
Judge Sprizzo next reviewed the case law interpreting the "political
offense" exception to extradition. He rejected the broad view of the early
cases, 82 and observed that the modern cases had adopted a more restrict-
ive view of the exception. 3 Judge Sprizzo then fashioned his own test.
78. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
79. Id at 273.
80. Id
81. Id at 273 n.2.
82. See id at 274. The early cases held that the "political offense" exception should
apply so long as the alleged offense was committed during the course of, and in the fur-
therance of, a political struggle. See In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 999 (N.D. Cal. 1894); In re
Muenier [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419; In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 156, 159, 166.
83. Among the modem and more restrictive cases cited by Judge Sprizzo were Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518-21 (7th Cir.) (limiting use of the exception to "acts committed
in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance such as a war, revolution
or rebellion," without consideration of the motivations underlying the alleged crime),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Exparte Cheng [1973] W.L.R. 746, 753 (limiting the
"political offense" exception to "offenses of a political character as between the applicant
and the requesting state."); and Ex parte Schtraks [1964] A.C. 556, 591-92 (it is not
enough that the offense is committed for a political motive or to further a political cause;
if the government is only enforcing the criminal law, then the fugitive should be extra-
dited). See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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He held that a court should consider five factors in determining whether
the "political offense" exception applies: (1) "the nature of the [alleged]
act," (2) "the context in which [the act was] committed," (3) "the status
of the party committing the act," (4) "the nature of the organization on
whose behalf [the act was] committed," and (5) "the particularized cir-
cumstances of the place where the act [took] place."84 After applying his
test to the facts before him, Judge Sprizzo concluded that Doherty had
"present[ed] the assertion of the political offense exception in its most
classic form." 85
a. Nature of the Act
Judge Sprizzo determined that an act which violates international law
and is inconsistent with international standards of civilized conduct
should not be considered "political." He refused to hold, however, that
the use of violence by itself was dispositive. He observed that Doherty's
offenses did not involve the detonation of a bomb in a public place, were
not directed against civilian representatives of government, did not result
in the death or injury of hostages, and did not clearly violate the princi-
ples of the Geneva Convention.
8 6
b. Context in Which the Act Was Committed
Judge Sprizzo held that the "political offense" exception should not be
limited to actual armed insurrections and traditional and overt military
hostilities, but should be applied to guerrilla warfare as well.87 He noted
that the death of Captain Westmacott had occurred during an attempted
ambush of a British army patrol, and expressed little doubt that such
conduct would have fallen within the "political offense" exception had it
occurred during the course of "more traditional" military hostilities. He
declined to find the exception inapplicable simply because the PIRA was
84. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275.
85. Id. at 276.
86. See id. at 274-76; cf. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There
is a meaningful distinction between terrorist acts directed at the military or official agen-
cies of the state, and random acts of violence against ordinary citizens that are intended
only 'to promote social chaos.' " (citation omitted)). Note that Judge Sprizzo never men-
tioned the family that was held by the PIRA on the first floor of the Antrim Road apart-
ment building, see supra text accompanying note 40, except to note that "the court was
not presented with [proof] that hostages were killed or injured." In re Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. at 276.
87. See id. at 275. Judge Sprizzo stated the following:
[P]olitical struggles have been commenced and effectively carried out by armed
guerrillas long before they were able to mount armies in the field. It is not for
the courts, in defining the... political offense exception, to regard as dispositive
factors such as the likelihood that a politically dissident group will succeed, or
the ability of that group to effect changes in the government by means other
than violence ....
Id.; accord Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 810 (9th Cir.) ("It is for the revolutionaries,
not the courts, to determine what tactics may help further their chances of bringing down
or changing the government."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
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engaged "in a more sporadic and informal mode of warfare.""8
c. Status of the Party Committing the Offense
Judge Sprizzo next held that an otherwise political offense might lose
its political character if committed for purely personal reasons such as
vengeance or vindictiveness. He concluded, however, that Doherty's acts
on May 2, 1980 and June 10, 1981, were performed solely at the direction
of the PIRA and not for reasons of his own.8 9
d. Nature of the Organization
Judge Sprizzo stated that it would be "most unwise as a matter of
policy to extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every
fanatic group or individual with loosely defined political objectives who
commit acts of violence in the name of those so called political objec-
tives."'9 He thus found it appropriate to consider the nature and struc-
ture of an organization, "and its mode of internal discipline, in deciding
whether the act of its members can constitute political conduct."9' After
such consideration, Judge Sprizzo concluded that the PIRA had "an or-
ganization, discipline, and command structure that distinguish[ed] it
from more amorphous groups such as the Black Liberation Army or the
Red Brigade."9 2
e. Place Where the Act Occurs
Judge Sprizzo determined that the "political offense" exception would,
in all probability, not apply to acts that occurred outside the territory
where political change was to be effected. 9 In the Doherty Case, how-
ever, it was undisputed that all of the relevant events took place within
Northern Ireland.94
88. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276; cf. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th
Cir.) (once circumstances move away from an ongoing, clearly-defined clash of military
forces, the judiciary's task becomes much harder), cert denied, 454 U.S. 894 (198 1).
89. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 277 n.7. Judge Sprizzo stated the following:
[Tihere is no suggestion that Doherty had any personal hostility [towards] Cap-
tain Westmacott. There is some suggestion that the physical attack upon one of
the guards may have had ... retaliatory aspects .... However, on balance the
Court is persuaded that that guard was assaulted because he sought to prevent
the escape.
Id (citation omitted); see also id at 272 (discussing the facts surrounding the death of
Captain Westmacott and Doherty's subsequent escape).
90. Id at 276.
91. Id
92. Id
93. See id. at 275-76; see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 814 (9th Cir. 1986)
("political offense" exception inapplicable because conduct occurred in England rather
than in Northern Ireland), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
94. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272. As a final matter, the court dismissed
Doherty's argument that his offenses should be regarded as political because the United
Kingdom has enacted special legislation and created special non-jury courts to deal with




Judge Sprizzo was not the first American jurist to conclude that the
"political offense" exception barred the extradition of a convicted mur-
derer," nor was he the first to refuse to extradite a member of the PIRA
under the 1977 Treaty.96 In fact, at the time, jurists in many nations
were refusing British extradition requests.97 Judge Sprizzo's opinion was
well-received by the Second Circuit and by several legal commentators,
who praised it for its careful analysis.98
not and could not get a fair trial in Northern Ireland. See id. at 276. Judge Sprizzo
characterized the government's testimony on the non-jury (Diplock) court issue as "both
credible and persuasive." Id He further concluded that both unionists and republicans
who commit scheduled offenses in Northern Ireland "can and do receive fair and impar-
tial justice." Id.
95. See Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D. Fla. 1959); Artukovic v. Boyle,
140 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d
198 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958); In re Ezeta,
62 F. 972, 1004-05 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
96. The British government had requested extradition of fugitives on at least 64 occa-
sions over a 20 year period. The United States government granted such requests on all
but four occasions (including the Doherty Case). On all four occasions, the "political
offense" exception was employed to deny extradition. See Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-
6688 RPA, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated and remanded, 783 F.2d 776 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re
McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG, slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
A Department of State Memorandum indicates that State and Justice Department offi-
cials anticipated that Judge Sprizzo would rule as he did, and informed British officials of
that view beforehand. See Department of State Memorandum from Martin Wenick to
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Jan. 7,
1985) (copy on file with Fordham Law Review). The memorandum specifically states:
"With Department of Justice approval, [State Department Deputy Legal Advisor Daniel
W.] McGovern two months ago pointed out to [Her Majesty's Government] that under
current case law the British will continue to lose similar extradition requests [for IRA
offenders]." Id (emphasis added). The memorandum was released to the author by the
Department of State, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.
97. From 1970 to 1982, the Republic of Ireland rejected 48 British applications for
extradition to Northern Ireland of persons accused of terrorist acts in the north. In 1982,
the Republic of Ireland granted its first extradition for an accused terrorist since the
troubles began in 1969. See SL Patrick's Fire Crackers, Economist, Mar. 24, 1984, at 42,
45. In December 1986, Holland became the first continental European nation to extra-
dite an IRA member to the United Kingdom. See Dutch Extradite Two LR.A. Fugitives,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1986, at A5; see generally Colm Campbell, Extradition to Northern
Ireland: Prospects and Problems, 52 Mod. L. Rev. 585 (1989) (examining the "political
offense" exception for extradition requests connected with the Northern Ireland conflict);
Margaret McGrath, Extradition: Another Irish Problem, 34 N. Ir. Legal Q. 292 (1983)
(discussing the current extradition arrangements between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland); Colm Campbell, Comment, Irish Extradition Developments, 39 N.
Ir. Legal Q. 191 (1988) [hereinafter Irish Extradition Developments] (observing that Irish
courts' previous interpretation of political offenses had effectively barred the extradition
of IRA and INLA suspects); Timothy J. Duffy, Comment, The Law v. the IRA: The
Effect of Extradition Between the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and the United
States in Combatting the IRA, 9 Dick. J. Int'l L. 293 (1991) (discussing the evolution of
extradition laws between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of
Ireland, and the laws' effectiveness in combatting the IRA's terrorist campaign).
98. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1986); Abraham
[Vol. 61
THE DOHERTY CASE
But that judgment was hardly unanimous. Judge Sprizzo's decision to
deny extradition also sparked an immediate negative reaction" that
originated with its timing; it was released only two months after a PIRA
bomb exploded at a hotel in Brighton, England, nearly killing Prime
Minister Thatcher and her cabinet. 1° ° In addition, commentators have
Abramovsky, The Political Offense Exception and the Extradition Process The Enhance-
ment of the Role of the U.S. Judiciary, 13 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev. 1, 18 (1989)
("This balancing test constitutes the most elastic standard yet to be applied in determin-
ing whether particular acts fall within the political offense exception.... [It offers] a
meaningful test .... "); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited.
Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation
Among Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 Deny. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 255, 265-66 (1987)
(McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty "were decided... in accordance with the longstanding
jurisprudence of the [United States] on the 'political offense exception.' None of these
cases constitutes a departure from the jurisprudence in existence in the [United States]."
(footnotes omitted)); Scott C. Barr, Comment, The Dilemma of the Political Offense Ex-
ception: To Which Acts Should It Apply?, 10 Hamline J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 141, 155 (1989):
[Tihe Eain/Doherty test goes far in narrowing the incidence test in order to
protect the interests of both political activists and of innocent civilians, [but] it
does not go far enough. The test must be further narrowed by inquiring
whether the existing government... is representative enough that... the citi-
zens ... could change the government by their vote;
Linda G. Feder, Note, In Re Doherty: Distinguishing Terrorist Activities From Politically
Motivated Acts Under the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 1 Temp. Int'l &
Comp. LJ. 99, 121 (1985) ("mT1he first part of Judge Sprizzo's opinion can only be ap-
plauded for its clarity and flexibility .... ."); John P. Groarke, Comment, Revolutionaries
Beware" The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under The 1986 United States-
United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1515, 1524 (1988)
(McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty "were properly decided under the provisions of the
treaty").
99. On December 18, 1984, The Wall Street Journal stated the following:
[A]nother setback in the war against international terrorism....
... In what must strike Britons as an especially galling passage, Judge
Sprizzo stated that "it was the British army's response" to the attempted am-
bush on their patrol that "gave rise to" the captain's death.
To blame an army for a death caused by an attempted ambush on its troops is
outrageous ....
Moral Confusion, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1984, at 34; see also British M.P. 's Criticize Ruling
on Extradition, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A5 (Judge Sprizzo's decision was "greeted
with fury [in London] by several Conservative Members of Parliament"). But see
Holland, supra note 19, at 177:
What was conveniently ignored, in the torrents of near-hysterical abuse directed
at [Judge Sprizzo], was the careful and conservative nature of his decision. It
represented a limiting of the scope of the political-offiense exception to actually
exclude most of the kinds of crimes that the Reagan government and the popu-
lar press were accusing it of glorifying or excusing. The angry reaction had
another aspect. In [the] future, any judge or magistrate contemplating finding
in favor of the political-exception defense could not help being intimidated by
the prospect of the denunciations and controversy that the finding would be
bound to produce.
100. For details of the Brighton bombing of October 12, 1984, which killed five and
injured 34, see Harry Anderson et al., The Iron Lady's Brush With Death, Newsweek,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 40; The Target Thatcher, Time, Oct. 22, 1984, at 50. On October 25,
1984, in the wake of the bombing, Secretary of State George Shultz had publicly con-
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criticized Judge Sprizzo's five-part test for being an overly-expansive and
confusing interpretation of the "political offense" exception. 10 1 Other
demned the PIRA. See Secretary Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, Dep't St.
Bull., Dec. 1984, at 12.
The terrorists ... [of] the Marxist Provisional IRA... in Northern Ireland are
ideological enemies of the United States....
... Organizations such as the Provisional IRA.. . play on popular griev-
ances, and political and religious emotions, to disguise their deadly purpose....
[It is] an organization which has killed-in cold blood and without the slightest
remorse-hundreds of innocent men, women, and children in Great Britain and
Ireland; an organization which has assassinated senior officials and tried to as-
sassinate the British Prime Minister and her entire cabinet; a professed Marxist
organization which also gets support from Libya's Qadhafi and has close links
with other international terrorists. The Government of the United States stands
firmly with the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of
Ireland in opposing any action that lends aid or support to the Provisional IRA.
Id. at 13-15.
101. See eg., Phyllis J. Baunach, The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty:
Justice For Terrorists or Terror For Justice?, 2 Conn. J. Int'l L. 463, 473-74 (1987) ("This
standard ... is at best confusing . . . [and] the distinctions among the elements are
obscure .... [T]he court's rationale for its decision appears to rest on two facts: first,
that the incident occurred in the context of a military operation, .. . and, second, that the
PIRA... rather than Doherty himself, directed the actions taken." (footnotes omitted));
Lubet, supra note 70, at 865 ("At the same time that the United States vigorously con-
demns terrorism, it provides an escape hatch for perpetrators that would be derided if
applied to domestic crimes." (footnote omitted)); Miriam E. Sapiro, Note, Extradition in
an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 654, 678 (1986) ("[T]he court gave little guidance on the application of four of these
five rather broad considerations and instead focused its attention on the nature of the
organization." (footnote omitted)).
Some commentators have suggested that the duty to extradite PIRA members under
the "political offense" exception should be examined by analogy to the international hu-
manitarian law of armed conflict (the "humanitarian law"). See Supplementary Extradi-
tion Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom: Hearing on the Impact of
the Supplementary Treaty Upon American Domestic Law and Upon the American Consti-
tutional Process in the Fight Against Terrorism Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 137-38 (1985) [hereinafter
Hearing before the Judiciary Subcommittee] (statement of Professor John F. Murphy);
Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom:
Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 519-26 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations]
(statement of Professor Francis A. Boyle); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Leg-
islation in the United States 1981-1983, 17 Akron L. Rev. 495, 551-53 (1984). Under the
humanitarian law, members of national liberation movements would fall within the pa-
rameters of the "political offense" exception only if their conduct adheres to the Geneva
Convention of 1949. See Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also ProtocolAdditional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflict (Protocols I and II), U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annexes I and II
(1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (although the United States signed the 1977
Protocols, it has not ratified them; in part, because the 1977 Protocols appear to give
legitimacy to certain national resistance movements).
Another commentator has suggested that the "political offense" exception should only
be applied to protect "democratic" revolutionaries-i.e., revolutionaries that are fighting
for traditional democratic values, rather than to impose a totalitarian ideology on the
states within which they operate. See Groarke, supra note 98, at 1528-29. Under this
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commentators have found fault with Judge Sprizzo's assumption that the
goals of the PIRA are those of the Irish republican movement,"o2 with
his differentiation between the PIRA and other "more amorphous
groups," ' 3 and with his distinction between military and non-military
targets."° Moreover, several critics have emphasized that the use of vio-
lence against a democratic society should never be countenanced) 05
Finally, for endorsing the Diplock court system of Northern Ireland as
"fair" and "impartial,"'"I 6 Judge Sprizzo has been accused not only of
disregarding the "rule of non-inquiry,"107 but of reaching a highly-debat-
analysis, the philosophies of many revolutionary organizations (including the Marxist
philosophy of the PIRA) could bar its adherents from achieving "political offender" sta-
tus. See Dillon, supra note 39, at 106-07 (attributing to Doherty a Marxist philosophy
that he kept well under wraps during his time in the United States). These two alterna-
tives were not addressed by Judge Sprizzo because the parties to the Extradition Hearing
did not develop them.
102. See Debra Caffee, Comment, The United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty: Limiting Availability of the "Political Crime" Defense, 9 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 303, 324 (1987) ("A change in policies of the British government, or even
England's complete withdrawal from the governing of Northern Ireland, would not seem
to cause the PIRA to cease its violent tactics under its long-existing set of goals."). Com-
pare In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[lit is the end of British rule
in Ireland that has been and continues to be the principal objective of the Irish
[r]epublican movement.") with Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
supra note 101, at 152 (quoting 1981 statement of John Hume, the leader of Northern
Ireland's Social Democratic and Labor Party) ("We say to the Provisionals you are not
Irish Republicans. You are extremists, who have dishonored and are dishonoring the
deepest ideals of the Irish.").
103. See Sapiro, supra note 101, at 679 ("The court's assumption that it is possible to
draw valid distinctions between groups like the Red Brigade, the PIRA, and the PLO is
tenuous."). Compare In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276 (stating Judge Sprizzo's deter-
mination about the PIRA's "organization, discipline, and command structure") with
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (magistrate held that PIRA Active
Service Units "often acted without guidance from superiors, [and] their targets may have
been chosen for personal reasons-such as spite or revenge-rather than out of political
motivations").
104. In Doherty's subsequent deportation case, Attorney General Meese noted that a
homicide victim's identity should not affect a decision on whether to extradite. See infra
part IV.A. The Ninth Circuit has criticized this aspect of Judge Sprizzo's decision for
entirely different reasons, pointing out that "non-military" offenses often fall under the
"political offense" exception: "It is clear that various 'non-military' offenses, including
acts as disparate as stealing food to sustain the combatants, killing to avoid disclosure of
strategies, or killing simply to avoid capture, may be incidental to or in furtherance of an
uprising." Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810.
105. See, e.g., Caffe, supra note 102, at 324 ("If ballots are available to effect change,
the line must be drawn so that those preferring to use bullets are not politically and
legally protected simply because they find anarchist methods more appealing than demo-
cratic ones.").
106. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 276.
107. The "rule of non-inquiry" is actually a custom based in comity, that American
courts will refrain from inquiring into the acts of foreign governments. See Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (where an extradition treaty exists between two coun-
tries, courts in the requested country must assume that the trial in the requesting country
will be fair); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901) (an individual cannot prevent
his extradition by alleging that the criminal processes of the requesting country fall short
of the United States' constitutional guarantees); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694
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able conclusion after hearing only half the story. 108
E. The Declaratory Judgment Action
Judge Sprizzo's refusal to certify Doherty's extradition limited the
government's options. Barred by a Second Circuit decision from taking a
direct appeal," and reluctant to renew the extradition request with
another magistrate, the government attempted to do indirectly what it
could not accomplish directly: trump Judge Sprizzo's decision. It in-
voked the Declaratory Judgment Act (the "DJA"), 11° and brought suit
against Doherty to obtain an authoritative judicial construction of key
provisions in the 1977 Treaty (the "Declaratory Judgment Action"). In
effect, the government sought a declaration that would bind any renewed
extradition request it might file against Doherty in the future.
This collateral attack strategy was clever, but ultimately unsuccessful.
On June 25, 1985, Judge Charles S. Haight of the Southern District of
New York granted Doherty's motion to dismiss the Declaratory
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim of prejudice by foreign courts must be reviewed solely by non-
judicial branches), aff'd, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1980); In re
Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (same), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.
1973).
Some courts have purported to depart from the "rule of non-inquiry," although "in-
quiry" has never been used as a basis for denying extradition. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974) (pursuant to Gallina,
Canadian criminal procedures were reviewed and approved); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d
77, 79 (2d Cir.) ("We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would
be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of de-
cency as to require reexamination of the principle" that the criminal processes of a for-
eign sovereign are presumed fair), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960); cf. Arnbjornsdottir-
Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) (declining to scrutinize for-
eign sovereign's criminal process, but noting that such scrutiny might be appropriate
elsewhere); In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 133 n.1 (D.NJ. 1987) (accepting affidavit con-
cerning foreign government mistreatment of minority ethnic group for purpose of re-
examining non-inquiry doctrine).
One commentator has suggested that Judge Sprizzo's approach- which undertook a
perfunctory examination of the Northern Ireland judicial system, solicited the executive
branch's advice, gave the advice "appropriate" weight, and then yielded to the executive's
determination-"rings with a certain degree of hypocrisy." Michael P. Scharf, Foreign
Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the
Supplementary U.S.-UK. Extradition Treaty, 25 Stan. J. Int'l L. 257, 286 (1988).
108. As noted earlier, Doherty could not cross-examine the government witnesses or
present evidence of his own on that issue. See supra text accompanying note 70. This
aspect of the opinion received especially close attention during the United States Senate's
consideration of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty. See infra part III.B.
109. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); supra note 72.
110. In relevant part, the DJA provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
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Judgment Action. 1 Judge Haight observed: "If declaratory judgment,
a feature of federal practice since 1934,... furnishes an appropriate rem-
edy to a foreign nation disappointed in extradition proceedings, it has
escaped the attention of the Departments of Justice and State for a con-
siderable time."' 1
2
Judge Haight took umbrage at the government's warning that a nar-
row reading of the DJA "'would literally compel [it] to continue refiling
the [Doherty extradition] request until a favorable decision is obtained,
however long that might take.' ,113 He responded: "If [the govern-
ment's] statement was intended to intimidate this Court, it does not; and
quaere whether unlimited repetitions of judicially rejected contentions
comport with the dignity of the United States Attorney's office."'"
14
Undaunted, the government appealed to the Second Circuit, where
Doherty prevailed again."' In a forcefully worded opinion, Judge Henry
A. Friendly praised Judge Haight's "careful opinion" in the Declaratory
Judgment Action, and Judge Sprizzo's "careful analysis of the political
offense exception" in the Extradition Hearing." 6 His words for the gov-
ernment, however, were much less charitable. Judge Friendly character-
ized the Declaratory Judgment Action as an attempt to "escape from [a]
long held principle."'" Moreover, he implied that the government was
being hypocritical-noting that, shortly after the government had com-
plained to Congress that its remedies under the extradition statute were
111. See United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 786 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1986). The district court held that the government had failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted. See id. at 757 n.3. However, it rejected Doherty's
alternate theory for dismissal, holding that the case "arose under" the 1977 Treaty, and
that subject matter jurisdiction therefore existed. See id.
June 25, 1985 was also the date on which the United States and the United Kingdom
signed a supplementary extradition treaty, which retroactively narrowed the "political
offense" exception under which Doherty had prevailed before Judge Sprizzo. See infra
part III.
112. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. at 760. Judge Haight characterized the government's De-
claratory Judgment Action as a search for "a decision on the merits [of the scope of the
'political offense' exception] rendered by an Article III judge, whose decision is appeala-
ble under existing statutes to higher courts." Id. at 758.
Judge Haight acknowledged that the issue had not been squarely addressed by the
Second Circuit in Mackfn, but nevertheless found that "Judge Friendly's careful analysis
... fiirnish[ed] guidance" and "militat[ed] against" extension of the declaratory judgment
remedy to a foreign nation that was requesting extradition. Id at 761.
113. Id at 760 n.5. When United States Attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani ran for Mayor
of New York City in 1989, Giuliani's handling of the Doherty Case was used by his
opponent to sway New York City's many Irish-American voters against him. See infra
text accompanying note 350.
114. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. at 760 n.5.
115. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
116. IdL at 493-94. Judge Friendly's opinion in Doherty was one of his last before his
death on March 11, 1986.
117. Id at 492. Judge Friendly, who had also authored In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1981), referred to the "long held principle" that the government's sole recourse
following an extradition magistrate's refusal to certify an extradition case "is to submit a
request to another extradition magistrate." Doherty, 786 F.2d. at 492-93.
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narrow and unsatisfactory, it was urging the court to hold that the DJA
provided broad relief.11' In addition, Judge Friendly accused the govern-
ment of "[seeking] to veil the true nature of the present action," 119 ex-
plaining: "[W]hat the Government here seeks in reality is not a 'review'
of Judge Sprizzo's decision but a declaration that will bind another extra-
dition judge in a proceeding not yet commenced."' 20 On March 13,
1986, upon finding that the government's theory "[ran] counter not only
to fifty years of history but to the evident purpose of [the extradition
statute] 121 and of the [DJA]," the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Haight's
order of dismissal.' 22
At this point, three things should be noted. First, no commentator has
suggested that the government's pursuit of declaratory relief was merito-
rious, or that Judge Haight's and Judge Friendly's holdings were errone-
ous. In fact, just the opposite has been suggested. 123
Second, several observers have proposed that Congress amend the
118. See id. at 497. Judge Friendly called the government's declaratory judgment ac-
tion "somewhat startling." Id. at 494-95. "No one has stated the long standing principle
... more clearly than the United States itself" when it urged Congress to enact new
legislation because the current extradition law left it without a meaningful remedy. Id.
119. Id at 499.
120. Id. at 502. Judge Friendly further explained:
The Government now tells us that everything that has been said about its reme-
dies if the extradition magistrate refuses to issue a certificate, including what it
has told the Congress within the last few years, has been wrong for the half
century since the [DJA] ... was adopted in 1934....
[Yet, nothing suggests that] the DJA was intended to enable the Government
... to arm itself with a favorable ruling on the law before starting a new pro-
ceeding.... Having tried and failed to obtain a certificate from Judge Sprizzo,
[the Government] fears that it may lose when it tries again before another extra-
dition magistrate and seeks insurance in the form of a declaration of law.
Id. at 497, 500.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
122. Doherty, 786 F.2d at 503 (footnote added). Because rehearing was denied on June
2, 1986, the government was allowed until September 1, 1986, to petition the Supreme
Court for certiorari. See infra part IV.A.
123. See, eg., Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J.,
dissenting) ("IT]he government's declaratory judgment motion embodied the general liti-
gation posture that [it has] assumed in this case-once dissatisfied with the result of a
decision in Doherty's favor, the government attempted to use an extraordinary, but legiti-
mate, tool to obtain the result it was seeking."), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992);
Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1108, 1122 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The
government's use of administrative and judicial processes [against Doherty] has been ex-
haustive, to say the least."), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992); Susan K. Story,
Comment, Scope of Review In Extradition Proceedings: The Government Cannot Appeal
A Denial of Extradition Request Based on the Declaratory Judgment Act- United States v.
Doherty, 19 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 893, 906 (1986):
[T]he Court correctly decided the case. While some of the government's argu-
ments show creativity, only an extreme reading of the [DJA] would suggest that
Congress intended that it embrace extradition matters .... The government
built its entire case... on a shaky foundation [and] [t]he Second Circuit arrived




extradition statute12 4 to allow for direct appellate review of all extradi-
tion decisions. 2 Although the existing system is unquestionably cum-
bersome, the wisdom of a prospective change in the law is beyond the
scope of this Article. The narrower issue considered here is the equity of
stretching the existing law to compel Doherty's extradition.
Third, the declaratory judgment action and its appeal stalled
Doherty's deportation proceedings by eighteen months. Yet, in a subse-
quent opinion denying Doherty's habeas corpus request for release on
bail (in which the delay was a collateral issue), the Second Circuit attrib-
uted the delay solely to Doherty:
[Tihe delay in Doherty's deportation proceedings was solely the result
of his own tactical decision. For the almost eighteen months from
March 18, 1985 to September 3, 1986, his deportation proceedings
were held in abeyance because of a stay entered on his motion and
opposed by the INS. Even if a delay of this length might justify
[habeas corpus] relief,... it is of no aid to Doherty because he was its
sole cause.
12 6
Given Doherty's understandable desire not to engage in a two-front war
of attrition against a government opponent with limitless resources, the
Second Circuit's conclusion seems unduly harsh.
III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
A supplementary extradition treaty (the "Supplementary Treaty") was
signed by the United States and the United Kingdom on June 25, 1985.
Although it did not mention the PIRA or Northern Ireland, the Supple-
mentary Treaty was meant to narrow the 1977 Treaty's "political of-
fense" exception so as to eliminate its application to violent "relative"
political offenses. 27 On July 17, 1986, the United States Senate gave its
advice and consent regarding the Supplementary Treaty, and, on Novem-
ber 26, 1986, the British House of Commons gave its approval.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
125. Se eg., Abmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("It would be
desirable to allow an appeal by either side from an extradition decision. But this is a
matter for the legislature, not the courts."), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990); Kevin S.
Rosen, Note, Toward Direct Appellate Review in U.S Extradition Procedures, 25 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. 433, 434-35 (1987) (arguing that legislation providing for direct appellate
review of extradition proceedings would significantly improve many of the weaknesses
and injustices inherent in the current statute).
126. Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1986). This holding became the law
of the case and was given preclusive effect in a second habeas corpus proceeding. See
Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
127. "Pure" political offenses are acts directed against the government (such as trea-
son, sedition, and espionage) and contain no elements of common crimes. "Relative"
political offenses contain elements of common crimes, but are committed for political
purposes or in political contexts. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Supplementary Treaty did not seek to alter the exception to extradition for "pure"
political offenses or for non-violent "relative" political offenses.
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A. Negotiations: December 1984-June 1985
Judge Sprizzo was the fourth American jurist in five years to refuse to
extradite a member of the PIRA to the United Kingdom under the 1977
Treaty.128 According to the Reagan Administration, those four rulings,
coupled with Congress' inability over a three-year period to enact broad
extradition reform legislation, 29 created an intolerable situation. In
turn, the Administration's frustration with the judiciary and the
Congress led to a plan to renegotiate, one-by-one, all of the extradition
treaties between the United States and friendly democratic nations.
Under this plan, the Supplementary Treaty with the British was intended
to be the first of several such bilateral renegotiations.
There is some validity to this explanation; but with regard to Doherty,
it overstates key facts and ignores compelling evidence of ad hominem
motivation. 130 When the timing of the British-American negotiations is
considered and the retroactivity clause of the treaty is analyzed, there is a
strong suggestion that the Supplementary Treaty may have operated as
an unconstitutional bill of attainder.' 31
128. See supra note 96.
129. The last major revision of the federal statutes that govern international extradi-
tion procedures occurred in 1848. In 1981, in response to In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-
78-1099 MG, slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), and In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), the
Reagan Administration proposed legislation to reform the extradition laws, but Congress
did not enact it. See Bassiouni, supra note 101, at 495-96; Sapiro, supra note 101, at 681-
83; see also The Extradition Act of 1984, H.R. Doc. No. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 130 Cong. Rec. 24,641 (1984) (proposed amended extradition bill would have
granted either party the right to appeal, required courts to inquire into the motives of the
nation seeking extradition, and codified current case law on (1) what constitutes a "polit-
ical offense" and (2) right to release on bail before an extradition hearing); 130 Cong.
Rec. 24,645 (1984) (debate centered around whether the amendments would make it
more, or less, difficult to extradite criminals); 130 Cong. Rec. 25,157 (1984) (the vote was
307 against, and 103 for, suspending the rules and passing the bill as amended).
130. The wisdom of prospectively amending the 1977 Treaty is beyond the scope of
this Article. The narrower issue considered here is the propriety of amending it retroac-
tively, so as to negate Doherty's victory before Judge Sprizzo.
131. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial
trial. It includes any legislative act which takes away the life, liberty, or property of a
particularly named or easily ascertainable person or group of persons because the legisla-
ture thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. See Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468-73 (1977); United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965); Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86 (1961). A bill of attainder violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 3
of the Constitution. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957) (treaties must comply
with the Constitution).
As this Article goes to press, nearly six years after the Supplementary Treaty took
effect, it is still not possible to state with certainty whether the Treaty's retroactivity
clause will survive constitutional challenge. Two courts have already found that the
clause operates as an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See In re McMullen, 769 F. Supp.
1278, 1283-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom. McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761
(2d Cir. 1992). But at the government's request, the Second Circuit granted rehearing en
banc on June 5, 1992 (unpublished order), and the case was reargued on September 15,
1992. Regardless of the Second Circuit's ultimate ruling, an appeal to the Supreme Court
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By December 1984, at least two and perhaps three of the four extradi-
tion rulings that had so provoked the British were well on their way to
becoming non-issues; Doherty's case was arguably the only one that
could still be fairly described as an open wound.' 32 Further, renegoti-
ation of the 1977 Treaty closely followed Assistant Attorney General
Stephen S. Trott's negative reaction to Judge Sprizzo's decision in the
Extradition Hearing. On December 18, 1984, Mr. Trott, Chief of the
Justice Department's Criminal Division, called the decision "outra-
geous," and stated: "We've got to get rid of this 'political offense' non-
sense among free, friendly nations .... We're going to have to attack
this treaty by treaty and redo the extradition language." '33
by the losing side appears likely. Obviously, final resolution of the issue will come too
late for this Article, and for the Doherty Case as well.
132. Of the defendants involved in the other three cases, Desmond Mackin had been
deported to the Republic of Ireland by consent in December 1981, only a week after the
Second Circuit's ruling in In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124 n.3 (2d Cir. 1986). See IRA.
Suspect Sent to Ireland, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1982, at A2. William Quinn was extradited
to England in October 1986, under the 1977 Treaty. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d
776, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); American is Extradited to Britain in
Killing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, at A5. He was later convicted in a jury trial and
sentenced to life in prison. See American Given Life in IRA. Case in London, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1988, at A7. Peter McMullen was on the verge of being deported to
Ireland. See McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986). McMullen was later ar-
rested on a second extradition warrant before deportation was effected. See In re
McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom. McMullen v. United
States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992), reh'ggranted, June 5, 1992 (unpublished order). The
British have never considered the deportation of PIRA fugitives to Ireland to be a satis-
factory substitute for extradition to the United Kingdom. See infra part IV.A.
133. Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Aide Faults Judge's IRA. Extradition Ruling, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 1984, at A23. Note that the Doherty Case was not Mr. Trott's first
encounter with the PIRA. When he was United States Attorney for the Central District
of California (1981-1983), Mr. Trott's office prosecuted John DeLorean for conspiracy to
smuggle narcotics. See Judith Cummings, Jury in Drug Case Indicts De Lorean, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1982, § I, at 1. The prosecution's theory was that DeLorean had turned
to crime in an effort to save his failing automobile plant in Belfast. The prosecution
asserted that DeLorean had boasted of an intimate relationship with the IRA and had
claimed that it was funding his drug smuggling. See John Kendall, DeLorean Linked
IRA to Drug Deal Prosecutor Says, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1982, § I, at 1. The IRA
strongly denied any link to DeLorean. See John Kendall, IRA Strongly Denies Link to
DeLorean, L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1982, § II, at 1. DeLorean was acquitted of all charges
in August 1984. See Michael Isikoff & Jay Mathews, Court Suits Next Hurdle for
DeLorean, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1984, at D9.
For a discussion of Mr. Trott's role in negotiating the Supplementary Treaty and his
participation in Doherty's deportation case, see infra part IV.
The Department of State also reacted swiftly to Judge Sprizzo's decision. See U.S.
Dep't of State, Night Note, IRA Fugitive Extradition Request Denied (Dec. 14, 1984) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review):
Our Consulate in Belfast reports that the Doherty decision has prompted a loud
outcry in both London and Belfast. Some Westminster MP's [Members of
Parliament] are reportedly urging Prime Minister Thatcher to "confront"
[President Reagan] with this issue during her visit next week. Senior State and
Justice Department officials will be meeting with U.K. officials in London early
next week to discuss ideas for avoiding such decisions in the future.
In fact, State Department Deputy Legal Advisor Daniel McGovern and two Deputy
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Even those who have viewed the renegotiation movement favorably
have been unable to offer a convincing explanation as to why the 1977
Treaty with the United Kingdom was the very first to be renegotiated. 134
Arguably, this resulted from two visits made by British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher to the United States, visits that came within three
months after Judge Sprizzo's decision in the Extradition Hearing. On
December 22, 1984, Prime Minister Thatcher met with President Reagan
at Camp David, Maryland, 135 and on February 20, 1985, she addressed a
joint session of Congress and then met with President Reagan at the
White House. On both visits, international terrorism and the situation in
Northern Ireland were discussed.' 36
Assistant Attorneys General arrived in London on December 17, 1984, for "informal"
and "exploratory" discussions with the British Foreign and Home Offices on the possibil-
ity of amending the 1977 Treaty. See Memorandum from Daniel W. McGovern, State
Dep't Deputy Legal Advisor, to Deputy Secretary of State at 4 (Jan. 9, 1985) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review); see also Memorandum from Charles Hill, State Dep't Execu-
tive Secretary, to Robert C. McFarlane, White House (Dec. 21, 1984) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (transmitting a fact sheet on the Doherty Case "for the President's
use during his meeting with Prime Minister [Margaret] Thatcher on Saturday, December
22"). The Night Note and the Memoranda were released to the author by the Depart-
ment of State pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.
134. See Lubet, supra note 70, at 883.
The decision to reform the political-offense exception through bilateral negotia-
tions with a select group of democratic countries did not inevitably require that
the United Kingdom be included on the list. Many reliable observers have
strongly criticized British rule in Northern Ireland for failing to meet the test of
fairness and democracy.
Id (citations omitted).
Following renegotiations of the 1977 Treaty, the United States signed supplementary
extradition treaties with the German Federal Republic (October 1986), Belgium (March
1987), and Canada (Jan. 1988). See Groarke, supra note 98, at 1540 n.202. The
Canadian supplementary treaty was approved by the Senate in 1991, see S. Treaty Doc.
No. 17, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990), and the German supplementary treaty was pend-
ing before the Senate at the time of this Article. However, no other supplementary trea-
ties have been transmitted, evidencing that the treaty-by-treaty renegotiations movement
has lost its steam.
135. See Bernard Weinraub, Thatcher Sees No Differences on 'Star Wars,' N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1984, at Al. This first visit came only 10 days after Judge Sprizzo's ruling in the
Doherty Case, only four days after Mr. Trott voiced the need "to get rid of this political
offense nonsense," see Taylor Jr., supra note 133, at A23; text accompanying supra note
133, and only one day after an immigration judge ordered Doherty released on bail. See
infra note 346; see also Cronin, supra note 9, at 322 (discussing meetings between Prime
Minister Thatcher and President Reagan); Holland, supra note 19, at 145 (Northern
Ireland was on the agenda of the December 22, 1984 meeting). Two months earlier, in
Brighton, a PIRA bomb had nearly killed Prime Minister Thatcher. See supra note 100
and accompanying text. The bombing had hardened the Prime Minister's opposition to
Irish nationalism, and any flexibility on her part at that time might have been read as a
capitulation to terrorism.
136. Prime Minister Thatcher's address to Congress left little doubt about her views on
the partition of Ireland and on the PIRA. See 131 Cong. Rec. H484, H486 (daily ed.
Feb. 20, 1985). Prime Minister Thatcher stated the following:
So long as a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wish to remain part of
the United Kingdom, their wishes will be respected. If ever there were to be a
majority in favor of change, then I believe that our Parliament would respond
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Bilateral negotiations culminated, on June 25, 1985, in the signing of
the Supplementary Treaty at Washington, D.C. 37 Article 1 of the Sup-
plementary Treaty narrowed the "political offense" exception of the 1977
Treaty by identifying particular crimes that would not be regarded as
"political." 3 ' Article 2 lengthened the statute of limitations of the 1977
Treaty,1 39 and article 3 extended the time allowed the requesting state to
accordingly ... Be under no illusions about the Provisional IRA. They terror-
ize their own communities. They are the enemies of democracy, and of free-
dom, too.
Id For a summary of Prime Minister Thatcher's meeting with President Reagan, see
Dep't St. Bull., June 1985, at 46-47.
When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff asked the State Department to
describe the negotiations that led to the Supplementary Treaty, it was told only that
negotiations commenced "last year" (meaning sometime in 1984), at the initiation of the
United States, and that the general approach of the treaty had been proposed by the
United States delegation. See Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra
note 101, at 711. Moreover, the State Department omitted mentioning Prime Minister
Thatcher's two visits to the United States. Cf Holland, supra note 19, at 182 ("[T]he new
treaty [was] kept secret until after it was signed."). This omission becomes more signifi-
cant in light of a later statement by an INS attorney that Doherty's case was "of concern
at the highest levels of government." See infra part IV.A.1.
The level of secrecy surrounding the negotiations may be gauged by an April 1, 1985
Department of State memorandum from Michael Peay to Deputy Legal Advisor Daniel
McGovern, US-UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Press Guidance, reacting to a
leaked story in the London Times:
[The British embassy official] commented that he had no clue as to how the
Times correspondent had come upon his information which he noted was sub-
stantially accurate....
To date, I have not seen or heard of any news reports from US sources con-
cerning the Supplementary Treaty.... The UK Embassy is being vigilant
about any press reports because of US sensitivities about how this issue is man-
aged publicly.
See also Briefing Memorandum from State Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer
to Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost (June 20, 1985) ("No members of the press
will be present at the signing ceremony."). Copies of memoranda furnished to the author
by the Department of State, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, are on
file with the Fordham Law Review.
137. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-8 [Supplementary Extradition Treaty With The United
Kingdom, June 25, 1985], 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Treaty Doc. No. 99-
8]. Sir Oliver Wright, British Ambassador to the United States, signed for the United
Kingdom, and Michael H. Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, signed
for the United States. For a discussion of Mr. Armacost's subsequent role in Doherty's
deportation, see infra part IV.A.4.
Prior to assuming the post of Undersecretary, Mr. Armacost had been Ambassador to
the Philippines. See generally supra note 76 (discussing the swiftly evolving political rela-
tions between the United States and the Phillipines).
138. See Treaty Doc. No. 99-8, supra note 137, at 1. Article 1 of the Supplementary
Treaty identified offenses that were said to be typically committed by terrorists, including
aircraft hijacking and sabotage, hostage taking, kidnapping, and (as relevant to Doherty)
murder and firearms offenses. See id In effect, article 1 of the treaty adopted Judge
Sprizzo's methodology (describing the offenses considered to be not political) but rejected
his ultimate conclusion (by implying that only terrorists commit acts of violence and by
assuming that all armed rebellion is terrorism).
139. See id at 2. The 1977 Treaty provided that extradition would be barred if an
offense was beyond the limitation period of either the requesting state or the requested
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submit evidence in support of its extradition request, from forty-five days
to sixty days after arrest.1" Article 4 applied the Supplementary Treaty
to any offense committed before its entry into force, as long as the alleged
offense violated the laws of both the United States and the United King-
dom at the time of its commission.14 Articles 5 and 6 involved technical
matters, but also pledged that the instruments of ratification would be
exchanged "as soon as possible."1 42 The key provisions for Doherty were
articles 1 and 4.
B. American Ratification
1. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Delays Action
for Nine Months
Secretary of State Shultz submitted the Supplementary Treaty to
President Reagan on July 3, 1985, and the President forwarded it to the
Senate for advice and consent on July 17, 1985.143 At the Senate, the
Supplementary Treaty met a hostile reception.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered the Supplemen-
tary Treaty during three days of remarkably contentious hearings141
During these hearings, twenty witnesses testified before vocal galleries of
spectators. 145 Opponents of the Supplementary Treaty browbeat Admin-
state. In contrast, the Supplementary Treaty provided that extradition would be denied
only if prosecution would be barred by the statute of limitations of the requesting state.
This seemingly innocuous clause was repeatedly criticized during the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearings, see Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
supra note 101, at 31-32, 49, 312, 630-33, because the United Kingdom has no statute of
limitations for most criminal offenses. Thus, under the retroactivity clause of the Supple-
mentary Treaty, even those persons who had participated in the 1916 Easter Rising could
be subject to extradition. See id.
140. See Treaty Doc. No. 99-8, supra note 137, at 2.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See Treaty Doc. No. 99-8, supra note 137, at iii and v.
144. The Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on August 1, September 18, and
October 22, 1985. See Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note
101. On November 5, 1985, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Constitution also held a hearing. See Hearing Before the Judiciary Subcommittee, supra
note 101.
Treaty analysis properly begins with the language of the treaty. See United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365.66 (1989). However, the relative weight to be accorded to non-
textual sources remains in dispute. The Stuart majority concluded that reliance on the
Senate's pre-ratification debates and reports was appropriate, but dismissed a treaty's ne-
gotiating history as "a worse indicator of a treaty's meaning." Id. at 367-68 n.7. But see
id. at 370 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (declining to reach the question of whether
Senate debates on ratification are authoritative or even helpful); id. at 374 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (suggesting that, if treaty's text is ambiguous, negotiating history may
be a better indicator of the signatories' intent than legislative materials).
145. Abraham Sofaer, formerly a United States District Judge in the Southern District
of New York and a colleague of Judge Sprizzo, became State Department Legal Advisor
in the spring of 1985, and served as one of the principal administration spokesmen for the
treaty. See Holland, supra note 19, at 183, 185. One commentator has described Sofaer
as "a pugnacious and vigorous exponent of neoconservatism," and has stated that
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istration witnesses"4 and openly expressed plans to stall, 4 ' while sup-
porters of the Supplementary Treaty hectored witnesses who were
Sofaer's "love for Great Britain was evident throughout the hearing, ... [and that]
[l]istening to [him] made one wonder at times why it had been necessary for the
American separatists to rebel against such a nation [as Great Britain] in the first place."
Id. at 183, 185; see also Christopher Hitchens, Minority Report, Nation, Jan. 31, 1987, at
103 (describing Sofaer as manipulating the law to support Reagan Administration poli-
ies); Bruce van Voorst, George Shultz's Feisty Lawyer, Time, Apr. 6, 1987, at 31
(presenting Sofaer as both influential and controversial legal advisor to Secretary of State
Shultz).
146. The Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the Supplementary Treaty
marked Judge Sofaer's first appearance as State Department Legal Advisor before the
Foreign Relations Committee. As judged from the following excerpt, things did not pro-
ceed smoothly:
Senator Biden [asking for data]. You can find [that information]. You have
weeks to find it, gentlemen. We will be gone for [five] weeks before we get back.
There is plenty of time. I am confident you can find them. I am confident the
British Government will cooperate with you in that effort.
Judge Sofaer. Well, if you'd like your staff people to come over and help, that
would be fine.
Senator Biden. No, I'm confident that you are able to do it, Judge. And if you
are not able to do it, I am confident that we can wait.
Senator Biden .... I would like for the record a comparison of those four
different [legal] systems, if I could.
Judge Sofaer. Well, I will certainly give you a detailed description of the
Diplock courts, which is what we have before us.
Senator Biden. That's not what I'm asking, Judge... My job is to ask the
questions and yours is to answer them. If you are not going to do it, say no.
Judge Sofaer. I don't see why we should be having to justify and engage in an
analysis of judicial systems-
Senator Biden. Because I asked.
Judge Sofaer. Of countries-
Senator Biden. Because a Senator asked.... Either I'm new to this system,
after 13 years, or you're new to the State Department.
Judge Sofaer. I blame myself in that regard, sir.
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 101, at 28, 30.
147. Senator Biden. Judge, I want to be up front with you.... I think this
extradition treaty is an opportunity to do what we have been unable to do so
far. There is an incredible reluctance on the part of this Government to criti-
cize one of our closest allies for what I believe to be an absolutely outrageous
position.., with regard to Northern Ireland .... So I want to make it clear to
you that I am going to do all that I can to hold this up as long as I can to make
the case.... I am delighted to go forward with this [Supplementary] [T]reaty
as long as we are also going forward at the State Department and in this
Congress with, at a minimum, verbal sanctions of... the British Government
with regard to what they are not doing in Northern Ireland. I have many ques-
tions and I will be back. I will probably have question for months and months
on this treaty.
[applause from the audience]
Judge Sofaer. Well, Senator Biden, I can imagine what your concerns are moti-





opposed to ratification.148 In addition, several congressmen urged the
Senate not to proceed by treaty at all, but to allow the House of
Representatives one more chance to pass extradition reform
legislation.149
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, two wit-
nesses cautioned that, as to Doherty and others similarly situated, the
retroactivity clause in article 4 of the Supplementary Treaty would vio-
late the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder.150 However, dur-
ing a hearing held two weeks later by the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on the Constitution, the Administration's spokesmen
strongly disagreed."5 At the close of the hearings, Senator Thomas
Eagleton predicted that the Supplementary Treaty, as submitted, was un-
148. Senator Eagleton. Mayor [Raymond] Flynn [of Boston], is it your position
that as long as the Diplock procedures are in place, no PIRA individual should
be extradited to Northern Ireland?
Mayor Flynn [a witness opposing the Supplementary Treaty]. I would say,
Senator, that it's a bad system to me....
Senator Eagleton. Let's stipulate that it's a rotten system.... We will stipulate
for the record that it stinks. Is it your position that no PIRA fugitive who flees
to the United States for whatever crime should be extradited back to Northern
Ireland because of the Diplock system being in place?
Mayor Flynn. I can't tell you with great authority about an individual case or
that particular situation.
.... Senator Eagleton. Did I hear you say that there could be, for some
horribly heinous offenses, extradition back to the north, even though Diplock is
in place?
Mayor Flynn. Well, again, it's a catch-22 position....
Senator Eagleton. Well, let the record note that the mayor does not want to
answer the question.
Mayor Flynn. Thank you.
Id. at 154-55; see also Cong. Q. Inc., Politics In America 862 (1986) (Senator Eagleton
"has evolved at the close of his career into a sort of premature curmudgeon, free to speak
out bluntly and even scold colleagues in a way he could not do if he were seeking re-
election in 1986").
149. House members objected to President Reagan's treaty-by-treaty strategy on the
ground that it would preempt the legislative process. That it would also enable a
Republican administration to negotiate exclusively with a Republican-controlled
Senate-thereby, leaving the Democratic-controlled House out of the picture-was not
discussed.
The Senate/House dispute has a long history. In 1945, the House passed a constitu-
tional amendment granting itself a role in the treaty ratification process. The Senate
allowed the proposal to die without a vote. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation
In The Treaty Process, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1511, 1519-20 (1989).
150. See Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 101, at 489,
528-30 (statements of Judge Eugene Maier and Professor Francis Boyle).
151. Mr. Trott. [I]t is definitely true that if this protocol were to become the law
of the land, it would enable Great Britain and the United States, on her behalf,
to go back into court and attempt to effectuate an extradition of these criminals
Senator Hatch. Do you agree with that?...
Judge Sofaer. Absolutely. I do not think that there is anything unfair about it.
Mr. Trott. No, there just simply is not ....
Hearing before the Judiciary Subcommittee, supra note 101, at 78. But see In re
McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1283-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding the retroactivity clause
of the treaty to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder), aff'd sub nom. McMullen v.
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likely to be ratified.' 52
2. The American Raid on Libya
Senator Eagleton's analysis proved accurate, and the Supplementary
Treaty remained buried in committee for another six months. When it
finally began to move, it did so for reasons that no one had anticipated-
namely, the American raid on Libya. This Article emphasizes the corre-
lation between the two events because the period from April 14 through
July 17, 1986, really marked the turning point in the Doherty Case. 53
Before then, Doherty had rarely lost. Thereafter, he rarely won.
On April 14, 1986, American military aircraft attacked targets in
Libya in reprisal for Libya's role in the April 5, 1986, terrorist bombing
of a West Berlin nightclub-a bombing which killed an off-duty
American serviceman and wounded other American servicemen.
Although other European allies had declined to cooperate with the
American raid, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher approved the use of
the British bases from which the American aircraft took off."
In a prescient editorial, the London Times suggested that British sup-
port for the raid on Libya should be linked to Senate ratification of the
Supplementary Treaty.'55 Prime Minister Thatcher adopted that theme
United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, June 5, 1992 (unpublished
order).
152. Specifically, Senator Eagleton stated:
The treaty is in trouble. That is self evident. The treaty, as written, is in
trouble.
My preference would be... that we go the legislative route. In fact, I think
we should inform the legislative committees of both the House and the Senate
that we may hold in abeyance for a reasonable period of time this treaty to give
them a chance to act.
However, if they do not act, then we must do something with this treaty.
I think we should.. . 'promulgate' some reservations to it ....
Finally, I think it is imperative... that we have the State Department back
as witnesses.
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 101, at 220-21 (remarks
of Senator Eagleton).
153. The legal literature on the Supplementary Treaty is extensive, but only the few
articles listed below have made the connection between the Senate's ratification and
British support for the American raid on Libya. See Bassiouni, supra note 98, at 282
n.127 (citing Kennedy, Why Were F-lls 'Misused' In The Raid On Libya?, Chi. Trib.,
Aug. 19, 1986, § 1, at 15); Scharf, supra note 107, at 263 n.28; Kathleen A. Basso, Note,
The 1985 US-U.K Supplementary Extradition Treaty: A Superfluous Effort?, 12 B.C.
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 301, 313 n.100 (1989); Douglas A. Felman, Note, Limiting Extra-
dition Law's Political Offense Exception.: The United States-United Kingdom Supplemen-
tary Extradition Treaty, 20 Cornell Int'l L.J. 363, 376 n.82 (1987); Guy C. Iversen, Note,
Just Say Nol United States Options to Extradition to the North of lreland's Diplock Court
System, 12 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 249, 252 n.27 (1989); Sapiro, supra note 101, at
699 n.274.
154. See Neil A. Lewis, Paris Barred Jets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al.
155. Specifically, the editorial stated:
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in an April 27, 1986, radio interview with the BBC, 156 and the United
States Department of State followed suit.157 Newspaper editorials also
drew attention to the issue,158 prompting a Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff member to marvel at how quickly the Supplementary
The British government took upon itself political opprobrium last week by its
approval of the use of American bases in Britain for the Libyan strikes. It of-
fended, the polls said, a wide swathe of British public opinion. Is it not time for
the government of the United States to pay a debt?...
Before the United States Senate this week is ratification of treaty amendments
with the effect of forbidding fugitives from United Kingdom justice to claim in
their defence [sic] that their crime was somehow political....
There are in the Senate, and not only among the Democrats, politicians who
are devout believers in the twentieth century doctrine that homicide is not mur-
der provided it is carried out in the right spirit. For some legislators with Irish-
American constituencies the right spirit is intent to unify Ireland under the flag
of revolutionary nationalism....
[But] the greenery of Irish nationalism has been tainted by the green of
Islamic crusade against the West. [Qadhafi] has through his money and arma-
ments supply been an actor in Ulster, and Americans should be told the com-
pany that [NORAID] keeps....
The British in Washington have in the past tended to be rather gentlemanly
about the issue of Ireland .... The time has come[, however] for ... [a] round
of high pressure salesmanship....
Mrs. Thatcher's credit with the people of the United States is at an all time
high; the government could do worse than employ some Madison Avenue skills
in putting over the British case....
Let it be simply put to the voters in the states who alone can bring the pro-
IRA senators to book: you owe us one.
Reciprocity In Washington, The Times (London), Apr. 22, 1986, reprinted in Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 101, at 883.
156. See Joseph Lelyveld, Thatcher Faults U.S. Terror Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,
1986, at A6.
Referring pointedly to her Government's readiness to allow the use of British
bases in the American raids on Libya, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher con-
tended today that the United States had an obligation to fight the terrorism of
the [IRA] by agreeing to an extradition treaty that has been held up for months
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Id.
157. See Linda Greenhouse, The War On Terrorism, From Tripoli To Belfast, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 30, 1986, at B6. "[A] State Department spokesman, Charles Redman, urged
the Senate on [April 28] to reciprocate for Britain's allowing American planes to take off
from bases in England by 'demonstrating our willingness to support the British on an
issue of terrorism of primary importance to them.'" Id.
158. See, e.g., In Aid of Terrorism, Wall St. J., April 29, 1986, at 30:
Margaret Thatcher's courageous support for the U.S. raid on Libya proved that
the U.S. still has one friend in Europe. It would be unthinkably squalid if the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee repaid her courage by refusing to help
with her own terrorism problem.
Yet that is what the solons on Foreign Relations may do when they vote on a
Supplementary Extradition Treaty ... which the committee has held up since
last July. ...
The main opposition to the [treaty] comes from senators with strong Irish
Catholic constituencies, among them Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, John
Kerry of Massachusetts and Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island. One opponent,
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Treaty's momentum had revived. 159
Pressure to ratify the Supplementary Treaty continued to build during
May 1986. On May 5, the heads of state of seven democratic nations
meeting at the Tokyo Economic Summit Conference issued a forceful
statement on international terrorism.16" Moreover, Senator Richard
Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, warned that a
popular foreign aid package to Ireland and Northern Ireland 6 ' would
not be approved until the Supplementary Treaty was approved 1 62 In
addition, the British government lobbied key Senators, 63 and American
Joe Biden of Delaware, traces his own ancestry to Wolf [sic] Tone, an 18th
century Irish revolutionary....
[Mrs. Thatcher] is quite right in demanding that U.S. Senators abandon their
pettifogging politics and get serious about terrorism, wherever it exists;
see also Partners Against Terrorists, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 1986, at A14 (observing that the
proposed Extradition Treaty will be considered just after the British aided the American
strike against Libya, and that passage of the Treaty would give senators an opportunity to
demonstrate solidarity with Britain).
159. "'This issue was a sleeper for a long time... It looked easy to kill when no one
was looking.... All of a sudden, people are starting to pay attention. Suddenly, it's
bigger than ethnic politics.'" Greenhouse, supra note 157, at B6 (quoting Mark Helmke,
a spokesman for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar).
160. See Statement on International Terrorism, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 583
(May 5, 1986) ("Terrorism has no justification.... It must be fought relentlessly and
without compromise."). The statement also called for "improved extradition procedures
within due process of domestic law for bringing to trial those who have perpetrated...
acts of terrorism .... " Id.
161. The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act, Pub. L. No. 99-415, 100 Stat. 947
(1986).
162. On November 15, 1985, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland signed
the Hillsborough Accord, which was designed to facilitate joint consultation on the ad-
ministration of Northern Ireland. This was the first time that Britain had formally ac-
knowledged the Irish Republic a role to play in governing the North, and its decision to
do so at Hillsborough angered most unionists.
In return for a voice in the province's affairs, the Republic of Ireland formally
acknowledged British sovereignty over Northern Ireland-an act that provoked most na-
tionalists because it appeared to legitimize partition. In addition, the Irish Republic
stated its intention to accede to the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism; by acceding to the Convention, the Irish Republic would reverse its old posi-
tion and smooth the path for extradition of republican fugitives back to the North. See
infra part IV.
The Hillsborough Accord effectively ruled out any form of armed political resistance to
established governments. It was vague about procedures and details, however, and na-
tionalists have criticized it for co-opting the Irish government into a gradualist, slow-
motion position that better suited British interests.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986, which was billed as a "mini-
Marshall Plan," was designed to demonstrate American financial support for the
Hillsborough Accord. The House of Representatives had passed on March 11, 1986.
Chairman Lugar linked the Irish aid issue to the issue of Supplementary Treaty ratifica-
tion, on the ground that the two measures were complementary policy vehicles to curb
instability in Northern Ireland. See David Shribman, Senate Debate On Terrorism In
Northern Ireland Entangles U.S.-British Treaty On Extraditions, Wall St. J., May 12,
1986, at 52.
163. See Francis X. Clines, Briton Presses U.S. on Irish Extradition, N.Y. Tunes, May
14, 1986, at A3 (recounting how British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom
King, travelled to Washington to lobby key United States senators on the pending treaty).
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newspaper editorials urged prompt ratification. 1" Finally, on May 31,
President Reagan went over the head of the Senate and directly urged the
American public to support ratification of the Supplementary Treaty.165
Thus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began compromise nego-
tiations on the Supplementary Treaty, which were spearheaded by
Senators Lugar and Eagleton. 166
164. See, e.g., The Right Response To Irish Terror, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1986, at A30:
[F]our Democrats-Senators Dodd, Biden, Pell and Kerry-want to . .. in
effect allow asylum for agents of the [IRA] accused of murdering British
soldiers. Understandably, the caveat angers the British....
Though the Democratic resisters invoke great principles, their obstruction
smacks of tribute to the I.R.A.'s small but vociferous American lobby.
The debate does raise one valid concern about civil liberties [referring to the
Diplock court system], . . . [but] Britain can be given the benefit of this
doubt....
That still leaves the committee's chairman, Senator Richard Lugar, pursuing
his own game. He links a favorable vote on the treaty to his support for a
special aid fund for depressed Northern Ireland, a pet project of House Speaker
Tip O'Neill. Watching this intricate log-rolling, the British throw up their
hands and wonder if this is the same country that berates Europeans for their
reluctance to face up to Libya's terrorists. It's time to ratify;
see also The Ulster Package, Wash. Post, June 16, 1986, at A10 (opining that the Supple-
mentary Treaty and the foreign aid package were "aimed at promoting peace," and that
there "should be little delay in getting the full Senate to consent to ratification [of the
Treaty]").
165. Specifically, President Reagan stated:
For nearly a year now a handful of United States Senators have held up ap-
proval of a supplementary extradition treaty ....
The world is watching. If actions by a few Senators allow terrorists to find
safe haven in the United States, then there will be irreparable damage. Refusal
to approve the [S]upplementary [T]reaty would undermine our ability to pres-
sure other countries to extradite terrorists who have murdered our citizens.
And rejection of this Mreaty would be an affront to British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, one European leader who, at great political risk, stood
shoulder to shoulder with us during our operations against Qadhafi's terrorism.
Some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have gone so far
as to prepare a substitute treaty permitting those who have murdered British
policemen and soldiers, for so-called political reasons, to avoid extradition.
Well, this substitute is not a compromise; it's retreat. Its passage would be a
victory for terrorism and a defeat for all we've been trying to do to stop this
evil....
I therefore urge the Senate to promptly approve the revised treaty and rein-
force the momentum building against terrorism.
President's Radio Address to the Nation, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 730-31 (May 31,
1986).
166. One publication has described Senator Lugar's tenure as Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman (from 1985 to 1986) in glowing terms, calling him the second or
third most influential voice in the United States on foreign affairs, and "something of a
shadow Secretary of State" who, by deft compromise, saved several Reagan Administra-
tion initiatives from failure. See Cong. Q. Inc., Politics in America, 1992, at 486 (1991).
Senator Eagleton, the only Democratic and Catholic member of the Foreign Relations
Committee favorably disposed to the Supplementary Treaty, see supra note 148, had an-
nounced his intent to retire at the end of 1986.
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3. The Substitute Treaty
On June 12, 1986, the Foreign Relations Committee recommended
that the Senate approve a substitute treaty (the "Substitute Treaty")-
i.e., the Supplementary Treaty with several amendments and a declara-
tion.167 The Substitute Treaty shortened article 1 of the Supplementary
Treaty, which excluded certain crimes from the "political offense" excep-
tion. References in the submitted treaty to property damage, possession,
intent, and conspiracy offenses were deleted; manslaughter was qualified
by "voluntary;" and unlawful detention was qualified by "serious." 1
Further, the Substitute Treaty deleted article 2 of the Supplementary
Treaty, which would have made applicable the statute of limitations of
the requesting state, and replaced it with a clause that clarified the right
of an accused to introduce evidence on the question of probable cause at
an extradition hearing.169
In addition, the Substitute Treaty inserted a new article 3, which
changed the rule of non-inquiry into a rule of partial-inquiry. Article
3(a) authorized a court to deny extradition where (1) the extradition re-
quest stems from "trumped up" charges against a dissident, or (2) the
accused individual establishes that he would be prejudiced at his trial or
punished because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.
Article 3(b), which applied only in the United States, limited the scope of
an article 3(a) hearing to those offenses listed in article one, and gave
either party to an extradition proceeding the right to appeal a decision
made under article 3(a). 17 0 The Committee also recommended that the
Senate declare that the Substitute Treaty was not a precedent for other
treaties, and that the "political offense" exception would not be narrowed
in treaties between the United States and totalitarian or non-democratic
regimes. 171
On July 16 and 17, 1986, the Senate considered the Substitute Treaty.
Chairman Lugar opened the debate by focusing on In re Mackin,"' In
re McMullen,173 and In re Doherty 74-- three judicial decisions that had
broadly interpreted the "political offense" exception under the 1977
Treaty. The Chairman acknowledged that the Reagan Administration
had negotiated the treaty revisions "because of these cases," and he em-
phasized that the Substitute Treaty's purpose was to "reverse [the] three
cases" and to "put an end to this development in the law." 
17"
167. See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Supplementary Extradition Treaty with
the United Kingdom, S. Exec. Rep. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
168. See id. at 4, 6-7.
169. See id at 5-7.
170. See id at 4-5, 7-8.
171. See id at 6.
172. No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, (68 F.2d
122 (2d Cir. 1981).
173. Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG, slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
174. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
175. 132 Cong. Rec. S9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) [hereinafter 132 Cong. Rec.] (re-
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Chairman Lugar characterized the treaty as "one of the most difficult
and contentious issues the [Foreign Relations] [C]ommittee faced this
Congress," and noted that the Committee "[had] spent the better part of
a year reviewing [the Supplementary Treaty]." '176 He assured the Senate
that the Committee's compromise resolution of ratification, i.e., the Sub-
stitute Treaty, was acceptable to both the Reagan Administration and
the Thatcher Government.' 77 On the issue of retroactivity, Chairman
Lugar opined that the Substitute Treaty would pass constitutional mus-
ter in the courts. 178  Finally, he promised that the Anglo-Irish
Agreement Support Act of 1986 would be considered immediately after a
final vote was taken on the Substitute Treaty. 179
4. Defeat of the D'Amato Amendment
Following Chairman Lugar's opening, Senator Alfonse D'Amato of
New York proposed an amendment to narrow, but not delete, the retro-
activity clause (the "D'Amato Amendment").1 0 In relevant part, the
D'Amato Amendment provided that the Substitute Treaty would not ap-
ply to any individual whose extradition had been sought prior to the
effective date of the Treaty.81 In support of his proposed amendment,
marks of Sen. Lugar). The fourth case to interpret the "political offense" exception
broadly, Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), was
not included in Chairman Lugar's discussion, because, on February 18, 1986, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the extradition magistrate's decision to
extradite William Quinn to England. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
176. 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at 59120, S9149 (remarks of Sen. Lugar).
177. See id. at S9148. Chairman Lugar stated: "These amendments were developed in
close consultation with the [A]dministration and the British Government. While both
governments would have preferred that the Senate approve the treaty as submitted, both
are willing to accept the committee's changes." Id.
178. See id. Chairman Lugar stated: "The courts have examined the question of the
retroactivity of extradition treaties on several occasions. They have found no constitu-
tional problem with retroactivity." Id. But see In re McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278,
1283-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the Supplementary Treaty is an unconstitutional
bill of attainder punishing McMullen for acts previously held by an extradition magis-
trate to be non-extraditable), aff'd sub nom. McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761
(2d Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, June 5, 1992 (unpublished order).
179. See 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9149.
180. See id. at S9153-54. The retroactivity clause from article 4 of the Supplementary
Treaty had been moved, unchanged, to article 5 of the Substitute Treaty.
Senator D'Amato was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and would
ordinarily not have been expected to play an active role in treaty ratification debates.
Doherty was in a New York City jail, however, and his case was well known among New
York's large Irish-American community.
One publication has called D'Amato a strong human rights supporter. It has also
referred to him as "Senator Pothole," because of his attention to running errands for
constituents. See Cong. Q. Inc., supra note 166, at 988. Yet, in light of the subsequent
rulings in In re McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1283-90 (holding the retroactivity clause of
the treaty to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder) and in McMullen v. United States,
953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992), perhaps "Senator Pothole's" critics owe him an apology.
181. See 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9153. The D'Amato Amendment did not
prohibit the retroactive application of the Supplementary Treaty to all offenses occurring
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Senator D'Amato argued that the American courts "have a distinguished
record in extraditing terrorists" and that the Senate "should not sweep-
ingly overrule their carefully considered judgments that [denied] extradi-
tion in certain cases."' 8 2 To do so, he cautioned, would violate the
constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, among other things.
In opposition to the D'Amato Amendment, Chairman Lugar asserted
that the Substitute Treaty would not operate as an ex post facto law and
would not constitute double jeopardy.'83 A discussion of the Doherty
Case then followed:
Chairman Lugar: I would object to the exception that [Senator
D'Amato] makes. I appreciate that [he] narrows the scope [of his
amendment] very substantially and almost narrows it specifically to
the case of Doherty and perhaps to [one other] case.... These two
cases are celebrated and they have a very important content in the
relationship of the United States and Great Britain because of their
celebration. They are not unknown situations.
Therefore, I would have to resist the amendment on the basis that it
is such an important aspect of the relationship of the countries and of
our consideration with them that it would destroy much of the value of
this treaty.
Senator D'Amato: [W]e are talking about really one case. That would
be Doherty.... Really what we speak about is a situation where we
may be violating an established principle of law so well engrained in
this country, in our Constitution, that in order to keep good relation-
ships with an important ally one person is sacrificed.
It seems to me that is a very dear price for us to pay .... [T]his is
politics. What we are talking about is the political relationship be-
tween the United States and England.18
In addition, Senator Pell, the ranking minority member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, expressed opposition to the amendment.'
8 5
prior to the treaty's entry into force. Rather, it only barred retroactive application of the
Supplementary Treaty as to persons whose extradition had previously been denied under
the 1977 Treaty: i.e., Joe Doherty and Peter McMullen. See id at S9154.
Extradition requests have recently been lodged in two cases involving offenses commit-
ted before the effective date of the Supplementary Treaty. See U.S. v. Smyth, No. 92-
0152 BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11439 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1992) (arrested July 15,
1992) (PIRA member convicted of attempted murder in 1978); In re Arnt, Crim. No. 92-
0151-Misc. FMS (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1992) (PIRA member convicted of murder in 1983).
The D'Amato Amendment would not have applied to these two cases.
182. 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at 59153.
183. See i d at S9154-56. Senator Lugar did not address the bill of attainder issue.
184. Id. at S9154-55.
185. See id at S9156 (remarks of Sen. Pell). Senator Pell stated:
[Tihe arguments of the Senator from New York... [are] well-reasoned and
[have] merit, but I believe, on balance, we are better off leaving this treaty the
way we worked it out in the committee with a great deal of effort. We consid-
ered these questions.... I intend to support our chairman.
Id Based on the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings, and because of Rhode Island's
large Catholic population, one might have expected Senator Pell to favor the D'Amato
Amendment; but any such sentiments had been neutralized by President Reagan's radio
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Although Chairman Lugar twice tried to end the debate, 18 6 three other
Senators voiced support for the amendment."' In the end, Chairman
Lugar moved to table the D'Amato Amendment, and that motion car-
ried, sixty-five to thirty-three. 88
5. Defeat of the Helms Amendment
Next, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina proposed an amendment
to the Substitute Treaty which would permit extradition in cases of crim-
inal violence but forbid it in cases of insurrectional violence (the "Helms
Amendment"). 8 9 This amendment, Senator Helms contended, would
differentiate "criminal terrorists" from "genuine freedom fighters."' 190
In opposition to the Helms Amendment, Chairman Lugar and Senator
Pell maintained that the IRA did not deserve to benefit from such a dis-
address and the newspaper editorials supporting ratification. In addition, Senator Pell's
personal friend, Lord Louis Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family, had been
killed by an IRA bomb in August 1979.
186. See id. at 59156, S9158 (remarks of Sen. Lugar).
187. Senators Dodd, Hatch, and Levin also spoke in support of the D'Amato Amend-
ment. Senator Dodd emphasized that there were no prior cases where a new treaty had
been retroactively applied to extradite an individual whose extradition had already been
refused under an earlier treaty, see 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9158 (remarks of
Sen. Dodd) (citing June 23, 1986, letter from State Department Deputy Legal Advisor
Mary Mochary); Senator Hatch expressed concern that the retroactivity clause in the
Substitute Treaty violated due process and fundamental fairness, see id. at S9159-60 (re-
marks of Sen. Hatch); and Senator Levin stated the following: "In the specific case to
which [the D'Amato] [A]mendment particularly speaks, the legal process has proceeded
so far along that retroactive application of the treaty would go beyond the bounds of our
traditional sense of justice." Id. at 59160 (extension of remarks by Sen. Levin).
188. See id. at S9160 (roll call vote). Viewing the D'Amato Amendment as a test vote
on the treaty itself, one notes that the Amendment drew the support of the one-third
(plus one) necessary to block ratification. The amendment found broad (if not deep)
support at both ends of the political spectrum, but the neocons held the center. A break-
down of the vote defies any simple regional or sectarian analysis. While many who sup-
ported the D'Amato Amendment were liberal Democrats, some conservative
Republicans (Helms, McClure, and Hatch) did so, too. Senator Helms expressed his
view: "'This is one time when I think the Democrats are exactly right .... It occurs
occasionally.'" Shribman, supra note 162, at 52 (quoting Sen. Jesse Helms). Of the
nineteen members of the Senate identifying themselves as Catholic, ten voted to table the
D'Amato Amendment and nine voted against tabling.
Senator Moynihan of New York and Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, two of the
"Four Horsemen" who had condemned violence in Northern Ireland since 1977, see
supra note 32 and accompanying text, differed in their opinions on the D'Amato Amend-
ment (Moynihan supported it and Kennedy opposed it). Both had remained silent during
the Senate floor debate.
189. See 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9161. The proposal defined "insurrec-
tional violence" as violence that occurs during an armed rebellion against the military
authorities of an individual's home nation, but did not include violence against civilians.
See id. at S9159 (quoting Sen. Hatch).
190. See id. at S9161 (remarks of Sen. Helms). Senator Helms further stated: "Once
the legal distinction has been abolished between terrorists and freedom fighters, it will be
very difficult to sustain support for the Afghan Mujahideen, Savimbi's UNITA fighters,
the Nicaraguan resistance, the Cambodian resistance, or any other group fighting against
an established tyranny." Id.
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tinction, because everyone in Northern Ireland has the same right to vote
for a member of Parliament as do citizens in the rest of the United
Kingdom.1 91 Moreover, they described the Helms Amendment as a "re-
treat" which would mark "a victory for terrorism," 192 noted that the
Foreign Relations Committee had already considered and rejected the
Amendment, and predicted that acceptance of the Amendment would
"undo" the "carefully crafted" Substitute Treaty. 19 3 The debate was not
extensive, and the Helms Amendment was tabled, eighty-seven to
nine.19
6. Contested Legislative History
The Senate debate on the Substitute Treaty did not end with the defeat
of the Helms Amendment. Just before seven o'clock in the evening, Sen-
ator Eagleton delivered a one-half hour soliloquy to a nearly empty
chamber. 9 ' During his speech, Senator Eagleton described himself as
the principal author of article 3(a)19 6-- the provision restricting extradi-
tion in cases of "trumped up" charges or if an individual could show that
he would be tried or punished on political or religious grounds. Further,
he asserted that Judge Sprizzo's extradition decision in the Doherty Case
had provided Northern Ireland's Diplock courts 197 with a clean bill of
health .on the fairness issue.'9" Finally, the Senator declared that the
191. See id. at 9162-63 (remarks of Senators Lugar and Pell). In an indirect challenge
to the assumption that Northern Ireland was a "democracy," Senator Helms had previ-
ously stated:
It is not enough to say that there is no right of rebellion against a country with
democratic institutions. It is not enough to say that the United Kingdom itself
is a democracy.... There is no commonly accepted definition of a "democ-
racy."... Moreover, a nation that is free in the main part of its territories may
not be free in all of the territories that it governs.
Id at 9161 (remarks of Sen. Helms).
192. Iad at S9163 (remarks of Sen. Lugar). This characterization had been taken from
President Reagan's May 31, 1986, radio address, in which he discussed his view of a
precursor to the Helms Amendment.
193. Id. at S9163.
194. See id. The debate over the Helms Amendment did not begin until six o'clock in
the evening, and it lasted only 20 minutes. Members of the Senate have often objected to
role call votes at "late" hours, characterizing them as "bedcheck" votes, see Helen
Dewar, Senate to Adopt A New Work Ethic-A Five Day Week, Wash. Post, Dec. 31,
1987, at A17, and a clear concern as to the time was demonstrated during the debate.
See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9161 (Majority Leader Dole promises "not
to have any votes after 6:30 p.m."); id, at S9162 (remarks of Sen. Lugar) ("Members...
are concerned, I know, about the time of departure."). Senator Lugar's earlier efforts to
end debate on the D'Amato Amendment can best be understood in this context as well.
See id. at 59156, S9158.
195. See 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9164-67 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
Considering Senator Lugar's prior statement about "departure time," and his 7:30 p.m.
request for a quorum call, see id. at S9168, it is fair to infer that the Senate chamber was
empty because of the late hour.
196. See id. at S9167. But see infra notes 200-02 (disputing claims of Sen. Eagleton).
197. See supra note 94.
198. Yet, at the Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Senator Eagleton had ex-
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courts should interpret article 3(a) very narrowly.199
Senator Eagleton's narrow interpretation of article 3(a) was challenged
the following afternoon. Senators Kerry,2"° Levin,20 1 and Biden 20 2 each
professed the Foreign Relations Committee's intent that, during an
extradition hearing, the American court should inquire broadly into the
administration of justice in Northern Ireland.2 °3
pressed an inconsistent view; he had denounced Judge Sprizzo's three sentence dicta
about the Diplock courts as "a gratuitous adventure on [Sprizzo's] part." Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 101, at 176. The Senator had also
stipulated that the Diplock court system "stinks." Id. at 154; see supra note 148.
199. See 132 Cong. Rec., supra note 175, at S9167 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton). Specif-
cally, Senator Eagleton stated the following:
I consider Judge Sprizzo's opinion, as it relates to the fairness of the Diplock
court system, as being conformative to our intent in fashioning article 3(a) ....
As the author of article 3(a), I wish to assure my colleagues that [article 3(a)]
has [a] narrow and focused scope .... article 3(a) is not intended to give courts
authority generally to critique the abstract fairness of foreign judicial systems.
It is directed at the treatment to which this particular person will be subjected.
Id.
200. Senator Kerry stated:
Despite the interpretation given article 3(a) of this supplementary treaty by
[Senator] Eagleton, this is the view of only one Senator and does not reflect the
intent of the Committee. The intent of the Committee is to be found in the
colloquy between myself, the chairman of the Committee [(Senator Lugar)],
and Senator Biden [in the Committee Report].... [Article 3(a)] is not a narrow
provision. It is a very broad, and far-reaching provision that represents a
marked departure from past practice in extradition law and should be so inter-
preted by the court system in this country.... mhe administration of justice
system in Northern Ireland has become acceptable to [the Reagan] Administra-
tion. It is not acceptable to the [United States] Senate and that is the reason for
article 3(a).
132 Cong. Rec. S9253-57 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Kerry).
201. Senator Levin stated: "I will vote for this treaty .... I am particularly relying on
the colloquy between the principal sponsor of the committee language, Senator Lugar,
and Senators Kerry and Biden, which is printed in the committee report. . . ." Id. at
59259 (remarks of Sen. Levin).
202. Senator Biden stated:
I understand that there was some discussion last night on the legislative history
of the treaty.... No Senators can claim principle [sic] authorship of the treaty
or any of its parts, and therefore the right to be the final arbiter of its meaning.
The committee report, and not the remarks of any of us, will serve as the princi-
pal interpretation of the treaty-should any be needed. If anyone is going to
stick to the other view-that the principal author of any particular section is
therefore the sole interpreter for all time, all courts, and all occasions-then I
would have to claim principle [sic] authorship of the second clause in article
3(a), and insist on my interpretation of it.
Id. at S9259-61 (remarks of Sen. Biden).
203. In the intervening years, no American court has yet been called upon to conduct
an article 3 hearing; that fact alone may suggest that the United States has never been the
haven for PIRA terrorists that treaty supporters made it appear to be. Ironically, in an
effort to prove that the treaty is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder, the government
has recently argued that the treaty provides significant new judicial safeguards in the
form of a broad article 3 hearing. In opposition, the prospective extraditee quoted Sena-
tor Eagleton to stress how narrow such a hearing would be. See McMullen v. United
States, 953 F.2d 761, 768 (2d Cir. 1992), rehg granted, June 5, 1992 (unpublished order).
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7. The Senate Vote
The final vote on the Substitute Treaty came one year to the day after
President Reagan transmitted the Supplementary Treaty to the Senate
for advice and consent. The Senate voted, 87-10, to approve the resolu-
tion of ratification.2'
C. British Ratification
On November 26, 1986, the British House of Commons considered the
Substitute Treaty. In contrast to the spirited deliberations of the United
States Senate, the British debate was subdued and anti-climactic. In fact,
it lasted only one hour. No real opposition to the Substitute Treaty sur-
faced, and the only difference of opinion was between those members of
Parliament who wanted to praise the Reagan Administration for negoti-
ating the Supplementary Treaty,205 and those members who were more
inclined to chastise the United States Senate for presuming to rewrite
it.2"6 The Doherty Case was again mentioned, although not in any de-
tail.27 The tone of the debate makes it clear that Parliament believed
that the Substitute Treaty was the best treaty it could get, and that this
When and if an article 3 hearing becomes necessary, one trusts that Senator Eagleton's
remarks will be measured against his own prior statements and the views of his col-
leagues, and weighed accordingly.
204. As Senator Lugar had promised, the Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986
was considered next, and was passed readily on a voice vote. See generally Pub. L No.
99-415, 100 Stat. 947-49 (1986) (providing for United States contributions to a support
fund established pursuant to the Act, as well as other assistance in the form of guarantees
and credit support to spur economic development and reconciliation in Ireland and
Northern Ireland); S. Rep. No. 326, 99th Cong., 2d Sess (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2065-73 (report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
205. See 106 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 373 (1986) (remarks of Sir Eldon Grifliths).
In the end we got the changes [to the 1977 Treaty] for two almost adventitious
reasons. The first was the support by the President for the request by our Gov-
ernment.... [His consistent support for the British position was of enormous
help in Congress.... I am [also] sure that we would have found it difficult to
achieve the [Supplementary Treaty] if Congress had not been impressed by the
Prime Minister's support for the United States when it launched the raid
against terrorism in Libya.
IdL
206. See id. at 373-75 ("[It] is limited and overdue. We should be unwise to expect too
much from it. It contains far too many let outs .... [I]t took far too long to get this
arrangement through the United States Congress .... It does not go anywhere near as far
as I would have liked or, to be fair, as the [Thatcher] Government would have liked."
(remarks of Sir Eldon Griffiths)); id. at 381 ("Of course, all of us would have preferred it
if the treaty that I am commending to the House tonight was the one originally initialed
by the two Governments, not the one that came from the Senate. But, that having been
said, this supplementary treaty from the Senate is still a worth while [sic] document,
although it is not ideal." (remarks of Mr. David Mellor)); see also id. at 376 ("I too
welcome the order, as far as it goes." (remarks of Mr. Ivor Stanbrook)).
207. See id. at 374 ("I do not wish to detain the House by going into detail about the
Doherty [C]ase. I am aware of that judgment and the weight that British Ministers have
put upon it in their discussions with the United States." (remarks of Sir Eldon Griffiths)).
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was a take-it-or-leave-it situation.2 °8
Following Parliament's approval of the Substitute Treaty, and then an
order in council, the United States and the United Kingdom exchanged
instruments of ratification in London. On December 23, 1986, the
Substitute Treaty, officially titled the "Supplementary Extradition
Treaty," entered into force.
From Doherty's perspective, ratification of the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty was a defeat, but not necessarily a mortal blow. To
be sure, the retroactive narrowing of the "political offense" exception
meant that he might soon face another, more formidable, extradition bat-
tle. But the lengthy ratification process had delayed that day, and, once
the Senate opponents of the original Supplementary Treaty could stall no
longer, they had negotiated substantial concessions from the Reagan Ad-
ministration and the Thatcher Government. These concessions left
Doherty with strong defenses to raise if the British ever decided to renew
the extradition request.2 °9
At the same time, the Senate debate put Doherty well on his way to
winning the public relations war. Specifically, the Foreign Relations
Committee Hearings provided a powerful vehicle for focusing public at-
tention on the broader issue: the condition of human rights in Northern
Ireland. 210  As a breakdown of the Senate's vote on the D'Amato
208. See supra note 206 (remarks of Mr. David Mellor and Mr. Ivor Stanbrook).
209. Included in these defenses was an opportunity to argue that the retroactivity
clause of the Supplementary Treaty was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. See In re
McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1283-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom. McMullen v.
United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992), reh'g granted June 5, 1992 (unpublished
order). At the very least, Doherty would also have a chance to argue that, upon extradi-
tion, he would be subject to persecution. Possibly, he could use an article 3 hearing to
put the Diplock courts and the criminal justice system of Northern Ireland on trial. In-
deed, one commentator has stated that article 3 hearings promise to be "the most excit-
ing, if not entertaining, judicial proceedings ever heard in the [United States]," and that
"[a] foreign government and a resistance movement will be on trial.... It would indeed
be quite a day for Irish resisters to vilify the [United Kingdom] and glorify their cause in
an [a]rticle 3 hearing." See Bassiouni, supra note 98, at 279.
210. A large amount of scholarly commentary on the Supplementary Treaty has been
negative. See, ag., Bassiouni, supra note 98, at 264 ("The actual purpose of the Supple-
mentary Treaty is to assist Great Britain in quelling Irish resistance in both its lawful and
unlawful forms."); Michelle M. Cain, Note, Abrogating The Relative Political Offense
Exception To Extradition: The United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradi-
tion Treaty, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 453, 480 (1987) ("[The Supplementary Treaty is] a
dangerous precedent .... It ignores the philosophy on which the United States was
founded, that of the legitimacy of armed insurrection to achieve political change... [and
is] neither an effective nor a just means of controlling terrorism."); John Lafferty, Note,
The Turning Point Approaches: The Political Offense Exception To Extradition, 24 San
Diego L. Rev. 549, 572 (1987) ("[The Supplementary Treaty was] an unwise attempt to
deal with the present problem of terrorism[,] ... [and] little more than a foreign policy
decision to help the British government more effectively suppress the conflict in Northern
Ireland, while avoiding the urgent need to bring about a peaceful solution to the prob-
lem"). But see Lubet, supra note 76, at 53 (arguing that neutrality in extradition matters
need not always be a guiding principle of foreign policy, and asserting that the political
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Amendment shows, those concerns no longer belonged only to Irish-
Americans in the Northeast or to political liberals.
IV. DEPORTATION
Unlike extradition, where an accused's appearance before the judiciary
for a de novo proceeding is the very first step, a deportation proceeding is
administrative, and it is subject only to limited judicial review at the end.
The United States Supreme Court has explained:
[A]lthough all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some
degree judicial and to some degree political[,] . . . [Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS" or "Service")] officials must exercise es-
pecially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations and therefore, the reasons for giving deference to agency deci-
sions... in other administrative contexts apply with even greater force
in the INS context.
2 11
The Supreme Court's formula was followed closely in Doherty's deporta-
tion proceeding, as executive reliance on foreign policy considerations
and judicial deference combined to bring about what the extradition pro-
ceeding had not: Doherty's return to Northern Ireland.
A. Doherty Asks to be Deported to the Republic of Ireland
Doherty's deportation proceeding, which had been stayed since
1983,212 was reconvened by an immigration judge (the "Immigration
Judge") in early September 1986.213 In response, Doherty invoked sec-
tion 243(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA"), 214
which in certain circumstances allows a deportable alien to select the
country to which he will be deported. 2 15 Doherty withdrew his applica-
tion for asylum, conceded his deportability for entering the United States
without valid documents, 216 and requested immediate deportation to the
Republic of Ireland." 7
branches of the United States Government made a perfectly permissible policy decision to
favor the British Government over the PIRA).
211. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988).
212. See supra note 60.
213. September 1, 1986, marked the expiration of the government's right to petition
the Supreme Court for certiorari in the declaratory judgment action. See supra note 122.
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
215. In relevant part, section 243(a) provides:
The deportation of an alien in the United States... shall be directed by the
Attorney General to a country promptly designated by the alien if that country
is willing to accept him into its territory, unless the Attorney General, in his
discretion, concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to
the interests of the United States.
Id
216. Note that Doherty did not concede the other charges against him, dealing with
criminal conduct, either actual or potential.
217. Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland made sense for several reasons.
First, the Republic of Ireland was the country from which Doherty had entered the
19921
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Doherty's change in strategy was motivated by the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, which was then pending before the British House of
Commons. He was concerned that, once the Treaty took effect, the
United Kingdom would renew its extradition request. Thus, Doherty
wanted to leave the United States before this could occur.2 18
1. The Immigration Judge Finds for Doherty
The INS opposed Doherty's partial concession of the grounds of de-
portation, 219 and it unsuccessfully sought to present evidence on all of
the charges it had lodged against him.22° In addition, the INS objected
to Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland, asserting that depor-
tation to that country would harm American efforts to cooperate with
other nations in combatting terrorism. 221  The Service stated that
United States in 1982. Second, it was also the country of his birth, see supra note 13, and,
third, the Irish government had expressed a willingness to accept Doherty into its terri-
tory upon deportation from the United States. Fourth, Doherty believed that his offenses
would be punished more leniently in the Republic of Ireland than in Northern Ireland, a
judgment shared by the INS.
Based on the Republic of Ireland's reciprocal agreement with the United Kingdom,
Doherty would face prosecution in Ireland and a maximum prison sentence of ten years
for the charges arising out of his escape from custody on June 10, 1981. However,
Doherty asserted that he would be immune from further prosecution in Ireland and
would not be extradited to the United Kingdom for murder or the other charges relating
to the ambush of the British army patrol on May 2, 1980.
Finally, an alien's designation of the country of deportation under section 243(a) of the
INA had never previously been rejected on grounds of prejudice to American national
interests.
218. As stated earlier, the British House of Commons ratified the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty on November 26, 1986, and the new Treaty took effect on December
23, 1986. See supra part III.
Doherty's concerns about the revised treaty were well-founded, as the case of Peter
McMullen makes clear. See In re McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(McMullen alleged that the United States government made only perfunctory efforts to
deport him to Ireland after it had won a final deportation order, and that the government
procrastinated so as to be able to arrest him minutes before his departure for Ireland on a
second British extradition warrant, one day after the Supplementary Treaty went into
effect), aff'd, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992).
219. See supra text accompanying note 216.
220. The Immigration Judge ruled that, in view of Doherty's concession of de-
portability, there was no purpose in allowing the INS to prove the remaining contested
allegations and charges. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (Oral Decision of the Im-
migration Judge, Sept. 19, 1986), reprinted in Appendix: Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct.
719 (1992), at 156a [hereinafter Appendix].
221. Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland placed the INS in the politically
and diplomatically awkward position of proving that British-Irish relationships over
Northern Ireland were unfriendly, and that, if Doherty were sent to the Republic of
Ireland, the British had little hope of getting him back. See Dillon, supra note 39, at 197.
At the September 12, 1986 hearing, the Service provided newspaper articles and speeches
on the general issue of terrorism, but offered no particularized evidence to support its
objection to Doherty's designation of Ireland. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231
(Transcript of Deportation Hearing, Sept. 12, 1986, Tr. 41-47 [hereinafter Deportation
Hearing Sept. 12, 1986, Tr. #]), reprinted in Joint Appendix: On Writ of Certiorari to
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Doherty's case was of concern "at the highest levels of government" and
would receive the Attorney General's personal attention that "coming
week." 2" The Immigration Judge granted the INS a one-week continu-
ance to produce specific evidence in support of its objection to Doherty's
designation of Ireland." 3
When the deportation hearing resumed on September 19, 1986, the
INS advised that it had nothing further to submit, although the case was
still "under review at the highest levels of the Justice Department." 4
The Immigration Judge accordingly found Doherty deportable and or-
dered him deported to the Republic of Ireland.
2. Doherty Seeks Habeas Corpus Relief
The INS appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the five-mem-
ber Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA" or "Board"), arguing that
the Immigration Judge had decided the case on an incomplete record,
and that Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland was prejudicial
to American national interests. Faced with the prospect of a lengthy
administrative proceeding, Doherty petitioned the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas
corpus-an order releasing him from custody to permit his immediate
deportation to the Republic of Ireland. In support, Doherty argued that
the INS was procrastinating" 5 solely to ensure that, once the Supple-
mentary Extradition Treaty took effect, he would be available for extra-
dition to the United Kingdom.
On September 25, 1986, Judge Peter K. Leisure, in an unreported deci-
sion, denied Doherty's petition and allowed the administrative appeal
process to continue.1 6 The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Leisure's rul-
ing on December 23, 1986,12 the day the Supplementary Extradition
Treaty took effect. In an opinion by Judge Ralph Winter, the court held
that its power to intervene in the ongoing administrative proceeding was
"extremely limited," so long as there was "any reasonable foundation at
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct.
719 (1992), at 23 [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
222. See Deportation Hearing Sept. 12, 1986, Tr. 47, supra note 221, reprinted in Joint
Appendix, supra note 221, at 23.
223. See id These concerns "at the highest levels of government" are an apparent
reference to the Reagan-Thatcher meetings of December 22, 1984, and February 20,
1985. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
224. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (Transcript of Deportation Hearing, Sept.
19, 1986, Tr. 57 [hereinafter Deportation Hearing Sept. 19, 1986, Tr. #]), reprinted in
Joint Appendix, supra note 221, at 48.
225. Specifically, Doherty argued that the INS was pursuing a frivolous administrative
appeal and improperly delaying his deportation to the Republic of Ireland. See Doherty
v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 941 n.3 (2d Cir. 1986).
226. See John Riley, U.S. Refuses to Deport an IRA Member, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1986,
at 3.
227. See Doherty, 808 F.2d at 944.
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all for the Attorney General's actions. ' 228 The court then went out of its
way to express views on an issue not even before it. It interpreted the
Attorney General's power to designate a country of deportation under
section 243(a) of the INA very broadly, and announced in dicta that the
scope of judicial review of an administrative decision rejecting an alien's
designation of country would be narrow:
There are no statutory guidelines regarding what quality or quantity of
prejudice to United States interests is necessary, or even what consti-
tutes "interests." The requisite judgment requires an essentially polit-
ical determination. . . . Consequently, apart from claims such as
"fraud, absence of jurisdiction, or unconstitutionality," . . . the deter-
mination of the Attorney General is essentially unreviewable. 229
The court also read section 243(a) to provide that, if an alien designated
a country of deportation and his choice was rejected, the next choice
belonged to the Attorney General.230
3. The BIA Affirms the Immigration Judge
Once the habeas corpus matter had been resolved, the parties turned
their full attention back to the administrative forum. On February 11,
1987, the BIA heard oral argument on the Service's appeal. One month
later, it issued a decision unanimously affirming the Immigration Judge
and ordering Doherty deported to the Republic of Ireland.231
The Board first rejected the assertion that the Immigration Judge had
erred in refusing to allow the Service to adduce additional evidence to
show that Doherty was deportable on more grounds than he had con-
ceded. It essentially agreed with Doherty that such proof would have
unnecessarily prolonged the hearing.2 32 Turning to Doherty's designa-
228. Id. at 942. The Second Circuit rejected Doherty's claim that the INS appeal to
the BIA was frivolous, noting that "the novelty of the issues raised makes this case a
particularly inappropriate occasion for judicial intervention in the administrative pro-
cess." Id. at 941 n.3.
229. Id. at 943-44. Presumably, the Second Circuit would view the Attorney
General's power as broad enough to send a German Jew back to the Third Reich. See
also Basso, supra note 153, at 326, 333 (characterizing the court's decision as one of
"virtually absolute deference," and concluding that, if the Attorney General's power to
deport a PIRA suspect to the destination of the Attorney General's choice is as broad as
the Second Circuit found it to be, the Supplementary Extradition Treaty may have been
unnecessary).
230. Specifically, the court stated: "The implied corollary to the Attorney General's
power to reject a designated country is the power to name the country to which the alien
shall be deported, subject of course to that country's willingness to accept the alien."
Doherty, 808 F.2d at 941.
231. In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (BIA, March 11, 1987 [hereinafter BIA March
11, 1987]), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 220 (all citations will be to Appendix
pages).
232. See id. at 153a-54a. The BIA specifically stated the following:
An immigration judge ... is not obligated to allow the Service to waste valuable
time and resources proving superfluous charges and allegations. A respondent
is no more deportable on seven charges than on two .... In this case, the
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tion of Ireland, the Board found the INS's appeal "confusing" because
"deportability and designation... are separate and distinct issues.""
In addition, it observed that an alien's designation of a country, pursuant
to section 243(a) of the INA, had never previously been rejected on the
ground that it would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.
The BIA declined to reject Doherty's designation for that reason, noting
that "the Service was granted a continuance to allow it to secure evidence
of such interest, but it has produced none."'
When the Board released its decision on March 11, 1987, it was una-
ware that six days earlier the INS had filed a motion to supplement the
record. That motion presented for inclusion in the file an affidavit from
Associate Attorney General Stephen S. Trott (the "Trott Affidavit").3 a5
The Trott Affidavit, which was dated February 17, 1987, explained why
in Mr. Trott's judgment Doherty's deportation to the Republic of Ireland
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. The Service
accordingly petitioned the Board to reopen the case and reconsider its
ruling in light of this new evidence.
On May 22, 1987, the BIA granted the INS's request and reopened the
case. However, after reviewing both the Service's motion and the Trott
Affidavit, the Board affirmed its March 1 th order. The BIA held that
the affidavit did not constitute "previously unavailable evidence," as re-
quired under the BIA regulations,236 and it again denied the INS's re-
quest to remand the case to the Immigration Judge. Moreover, the
Board expressed particular concern over the INS's failure to explain the
"extraordinary delay" in producing the Trott Affidavit:
[T]he Service's motion is completely silent as to the reasons for [the
Trott Affidavit's] submission at this late date. This is an especially
telling omission in light of the fact that the Service has repeatedly rep-
resented to the immigration judge that Mr. Doherty's case was of great
respondent ... conceded deportability on two charges.... The immigration
judge saw nothing to be gained from proof of additional charges of deportability
and, despite the Service's appeal, neither do we.
Id
233. Id at 154a.
234. Id at 155a.
235. Mr. Trott did not execute his affidavit until eight days after the Board had heard
oral argument. At that time, the INS may well have reassessed the strength of its posi-
tion and decided that the evidentiary record needed some additional support.
As Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Criminal Divi-
sion, Mr. Trott had previously characterized Judge Sprizzo's decision in the Extradition
Hearing as "outrageous," and the "political offense" exception as "nonsense." See supra
note 133 and accompanying text. He had also played a key role in negotiating the Sup-
plementary Extradition Treaty with the British. See Hearing before the Judiciary Sub-
committee, supra note 101, at 80 (remarks of Judge Sofaer) ("We worked very hard on
this treaty, especially Mr. Trott.").
236. In relevant part, 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1992) provides that "[m]otions to reopen in de-
portation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence
sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered
or presented at the former hearing .... "
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interest and under review at high government levels in September
1986. The glacial pace at which any tangible proof of this interest was
produced seems to belie any sense of urgency or responsibility on the
part of the government to proceed promptly in this case.23 7
The Board also observed that Doherty had claimed Irish citizenship as
early as February 1985.238 It reasoned that the Service therefore should
have been prepared well before the September 1986 hearing to contest
Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland.23 9
The INS's motion did persuade two of the five Board members to
switch their votes. The dissenters characterized the Trott Affidavit as
"authoritative, material, and dispositive" on the issue of whether
Doherty's deportation to Ireland would be prejudicial to the interests of
the United States.'4 The dissenters also faulted the majority for becom-
ing "entangled in the requirements of motion practice unnecessarily"t241
and for attempting "to equate the Service with the Associate Attorney
General and to punish the former because the latter did not act more
expeditiously. 242
4. Attorney General Meese Reverses the BIA
In most immigration cases, the BIA represents the highest level of ad-
ministrative review within the Department of Justice.243 Although the
Attorney General retains authority to review personally all BIA deci-
sions, that authority is rarely exercised.2'
On May 29, 1987, the INS petitioned Attorney General Edwin Meese
III to review the BIA's decision to deport Doherty to the Republic of
Ireland. On October 28, 1987, following five months of inaction, the
Attorney General agreed to accept the case.241
237. In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (BIA, May 22, 1987 [hereinafter BIA May 22,
1987]), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 220, at 140a (all citations will be to Appendix
pages).
238. Actually, the BIA appears to have been unduly generous to the Service. Other
parts of the record make it clear that the INS had actual notice of Doherty's claim to
Irish citizenship from his original application for asylum, filed in June 1983. See also
Dillon, supra note 39, at 183 (British knew as early as mid-1983 that Doherty was likely
to seek deportation to the Republic of Ireland, in lieu of returning to the United
Kingdom).
239. See BIA May 22, 1987, supra note 237, at 141a.
240. Id at 144a (Board Member Morris, dissenting).
241. Id. at 145a (Board Member Morris, dissenting).
242. Id. at 146a (Board Member Morris, dissenting).
243. Under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1992), the Board's affirmance of an Immigration
Judge's order of deportation would ordinarily render a case administratively final.
244. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1) (1992) (requiring the BIA to refer for review to the
Attorney General all cases which (1) the Attorney General directs the BIA to refer to
him; (2) the BIA believes should be so referred; or (3) the Commissioner of the INS
requests be referred for review). In the past twenty years, the Attorney General has
published fewer than a dozen opinions involving certification review of BIA decisions.
Two of those are in the Doherty Case.
245. On December 3, 1987, while the issue of his designation of the Republic of
Ireland was still pending before Attorney General Meese, Doherty petitioned the BIA to
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On June 9, 1988, Attorney General Meese issued a written opinion
(the "Meese Opinion"), 2' in which he held that deportation of Doherty
to the Republic of Ireland would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States, and that Doherty should be deported instead to the
United Kingdom.247 The Meese Opinion did not address many of the
procedural and evidentiary issues that had vexed the Immigration Judge
and the BIA. For example, the Attorney General expressed "no opin-
ion" regarding the BIA's decision to deny the Service's motion to supple-
ment the record,24s and announced that the procedural regulations that
bind the BIA are not even applicable to an Attorney General when re-
viewing BIA decisions.249 He also asserted that an Attorney General
reviewing an immigration case retains full authority to receive additional
evidence and to make de novo factual determinations.'
Turning to the merits, the Attorney General identified two reasons for
rejecting Doherty's designation of the Republic of Ireland. First, his own
de novo review of the factual record in the 1984 Extradition Hearing
persuaded him that Doherty had committed serious crimes in the United
Kingdom. 51 Second, Mr. Meese articulated that it was the policy of the
United States that those who commit acts of violence against a demo-
cratic state should receive prompt and lawful punishment in that state."'-
The Attorney General further determined that deporting Doherty to
the Republic of Ireland would injure American relations with the United
Kingdom. In so ruling, he cited a letter he had received from Michael H.
Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (the "Armacost
reopen his deportation proceeding. Doherty asked the Board to remand his case to the
Immigration Judge for further hearing, so that he might reassert his prior applications for
asylum and withholding of deportation, and redesignate the country of deportation. As
grounds for this relief, Doherty pointed to "changed circumstances": the December 1,
1987, implementation of a major change in Irish extradition law. For a discussion of the
reopening of Doherty's case, see infra part IV.B.
246. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (Mem. Att'y Gen., June 9, 1988 [hereinafter
Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988]), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 220, at 116a (all
citations will be to Appendix pages).
247. See id.
248. See id. at 128a n.12.
249. See id at 121a n.6.
250. See id. This assertion was surprising because it is wholly at odds with the notion
of appellate review of a record created below. The regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(2)
(1992), is silent on the scope of review. In addition, prior to the Doherty Case, whenever
an Attorney General had accepted certification review of a BIA decision on an immigra-
tion matter, the Attorney General had limited his review to legal issues and had not
disturbed the BIA's factual findings. In each prior case where further factfinding had
been necessary, the Attorney General had remanded the case to the BIA. See Brief for
Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 2-3 n.3, INS v. Doherty (No. 90-925).
251. Judge Sprizzo, of course, had reviewed the same record, yet he had concluded
that Doherty had committed unextraditable "political offenses," not common crimes.
See supra part II.B.3.
252. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988, supra note 246, at 124a. The assumption that
Northern Ireland is as democratic as the other parts of the United Kingdom was one that
Senator Jesse Helms had been unwilling to make during the Senate's treaty ratification
debate. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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letter").253 The Armacost letter stated that Judge Sprizzo's denial of
Doherty's extradition had been met with "great disappointment" in the
United Kingdom, and opined that the United Kingdom "would not wel-
come" a decision by the Attorney General to deport Doherty elsewhere.
The letter also stated that the United Kingdom is the United States'
closest partner in counter-terrorism efforts, and that failure to return
Doherty to the United Kingdom could undermine those efforts. Finally,
the letter cautioned that, "given the strength of British views on this is-
sue," a determination by the executive branch not to deport Doherty to
the United Kingdom "might well prejudice broader aspects of [the] bilat-
eral relationship beyond cooperation in counter-terrorism activities."
Mr. Meese agreed with those views.254
As a final matter, the Attorney General took note of Doherty's
December 3, 1987, request to reopen his deportation proceedings. Mr.
Meese remanded that motion to the BIA for its review, and expressed no
opinion as to how the Board should decide it.255
5. The Second Circuit Affirms the Meese Opinion
Doherty appealed the Attorney General's decision, and the Second
Circuit affirmed.256 The court characterized the appeal as "somewhat
curious" because Doherty's intervening motion to reopen the deportation
proceeding showed that he had lost interest in deportation to the
Republic of Ireland.257 It then reiterated its prior statement that section
243(a) of the INA grants the Attorney General "broad discretion to de-
termine what constitutes prejudice to national interests. ' 258 The court
found that Attorney General Meese's decision was "surely within the
scope" of this discretion to determine that deportation of Doherty any-
where other than to the United Kingdom "would harm our relationship
with [that country] and would contradict our policy of punishing vio-
lence against democratic nations. 259
The court also rejected Doherty's claim that the Attorney General had
253. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988, supra note 246, at 126a. Mr. Armacost signed
the Supplementary Extradition Treaty on behalf of the United States on June 25, 1985.
See supra note 137. Unlike the Trott Affidavit, to which Doherty was given an opportu-
nity to reply, Doherty had no notice of the Armacost letter.
254. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988, supra note 246, at 126a-27a.
255. See id. at 129a-30a; infra part IV.B.
256. See Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (2d Cir.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
257. See id. at 1113; supra note 245. The Second Circuit held this designation appeal
in abeyance pending administrative consideration of Doherty's motion to reopen. After
Doherty's motion to reopen was denied by Attorney General Thornburgh, Doherty filed
a second appeal, which the court consolidated for briefing and decision purposes with the
earlier designation appeal. Although this Article discusses the two appeals separately-
in parts IV.A and IV.B, respectively-it should be understood that the appeals were de-
cided simultaneously.
258. Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1113; see supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
259. Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1113. The court accepted, but did not analyze, the govern-
ment's articulation of the policy.
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committed reversible procedural error by relying on the Armacost letter,
evidence which had not been in the record when the case was before the
BIA. The court acknowledged that "it might have been preferable" for
the Attorney General to have given Doherty an opportunity to comment
on the letter, but it concluded that the Armacost letter "merely con-
firmed" the Attorney General's own conclusions about the foreign policy
implications of the case, and was "of no consequence to the outcome of
the decision." 2"
6. Analysis
This phase of the Doherty Case warrants several observations. First,
and most obvious, is that Doherty took a calculated risk by conceding his
deportability and designating the Republic of Ireland. Thereafter, he
could never quite overcome the perception that he had rolled the dice
and lost. For its part, the INS would never tire of arguing that Doherty's
decision to seek immediate deportation to Ireland was based on advice of
counsel, and should thus be viewed as a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his earlier claim to asylum.2 61
The second is that the Justice Department's handling of the matter
gave the appearance of organizational confusion or disarray. When the
Immigration Judge asked the Service for evidence that Doherty's depor-
tation to Ireland would prejudice American national interests, the Trott
Affidavit was not forthcoming for five months-virtually until the eve of
a BIA decision adverse to the government. When the INS later asked
the Attorney General to review the BIA's decision, it took Mr. Meese
five months just to agree to do so. Mr. Meese's opinion on the merits was
released less than a month before he announced his resignation from of-
fice. The overall impression is that Doherty's case was lost in the bureau-
cracy, became important to the Administration only when defeat was
imminent, and was resolved only as one of the loose ends that Mr. Meese
needed to tie up when he cleaned out his desk. Others have suggested
that Mr. Meese's tenure at Justice was marked by disorganization.26
260. Id. at 1113-14.
261. See, eg., infra note 293 and accompanying text (Attorney General Thornburgh
agrees with INS that Doherty waived his claims to asylum and withholding).
262. See Andy Pasztor, Meese's Avoidance Of Criminal Charges Won't End Justice
Department Turmoil, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at 2.
Persistent morale problems afflicting the Justice Department, coupled with a
substantial erosion of support for Mr. Meese among both Republicans and
Democrats in Congress, are likely to bring months of frustration, policy
gridlock and political sparring for the nation's chief law enforcement official
and the agency he heads.... Faced with such conflicts, the attorney general
has clung stubbornly to his job the same way he has run the Justice Department
the past three years: trusting only a small group of conservative aides, gererally
treating critics with disdain and, above all, relying on his ideological and per-
sonal ties to Mr. Reagan.
Id; see also Washington Wire, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1988, at I (referring to "Meese's
Morass" at the "demoralized Justice Department.").
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The Department's administrative handling of Doherty's case seems con-
sistent with that perception.
Third, the tenor of the Meese Opinion reads nothing like the review by
a cabinet officer of the decision of an inferior tribunal that it purports to
be. Rather, in tone and substance, it was really a rebuttal to Judge
Sprizzo's extradition decision by the losing litigant in that case. Mr.
Meese barely addressed the issues as framed by the Immigration Judge
and the BIA. Instead, he focused his attention on refuting the reasoning
of Judge Sprizzo.
The Attorney General's reliance on the Trott Affidavit and the
Armacost letter is also troubling. Neither document was before the
Immigration Judge. The Board received the Trott Affidavit only at the
last moment, and the submission of the Armacost letter to Mr. Meese
was unknown to Doherty. While immigration proceedings are not gov-
erned by the Administrative Procedure Act,263 they are still subject to
constitutional due process concerns.2  Mr. Trott and Mr. Armacost had
been the administration's "point men" in the extradition controversy-
i.e., critics of Judge Sprizzo's decision and negotiators with the British on
a treaty that sought to undo that decision. By relying so heavily on the
untimely evidence they provided, Mr. Meese eliminated any remaining
distinction between the conduct of foreign relations and the adjudication
of the merits of an alien's deportation case.265
Fourth, the Second Circuit's affirmance of Mr. Meese's opinion should
not be given the weight of precedent if a national interest challenge to an
alien's designation of country should arise in other circuits.266 Once
Doherty had moved to reopen his deportation case in December 1987,
his designation of the Republic of Ireland no longer presented a live case
or controversy. On that basis alone, Doherty might have abandoned his
appeal or the Second Circuit could have simply dismissed it as moot. If
the mootness issue was briefed by the parties, the court's opinion never
discussed it. Then, too, there was the insurmountable problem posed by
Judge Winter's dicta in Doherty v. Meese.267 In that case, the court had
263. 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
264. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
265. The procedures would have been arguably more objective if Attorney General
Meese had given Doherty an opportunity to respond to the Armacost letter, and if the
INS had not used evidence supplied by two officials who were directly involved in the
treaty negotiations. However, it seems likely that the Justice Department was not overly
concerned with its appearance, and that foreign policy was the engine that drove the
adjudication.
In some respects, the Doherty Case resembles United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992), another proceeding
with sensitive foreign policy overtones, in which a Reagan Administration cabinet officer
acted aggressively in the name of national security interests.
266. One commentator has suggested that this aspect of the case was correctly decided.
See William Roebuck, Comment, Recent Development, 20 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 665,
675, 680-82 (1990).
267. 808 F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1986).
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articulated an extremely narrow and deferential standard of review that
would govern the disallowance on national interest grounds of an alien's
designation of country of deportation when a proper case came before
the Circuit.268 With that rabbit already in the hat, it seems unlikely that
any alien could ever persuade the Second Circuit to overturn an Attor-
ney General's rejection of the country of designation under section
243(a).
Support for that theory may be found in the appellate panel's lack of
interest in the procedural issues raised by Doherty: the Service's last-
minute production of the Trott Affidavit, which had so angered the BIA,
or the almost magical appearance of the ex parte Armacost Letter to
support the reasoning of the Meese Opinion.269
B. Doherty Moves to Reopen His Deportation Proceeding
On December 3, 1987, while the issue of his designation of the
Republic of Ireland was still pending before Attorney General Meese,
Doherty petitioned the BIA to reopen his deportation proceeding.
Doherty desired to reassert his prior applications for asylum and with-
holding of deportation,270 and to redesignate his chosen country of de-
portation. As grounds for this relief, Doherty contended that the Irish
Extradition Act (the "LEA"), which had taken effect two days earlier,
would operate to ensure that the Republic of Ireland would extradite him
to the United Kingdom were he deported to Ireland.2
Doherty asserted that the EA amended and qualified the existing
Irish law, so as to remove from the Irish courts the authority to decide
whether a given offense was political or connected with a political
268. See supra notes 229-30, 258, and accompanying text.
269. Even assuming that an agency has used extra-record evidence, reversal is not re-
quired absent a showing of substantial prejudice. See United States v. Pierce Auto
Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 528-30 (1946). But see Wiscope S.A. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 604 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing a federal agency
decision for failure to turn "square comers" ordinarily required in sensitive international
issues).
270. See supra notes 60, 245. Congress has provided two forms of relief for persons
who come to the United States because they fear persecution in their homeland: (1)
asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988), and (2) withholding of deportation, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1988). The Attorney General can grant asylum upon the determination that
an alien is also a refugee-i.e., an alien that is unable to return to his homeland because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. However, not all refugees are entitled
to asylum; a grant of asylum remains discretionary with the Attorney General. In con-
trast, withholding of deportation offers a limited form of mandatory relief; it prohibits the
Attorney General from returning an alien to a country where the alien would be subject
to persecution, but leaves open the alternative of deporting the alien to a non-threatening
third country.
271. By enacting and then implementing the IEA, the Republic of Ireland fulfilled its
promise in the Hillsborough Accord of November 1985, and embraced the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. See supra note 162; see also
Duffy, supra note 97, at 310-17 (explaining that the passage of the Irish Extradition Act
by the Irish Parliament gave effect to the European Convention).
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offense. He further averred that, had he been deported to the Republic of
Ireland prior to December 1, 1987, any subsequent request by the British
government for his extradition from Ireland would have been considered
pursuant to the Irish statutes and decisional law which preexisted the
Extradition Act.2 72  Doherty contended that "under those laws, [he]
would have been able to resist extradition [from Ireland to the United
Kingdom] based upon the same sort of political offense exception which
precluded the British government from obtaining his extradition from
the United States. '2 73 Finally, he accused the INS and Attorney General
Meese of delaying the resolution of his case in order to ensure that, at
such time as he was eventually deported to Ireland, his subsequent extra-
dition to the United Kingdom would be a foregone conclusion under the
new Extradition Act.274
In the Service's view, Doherty's invocation of the new Irish extradition
law was disingenuous. On several occasions in the deportation proceed-
ing, Doherty had attempted to convince the BIA to sustain the Immigra-
tion Judge by arguing that, pursuant to pre-1987 decisions of the Irish
Supreme Court narrowing the "political offense" exception, he would
have been subject to extradition from Ireland to the United Kingdom.2 75
The government implied that the real motive behind Doherty's change of
strategy was Attorney General Meese's October 28, 1987, announcement
that he would review the BIA's decision in Doherty's behalf. At that
juncture, the government suggested, Doherty knew that he was unlikely
to be deported to Ireland, and needed to try a different tack.
1. The BIA Grants Doherty's Motion
On November 14, 1988, following eleven months of consideration,276
272. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (Affidavit of Mary Boresz Pike (Doherty's
attorney) Dec. 2, 1987, 11 24-30 [hereinafter Affidavit Dec. 2, 1987, #]), reprinted in
Joint Appendix, supra note 221, at 57; see also Irish Extradition Developments, supra note
97, at 195:
Athough the legislation was enacted in January 1987, its implementation was
suspended until 1 December subject to the proviso that resolutions of both
Houses of the [Irish Parliament] could either bring it into force at an earlier
date or provide for further postponement. This delay was to allow time for
reforms in the Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland, for which the Irish Govern-
ment was pressing, to be introduced by the United Kingdom. By December
pressure on these issues appeared fruitless but security developments on both
sides of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic meant that con-
tinued non-implementation was seen as politically impossible.
(footnotes omitted).
273. Affidavit Dec. 2, 1987, 31, supra note 272, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra
note 221, at 57.
274. See id. 24, 32, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 221, at 57.
275. See Petitioner's Brief at 47, INS v. Doherty, (April 1991) (No. 90-925); Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief at 3, INS v. Doherty, (July 1991) (No. 90-925).
276. The BIA initially expressed uncertainty about whether it had jurisdiction to con-
sider Doherty's motion while other aspects of his case were pending before Attorney
General Meese. Thus, by order of February 2, 1988, the BIA had forwarded Doherty's
motion to the Attorney General for action. On June 9, 1988, the Attorney General re-
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the BIA granted Doherty's motion to reopen by a three to two vote.2 "
The Board did not address Doherty's claim that a change in Irish extra-
dition law warranted reopening. Instead, as described below, it relied on
other grounds that Doherty had not invoked. The BIA concluded that,
at the time of his hearing in September 1986, Doherty had a reasonable
expectation that he would be deported to the Republic of Ireland, and
that deportation to the United Kingdom appeared unlikely. Given the
state of the law at that time, the BIA held that Doherty's failure to pur-
sue asylum was excusable because he "could not have been expected to
anticipate that he would not be deported to the country of [his]
choice. ' 278  In addition, the Board concluded that Attorney General
Meese's opinion of June 9, 1988, which disallowed Doherty's designation
of Ireland, constituted "changed circumstances."279
After reviewing affidavits from Doherty's mother and his attorney, and
other evidence which Doherty had submitted with his motion to reopen,
the Board held that Doherty had established a prima facie case that he
was likely to be persecuted if returned to Northern Ireland.2" The BIA
dismissed as premature the INS' claim that Doherty had engaged in con-
duct which would ultimately render him either ineligible for withholding
or unworthy of asylum, and stated that "[tlhe Service will have the op-
portunity to prove its allegations upon reopening of the proceedings."'"
2. Attorney General Thornburgh Reverses the BIA
On December 5, 1988, the INS once again took the unusual step of
certifying Doherty's case to the Attorney General for review. Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh, Mr. Meese's successor, accepted the request
manded Doherty's motion to the BIA, expressing no views as to how the BIA should
resolve the matter except to recommend that it be given priority in view of the case's age.
See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988, supra note 246, at 129a-30a; text accompanying supra
note 255.
277. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (BIA, Nov. 14, 1988 [hereinafter BIA Nov.
14, 1988]), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 220, at 92a (all citations will be to Appendix
pages).
278. Id. at 99a.
279. Id.
280. See id
281. Id. at 100a. The BIA did not permit Doherty to redesignate the country of depor-
tation.
The dissenting members of the Board argued that Doherty had failed to make a prima
facie showing of persecution if returned to the United Kingdom, and that reopening was
unwarranted in the exercise of discretion because Doherty was a terrorist and a member
of a terrorist organization. See id. at 10la-03a.
This dissent, in turn, prompted a strongly worded special concurrence from Board
Member Michael J. Heilman. He stated that "[m]any persons who have engaged in vio-
lence, or who have been accused of engaging in violence, have been granted asylum in the
United States by the very Department of Justice and the very [INS] which have so strenu-
ously tried to deport Mr. Doherty." Id at 108a. In illustration, Board Member Heilman
cited Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988), a recent decision in which the
Hon. Stephen S. Trott, by then a judge on the Ninth Circuit, had joined. See BIA Nov.
14, 1988, supra note 277, at 109a.
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for certification on February 22, 1989, and afforded Doherty and the Ser-
vice an opportunity for further briefing.
On June 30, 1989, the Attorney General disapproved the BIA's order
and denied Doherty's motion to reopen.282 In effect, his ruling rendered
Doherty's concession of deportability administratively final, and gave ef-
fect to Mr. Meese's determination that Doherty should be deported to
the United Kingdom. Mr. Thornburgh's exhaustive opinion (the
"Thornburgh Decision") set out five separate reasons why Doherty
should not be permitted to continue immigration proceedings.283
The Attorney General first rejected the BIA's sua sponte determina-
tion that the Meese Opinion of June 9, 1988, constituted changed cir-
cumstances warranting reopening of the deportation proceedings. Mr.
Thornburgh found it unlikely, as a general matter, that an Attorney
General's exercise of statutory authority to reject a deportee's designa-
tion of country could ever constitute new evidence.2"4 In the instant
case, he continued, deportation to the country designated by the alien
had been vigorously opposed by the Service, which had also "represented
that there [was] interest at the highest levels of the Government that the
alien not be deported to the country designated. '285 Under these circum-
stances, Attorney General Thornburgh found it "inconceivable" that
anyone represented by counsel could not know of the risk that the Attor-
ney General would deny deportation to Ireland to protect the interests of
the United States. 286 Furthermore, Mr. Thornburgh added, if "[t]he ulti-
mate decision in an administrative process ... constitut[ed] 'new' evi-
dence to justify reopening . . . there could never be finality in the
process.
2 87
The Attorney General next turned to Doherty's argument that the
IEA warranted reopening, an issue not addressed by the BIA. In es-
sence, Mr. Thornburgh reasoned that Doherty had committed a colossal
blunder by misreading the applicable Irish law. Mr. Thornburgh began
by noting that the IEA simply gave effect in domestic Irish law to the
provisions of the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism. He observed that the Irish government had expressed its in-
tention to sign the European Convention in November 1985 and had
signed it in February 1986-more than six months before Doherty with-
282. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (Mem. Att'y Gen., June 30, 1989 [hereinaf-
ter Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989]), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 220, at 46a (all
citations will be to Appendix pages).
283. The invocation of so many alternate grounds is a decisional tactic that had been
criticized by the D.C. Circuit in another context: "almost as if to ensure a preferred
result, the... judgment [below] is supported by layer upon layer of alternative holdings
on the issues...." See Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 983-
84 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
284. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 58a.
285. Id. at 58a-59a.
286. See id. at 66a.
287. Id. at 67a.
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drew his applications for asylum and for withholding of deportation.
Against this background of well-publicized events, the Attorney General
concluded that passage of the IEA in January 1987 and its implementa-
tion on December 1, 1987, were "neither sudden nor unforeseeable."2 8
The Attorney General also reviewed the extradition decisions of the
Irish courts and concluded that Doherty would have been subject to ex-
tradition from Ireland to the United Kingdom even before Ireland be-
came a party to the European Convention. Thus, he reasoned, Ireland's
subsequent adoption and implementation of the Extradition Act neither
created nor materially increased the risk that Doherty would be extra-
dited to the United Kingdom if deported to Ireland.23 9 In any event, Mr.
Thornburgh concluded, the issue of Irish law had become irrelevant after
June 9, 1988, once Attorney General Meese had ordered Doherty de-
ported to the United Kingdom, not Ireland. 2' 9
As a third ground for refusing to reopen, Mr. Thornburgh also re-
jected the new evidence Doherty had offered in support of his renewed
claim for asylum and withholding. He reasoned that such evidence was
"cumulative of that ... previously presented, discoverable long ago, or
not material in light of the evidence that was presented."'29
288. Id at 59a-60a, 67a-74a; see also supra note 162 (discussing events that led up to
the IEA).
289. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 58a-59a, 66a-74a.
290. See id at 74a.
291. Id at 75a. Mr. Thornburgh refused to consider a 1988 report by a Nobel Peace
Prize-winning human rights group concerning political persecution in Northern Ireland.
In explanation, he stated the following:
[A]lthough the Amnesty [International] Report itself first appeared in 1988,
[Doherty] could, with due diligence, have presented significant amounts of the
information contained in it at a much earlier stage of these proceedings. He
offers no reasonable explanation for his failure to do so.
Amnesty International's concerns over the causes of the incidents against
Irish republic groups do not bear on the treatment of individuals held in prison
for criminal activities. Assuming for the purposes of this motion that British
security forces have on occasion sought to kill suspected republican opposition
members who were outside their custody, it does not follow that an individual
actually in the keeping of British forces would also be exposed to such a threat.
Id at 76a, 76a n.31 (referring to Amnesty Int'l, United Kingdom/Northern Ireland:
Killings by Security Forces and "Supergrass" Trials (1988)). The Attorney General also
rejected an affidavit from Doherty's mother, in which she described her family's history
of mistreatment at the hands of the British security forces and unionist elements outside
the government. He reasoned as follows:
The affidavit's references to the conduct of nongovernmental "unionist" ele-
ments relate generally to the unstable conditions in Northern Ireland, but do
not substantiate a claim that [Doherty] would be threatened by persecution at
the hands of British governmental authorities.
m he affiant states that on two unidentifeid [sic] occasions on which her
daughter was detained by the police, "the interrogators talked about [Doherty]
and what would be done to him upon his return."
... The statements attributed to the security personnel are ambiguous.
Bearing in mind that [Doherty] has been convicted of a murder, "abusive"
statements about him by the police, or statements about "what would be done
1992]
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Fourth, the Attorney General also denied reopening on the alternate
ground that Doherty had explicitly waived his claims to asylum and
withholding at the September 1986 deportation hearing. Mr.
Thornburgh characterized Doherty's waiver as part of a calculated plan
to ensure his immediate deportation to the Republic of Ireland before the
United Kingdom ratified the Supplementary Extradition Treaty.292 In
the Attorney General's view, "the integrity of the administrative pro-
cess" outweighed Doherty's interest in withdrawing an explicit waiver
made upon advice of counsel.293
Finally, the Attorney General declined to reopen the case on the
ground that Doherty would not ultimately be entitled either to asylum or
withholding. Mr. Thornburgh did not dispute the BIA's finding that
Doherty had established prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. In-
stead, he ruled that it was unnecessary for him to address that issue in
light of INS v. Abudu.294
Noting that a grant of asylum is discretionary, Mr. Thornburgh ruled
that he would not grant Doherty asylum. Among other reasons, he de-
termined that it was in the foreign policy interests of the United States to
deport Doherty to the United Kingdom.295
to him" if he were returned, do not have to be understood as implied threats of
persecution on forbidden grounds.
Id. at 76a n.32, 78a n.37 (citations omitted). But cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct.
995, 1000 (1992) (holding that use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious
injury); id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (further proposing that nothing in the
Eighth Amendment limits the definition of injury constituting cruel and unusual punish-
ment to "physical injury" and, thus, even fear of beating may be enough).
292. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 79a-80a.
293. Id. at 79a.
294. 485 U.S. 94 (1988); see Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 64a
n.21. Under Abudu, the BIA (or the Attorney General) can deny a motion to reopen by
skipping ahead of the threshold concerns (prima facie case or reasonable explanation) and
by determining that the movant would not ultimately be entitled to discretionary relief
(here, asylum). Abudu makes clear that the opportunity to "skip ahead" is not available
to resolve motions for mandatory relief (here, withholding). See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-
06.
295. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 65a-67a. In essence, the
Attorney General turned the humanitarian remedy of asylum into a political and foreign
policy tool that could be used to favor the United States' allies and chastise its enemies.
But see Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group at 35, INS v.
Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (No. 90-925) ("The fatal flaw in this position is that there
is no American 'foreign policy' that specifically favors return of criminals for punishment
other than that expressed in the extradition treaties of this nation."); Kevin R. Johnson,
A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 279, 283
(indicating that the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to end the executive branch's use
of asylum as a foreign policy tool).
Eighteen months after Attorney General Thornburgh handed down his decision, the
government stipulated that the fact that an individual is from a country the United States
supports or with which it has friendly relations is irrelevant to the determination of
whether an applicant is eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of persecution.
See American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Mr. Thornburgh's decision in the Doherty Case was at some odds with this stipulation
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The Attorney General also found Doherty ineligible for withholding of
deportation under two statutory exceptions stemming from his PIRA
membership and rank, and his offenses in Northern Ireland.2 96 Mr.
Thornburgh took official notice of portions of the record in McMullen v.
INS,297 to which Doherty was not a party, and gave it collateral estoppel
effect against Doherty. He concluded from the evidence in the
McMullen record that the PIRA was a terrorist organization and had
committed terrorist acts against civilians in a manner that was not pro-
tected by the "political offense" exception. He then attributed these
PIRA actions to Doherty, under general principles of conspiracy law:
"[Doherty's] membership in the PIRA makes him a co-conspirator in the
PIRA's effort to overthrow British rule in Northern Ireland by violent
means, and hence responsible for any non-political crimes his co-conspir-
ators commit in pursuit of that objective."'2 9 On this basis, Mr.
Thornburgh found serious reasons for believing that Doherty had proba-
bly committed grave non-political crimes and had assisted in the persecu-
tion of others on account of their political opinion.
3. The Second Circuit Overturns the Thornburgh Decision
Doherty appealed the Thornburgh Decision to the Second Circuit,
where amicus curiae briefs were filed on his behalf by numerous members
of Congress and by the American Immigration Lawyers Association. On
June 29, 1990, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed the
Thornburgh Decision, and remanded the case to the Justice Department
because it essentially reintroduced foreign policy considerations through the back door
(i.e., using the Attorney General's discretion to deny asylum to an otherwise eligible
person).
296. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988), "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Under subsection (h)(2),
however, that provision "shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that (A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion" or "(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the
alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to [his
arrival in the United States]." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988).
297. 788 F.2d 591, 599 (9th Cir. 1986).
298. Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1988, supra note 282, at 85a n.46; see also id at 83a-
91a (discussing McMullen). The breadth of this ruling warrants two observations. First,
Mr. Thornburgh's invocation of conspiracy law principles to hold Doherty accountable
for PIRA acts in which he did not personally participate (including, one assumes, acts
that occurred during the period of his imprisonment) stands in sharp contrast to the
United Kingdom's handling of the M-60 Machine-Gun Case. When Doherty was tried in
Belfast in 1981, he was not charged with conspiracy even for PIRA attacks that had used
the same weapon. See supra note 48. Second, not even Nazi death camp guards are held
to the stringent conspiracy standards Mr. Thornburgh applied against Doherty here. Cf.
Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 877-79 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing conflicting circuit
interpretations of the need for the government to prove a deportee was actively and per-
sonally involved in misconduct under the Holtzman Amendment).
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with instructions to give Doherty a hearing.29 9 Judge George C. Pratt
wrote the majority opinion, and Judge J. Edward Lumbard issued a
strong dissent.
As a preliminary matter, the majority noted that the Attorney General
had not disturbed the BIA's finding that Doherty had established a
prima facie case of eligibility for substantive relief from deportation. It
thus assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that Doherty had met this
burden.3°
The court concluded that Mr. Thornburgh had abused his discretion
in ruling that Doherty had not demonstrated a change in circumstances
that would justify reopening his case. It held that the Attorney General
had relied on a mistaken view of the law, as neither the regulations nor
the applicable decisions require that new evidence offered by an alien in
support of reopening must be "unforeseeable." '30 1 The court also ex-
pressed doubt that the intervening circumstances in Doherty's case were
as "foreseeable" as the government suggested:
Until this case,... an alien's designation of a country of deportation
had never been rejected by the attorney general on the basis of preju-
dice to national interests after the designation had been approved by
the [BIA]. His power to make such a decision is expressly conferred
by the statute, to be sure, but one could hardly say that its exercise in
this case was "foreseeable" when it had never once, in over 30 years,
been invoked.302
The court also criticized the Attorney General for taking a different view
of the facts than had the BIA. In a controversial passage, it then de-
ferred to the BIA's judgment, rather than the Attorney General's, as to
when reopening of a deportation proceeding is warranted.30 3
The court then reviewed Mr. Thornburgh's ruling that reopening was
unwarranted because Doherty would not ultimately be entitled to with-
holding of deportation. The mandatory nature of the withholding rem-
edy suggested to the court that a determination of an applicant's ultimate
entitlement to relief was improper in the context of a motion to reo-
pen.3 4 Focusing on the types of issues raised by Doherty's claim for
withholding of deportation, the court stated that "the need for an eviden-
tiary hearing should be obvious" as "[the] issues all raise formidable
299. See Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1990),
rev'd sub. nom. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
300. See id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1115-16. The Second Circuit did not address those aspects of the
Thornburgh Decision rejecting the IEA and Doherty's proffered new evidence as grounds
for reopening. Instead, it focused on the issue of "foreseeability" as discussed by Mr.
Thornburgh. See id. at 1116.
303. See id. In the dissent, Judge Lumbard faulted the majority for giving more defer-
ence to the decision of an inferior administrative board than to the Attorney General's
decision disproving it. See id. at 1125.
304. See id. at 1116-17.
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questions of fact that cannot be adequately resolved in the absence of an
evidentiary record."3 5 The court concluded that "it was improper for
the attorney general to prejudge the merits of Doherty's claim for with-
holding of deportation without the benefit of a record," and it ordered
that claim to proceed to a hearing."
The court found that the need for a hearing on Doherty's asylum
claim "presents a more difficult question, because asylum, unlike with-
holdingL] . is a discretionary remedy"3 "7  and INS v.
Abudu3o permits the Attorney General to skip ahead.3"9 It then ana-
lyzed the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees,310 and the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980,311 which
revised American standards and procedures governing asylum. 31 2 It
concluded that Congress intended, in 1980, "to insulate the asylum pro-
cess from the influences of politics and foreign policy,"3" 3 and that Attor-
ney General Thomburgh "based his decision in large part on the types of
geopolitical concerns that [C]ongress intended to eliminate from asylum
cases."' 31 4 In so doing, the court concluded Mr. Thornburgh had "seri-
ously exceeded his discretion."'3 5 Thus, the court found that Doherty
was also entitled to an asylum hearing.31 6
The court saved its harshest criticism for Mr. Thornburgh's ruling that
Doherty had "waived" his right to apply for relief from deportation:
We find the government's professed concern for the "integrity of the
administrative process" unconvincing in light of its own actions in this
case. The government's use of administrative and judicial processes
has been exhaustive, to say the least. . . . [T]he government itself
moved to reopen the case at an earlier stage of the administrative pro-
ceedings... [and] the certification procedure itself, a rarely used pro-
305. Id at 1117.
306. Id In the dissent, Judge Lumbard read 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) as mandating that
the Attorney General deny withholding relief if an alien failed any of the tests in
§ 1253(h)(2)(A) through (D). In his view, the 1984 Extradition Hearing record was re-
plete with Doherty's admissions of § 1253(h)(2) violations. Judge Lumbard found the
Attorney General's determination to be "a model of a reasoned decision based on the
record," and he would have affirmed the Attorney General's refusal to reopen on the
withholding claim. Id at 1128-29.
307. Id at 1117.
308. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
309. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1117.
310. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
311. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
312. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1118-19. Judge Lumbard's dissent focused on the text of
the Refugee Act, which in his view placed "no restrictions on [the Attorney General's]
discretion." Id at 1126. He faulted the majority for dwelling on what the "historiogra-
phy" of the legislative history "supposedly indicates." Id
313. Id at 1118.
314. Id. at 1121.
315. I; see also Note, Prisoners of Foreign Policy: An Argument for Ideological
Neutrality in Asylum, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1878, 1896-97 (1991) (arguing that Mr.
Thornburgh's reliance on foreign policy considerations was improper).
316. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1121.
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cedural device that is removed from normal administrative channels,
has twice been invoked by the attorney general with respect to
Doherty.
In short, it would be unfair to deny a motion to reopen for what
amounts to a dubious procedural argument where the alien has other-
wise satisfied the standards for reopening and where the government's
own conduct in the case has demonstrated less-than-perfect adherence
to procedural formalities. The "sporting theory of justice" has no
place in deportation proceedings. 317
4. The Supreme Court Reinstates the Thornburgh Decision
At the government's request, and over Doherty's opposition, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.318 On January 15, 1992, the Court
reversed the Second Circuit, after concluding that the appeals court had
"placed a much too narrow limit" on the Attorney General's authority
to deny motions to reopen deportation proceedings.31 9
In part I of the Court's opinion, five Justices enunciated certain broad
principles.3 20 The opinion noted that no statutory provision governs the
reopening of deportation proceedings, and asserted that the authority for
such motions "derive[s] solely from regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General., 32 1 It then stressed that the Attorney General has
broad discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen which, in any event,
317. Id. at 1122 (quoting In re Martinez-Solis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 93-95 (BIA 1972)).
318. See INS v. Doherty, 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991). Amicus curiae briefs on Doherty's
behalf were then filed with the Supreme Court by the American Civil Liberties Union, the
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Amnesty International, the International
Human Rights Law Group, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and
132 members of Congress.
319. See INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 724 (1992).
320. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Justices
White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined in part I.
321. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724. The majority's statement that the regulations were
"promulgated by" the Attorney General is difficult to square with the earlier decisions by
Mr. Meese and Mr. Thornburgh, which emphasized that the regulations were the BIA's
and not the Attorney General's. See Mem. Att'y Gen. June 9, 1988, supra note 246, at
121a n.6:
[T]he regulations governing the BIA are not applicable to the Attorney Gen-
eral. Thus, even after having rendered a decision, if the Attorney General was
presented with a motion to reconsider, or a motion to remand as the BIA was,
he would not be governed by 8 C.F.R. 3.2 and 3.8 in deciding that motion;
Mem. Att'y Gen. June 30, 1989, supra note 282, at 55a ("The BIA has promulgated
regulations governing its consideration of motions to reopen proceedings. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 3.2, 3.8 .... These regulations, however, apply only to the BIA, not to the Attorney
General, although of course the Attorney General may refer to these regulations when
considering a motion to reopen.").
The distinction is significant in light of the Court's recent jurisprudence as to which
administrative decisionmakers ought to get judicial deference in the case of conflicting,
but reasonable, interpretations of regulations. See Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S. Ct. 1171,
1176-79 (1991); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2539-40 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are especially disfavored. 3" After determining that "abuse of discretion"
is the proper standard of judicial review of motions to reopen, the Court
offered a one-sentence conclusion:
[T]he proper application of these principles leads inexorably to the
conclusion that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in
denying reopening either on the basis that [Doherty] failed to adduce
new material evidence or on the basis that [he] failed to satisfactorily
explain his previous withdrawal of these [asylum and withholding]
claims.
3 2 3
In part II, four Justices criticized the Second Circuit's reading of
Abudu. 32 4 The plurality then concluded, "for the reasons stated in the
opinion of the Attorney General," that Mr. Thornburgh was well within
his broad discretion in considering motions to reopen to decide that the
material adduced by Doherty "could have been foreseen or anticipated at
the time of the [September 1986 hearing]. ' 325 The plurality also rejected
the Second Circuit's suggestion that the Attorney General was in any
way limited in his authority to overturn the BIA's decision in Doherty's
favor.3
26
In part III, two Justices agreed with the Attorney General that
Doherty had waived his claims to relief from deportation to obtain a
tactical advantage.327 These two Justices found the Attorney General's
opinion on this point to be the functional equivalent of a conclusion that
Doherty had not offered a reasonable explanation for failing to pursue his
claims at the September 1986 hearing.328 They reasoned that Doherty
should have pled inconsistently in the alternative: "There was nothing
which prevented [Doherty] from bringing evidence in support of his asy-
lum and withholding of deportation claims at his first deportation pro-
322. See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724-25. The Court specifically stated: "Motions for
reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored.... [I]n a deportation proceed-
ing[,]... as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien
who wishes merely to remain in the United States." Id. (citation omitted).
323. Id at 725. Having sustained Attorney General Thornburgh's exercise of discre-
tion on two grounds, the majority found it unnecessary to review the Attorney General's
holding that Doherty's involvement in serious non-political crimes in Northern Ireland
made him statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding. See id at 724.
324. See id at 726 (discussing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor, wrote that "[t]he Court
of Appeals seized upon a sentence in our opinion in Abudu ... as negating a requirement
of unforeseeability. But this sentence, we think cannot bear that construction ... ." Id.
325. Id
326. See id at 726-27. The Court stated: "(the Attorney General] is the final adminis-
trative authority in construing the regulations, and in deciding questions under them."
Id at 726. As previously noted, however, the plurality never acknowledged the Meese-
Thornburgh claim that the regulations were the BIA's, and not the Attorney General's.
See supra notes 249, 321, and accompanying text.
327. See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 727. Part III represents only the views of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. There were three "dissents" (Justices Scalia, Stevens,
and Souter, see id at 731-32), and three abstentions (Justices White, Blackmun, and
O'Connor) on the issues discussed therein.
328. See id at 727.
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ceeding, in case the Attorney General did contest his designation of
Ireland as the country to which he be deported."329
Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Souter concurred in part and dissented in
part. They agreed with the majority that the Attorney General's broad
discretion to deny asylum justified his refusal to reopen the deportation
proceeding so that Doherty might apply for that relief.33° Pointing to the
mandatory nature of the withholding-of-deportation remedy, however,
the dissent concluded that "the Attorney General's power to deny with-
holding claims differs significantly from his broader authority to adminis-
ter discretionary forms of relief such as asylum."3 ''
The dissent then examined the procedural bases put forward by the
Attorney General and the INS for rejecting Doherty's motion to reopen,
and found each one unpersuasive. Justice Scalia first rejected the Attor-
ney General's assertion that Doherty had waived his asylum and with-
holding claims by withdrawing them at the September 1986 deportation
hearing.33 2 He concluded that Doherty's waiver was far narrower than
portrayed by the government, and that, in any event, no regulation pre-
cluded the resubmission of a withdrawn application.333
The dissent next took issue with the Attorney General's conclusion
that Doherty failed to identify material evidence, not previously avail-
able, to be presented at the reopened hearing. Justice Scalia agreed with
Attorney General Thornburgh that the change in Irish extradition law
did not satisfy the reopening requirements, 3 4 but viewed Attorney Gen-
eral Meese's rejection of Doherty's designated country of deportation to
be "another matter. 3a35 Justice Scalia acknowledged that a change in the
329. Id. That statement represents a serious misreading of the record, and three
Justices clearly recognized it as such. See id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Doherty's motive, apparently, was to get the deportation hearing
over and himself out of the country quickly, before conclusion of a new extradition treaty
between the United States and the United Kingdom.").
330. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The three Justices
specifically stated: "Irrespective of foreign policy concerns and regardless of whether
Doherty's crimes were 'political,' it was within the Attorney General's discretion to con-
clude that Doherty is a sufficiently unsavory character not to be granted asylum in this
country." Id.
331. Id. at 729. The dissent specifically stated: "There is no 'merits-deciding' discre-
tion to deny reopening in the context of withholding of deportation. The Attorney Gen-
eral could not deny reopening here ...simply because he did not wish to provide
Doherty the relief of withholding." Id. at 730.
332. Id. at 730. Justice Scalia stated the following:
[T]he only commitment reasonably expressed by [Doherty's counsel before the
Immigration Judge], it seems to me, was a commitment not to seek withholding
if the proposed designation [of Ireland] was allowed.... But I do not think one
can reasonably find in the record any waiver, any commitment as to what
Doherty would do, if the proposed designation of country was not accepted-
which is what ultimately happened here.
Id. at 731.
333. See id. at 730-31.




outcome of an administrative appeal is not always a proper basis for re-
opening, but he framed the question before the Court as "whether it may
sometimes be." ' 6 He saw "no great practical difficulty in that," noting
that the Supreme Court itself in reversing a judgment "frequently re-
mands for further proceedings that our new determination has made
necessary.v9337
On that basis, Justice Scalia concluded that the Attorney General's
refusal to reopen on the withholding claim was an abuse of discretion:
The denial of reopening here takes on a particularly capricious colora-
tion when one compares it with the considerable indulgence accorded
to the INS's procedural defaults in the same proceeding-and when
one recognizes that it was precisely that indulgence which placed
Doherty in the position of being unable to present his withholding
claim.... The term "arbitrary" does not have a very precise content,
but it is precise enough to cover this. 338
As a final matter, the dissent addressed the Attorney General's argu-
ment that no hearing was necessary because Doherty was statutorily inel-
igible for withholding of deportation. Justice Scalia found no "per se rule
that withholding claims cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hear-
ing,, 339 and concluded that the Second Circuit "erred" in holding other-
wise.' Accordingly, he would have vacated that portion of the appeals
court's ruling which ordered the Justice Department to reopen the de-
portation hearing and directed the Circuit to consider whether the record
before the Attorney General was sufficient to support the conclusion that
Doherty's offenses were non-political. 3"
The Court's opinion is disappointing, not only for the brevity of its
analysis, but also for its approach to the facts and the law." 2 Neverthe-
less, it is clear that Doherty never came close to sustaining in the
Supreme Court the victory he had won in the Second Circuit. On the
issue of a reopened asylum hearing, the vote against Doherty was eight to
zero. On the issue of the withholding claim, it was five to three against
Doherty, and the dissenters would have afforded the government a sec-
ond chance to persuade the appeals court that a reopened deportation
hearing was unnecessary in view of the evidence from the 1984
Extradition Hearing.
V. DOHERTY'S BAIL REQUESTS
Following his arrest on June 18, 1983, Doherty was imprisoned for
eight years at the Metropolitan Correction Center in New York City (the
336. Id. at 733.
337. Id.
338. Id at 734-35.
339. Id at 736.
340. Id at 735-36.
341. See id. at 736.
342. See supra notes 321, 329, and accompanying text.
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"MCC").34 3 In July 1991, the government transferred him to the federal
prison in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, where he remained in custody until
he was deported on February 19, 1992. 34
Doherty's first application for release on bail was filed in connection
with his Extradition Hearing. Judge Sprizzo denied that application on
the ground that Doherty presented an unacceptable flight risk.345
Doherty renewed his bail request following Judge Sprizzo's rejection
of the British extradition request. At that time, formal custody of
Doherty had been returned to the INS pursuant to the original deporta-
tion warrant and order to show cause. On December 21, 1984, the
Immigration Judge set bond at $200,000,346 but the INS appealed to the
BIA and obtained an emergency stay. On March 4, 1985, the Board
reversed the Immigration Judge's order and ruled that Doherty be held
without bail. The BIA reasoned that Doherty presented such a poor bail
risk that no amount of bond could reasonably assure his presence during
future proceedings. The Board also expressed reservations about releas-
ing Doherty pursuant to a bond provided by an unknown source.34 7
343. The MCC, which is designed for the short-term detention of individuals awaiting
trial, lacks the more extensive facilities found in long-term prisons. During his stay,
Doherty was confined to a 9'x 9' cell for twenty-three hours a day. In 1986, Doherty was
transferred to the federal prison in Otisville, New York, but was returned shortly thereaf-
ter to the MCC. Note that detention pending deportation is not supposed to be punitive,
and thus it has been suggested that penal facilities should be avoided where possible. See
1 C.F.R. § 305.89-4 (1992) (recommendation of Administrative Conference of United
States).
344. See James Barron, U.S. Extradites [sic] an LR.A. Killer To Belfast Jail, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1992, at Al. In an inadvertent slip of the pen, the New York Times
headline writers underscored Doherty's argument that the government was using depor-
tation as disguised extradition. In the late edition, the New York Times corrected this
mistake and changed the headline to: IR.A. Fugitive Sent to Belfast from U.S. Jail. For
Doherty's personal account of his return to Belfast, see 138 Cong. Rec. E1220 (daily ed.
May 1, 1992) (extension of remarks of Congressman Manton).
345. At an October 12, 1983, hearing, Judge Sprizzo stated: "'I would be greatly
surprised, if Mr. Doherty were bailed, if he did not exercise what I would think would be
a very rational judgment perhaps to disappear.'" Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204,
206 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
Because of a compelling national interest in complying with extradition treaties, the
courts have generally held that bail should not be granted in extradition cases unless the
applicant shows "special circumstances" which warrant his release. See Wright v.
Henckel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903); United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986). "Special circum-
stances" do not include the "discomfiture of jail" or an applicant's status as a "tolerable
bail risk." United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hills, 765 F. Supp. 381, 385-86 (E.D. Mich. 1991); see generally Jeffrey A. Hall, Note, A
Recommended Approach to Bail in International Extradition Cases, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 599
(1987) (proposing an approach that looks to an accused's risk of flight rather than the
presence or absence of specific special circumstances).
346. The Immigration Judge issued his order one day before Prime Minister Thatcher
and President Reagan met at Camp David, Maryland. See supra note 135 and accompa-
nying text.
347. See In re Doherty, No. A26-185-231 (BIA, March 29, 1990), at 3-4 [hereinafter
BIA March 29, 1990] (citing BIA, March 4, 1985).
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Doherty never sought judicial review of the BIA order.
Over the next few years, Doherty proved to have a remarkable flair for
public relations. His predicament became a rallying point for opposition
in the United States to British rule in Northern Ireland. His support,
always strong in the Irish-American neighborhoods of the Northeast,
broadened as civil rights and human rights defenders came to his aid as
well.
From his jail cell, Doherty wrote a weekly newspaper column. 8
CBS-Television's "Sixty Minutes" twice broadcast a sympathetic pro-
gram about his case.3 9 His visitors at the MCC included several
Members of Congress; John Cardinal O'Connor, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of New York; presidential candidate Reverend Jesse
Jackson; and Reverend Lawrence Jenco, who had recently been released
as a hostage in Lebanon. In addition, in recognition of the unprece-
dented length of his confinement, the City of New York renamed the
street comer outside the jail after him.
Doherty's status even became an issue in the 1989 New York City
mayoral election. The Democratic Party candidate and eventual winner,
David Dinkins, urged the federal government to grant Doherty asylum,
while the Republican Party candidate and former United States Attor-
ney, Rudolph Giuliani, defended the government's handling of the
case.
350
In 1989, for the third and last time, Doherty requested release on
bond. He argued that he had been held in custody, pending deportation,
longer than any other person, and he contended that his continued deten-
tion violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11e also
emphasized that he had developed strong community ties in the New
York area, and thus was not a poor bail risk.
On September 22, 1989, the Associate Regional Commissioner of the
INS denied Doherty's bond application.351 The BIA affirmed that deci-
sion on March 29, 1990,352 with one member abstaining.353 In affirming,
348. Doherty wrote for the weekly newspaper, The Irish People.
349. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, June 19, 1988), available in 60 Minutes
Transcripts, Vol. XX, No. 40.
350. See William Glaberson, Threads of Irish Politics Woven Into Mayoral Race, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1989, at B5; Frank Lynn, Patronage Inquiry: Big Blast or Whimper?,
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1989, at B1.
351. BIA March 29, 1990, supra note 347, at 1.
352. The BIA noted that Doherty had submitted affidavits from several people who
regularly visited him in prison. See id. at 5. Those affidavits generally expressed confli-
dence that Doherty was a man of honor and integrity, and the belief that Doherty would
not dishonor or embarrass his supporters by fleeing to avoid deportation. One individual
offered to post a $100,000 bond, and another offered to post her personal assets. Doherty
also named several prominent political figures who visited him in detention, and pointed
to various letters and resolutions on his behalf. He noted that he had an offer of employ-
ment at $35,000 per year, and that one of his attorneys had offered to allow Doherty to
reside with him in his home. See id.
353. As grounds for abstention, BIA Member Heilman wrote:
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the Board held that Doherty was partially responsible for the length of
his own confinement, and thus rejected Doherty's constitutional argu-
ment.354 Moreover, although it acknowledged that Doherty had demon-
strated substantial community ties, the BIA concluded that the risk of
flight outweighed all other factors.355
Doherty's remaining arguments fared no better. The Board recog-
nized that, prior to his apprehension, Doherty had lived in the United
States for approximately sixteen months without incident, and that he
had not been charged with or convicted of any crime in the United
States. But the BIA found these facts to be "of little consequence,"
maintaining that any engagement in criminal activities during that time
"would have increased [Doherty's] likelihood of being discovered by
United States authorities. 3 56
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Doherty petitioned the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for a
writ of habeas corpus. He argued that his detention had become consti-
If a majority of this Board were to order [Doherty] released on bond, the result
would be... immediate certification by the Service to the Attorney General and
reversal of that order.... The previous and present Attorney General have
made it clear that Mr. Doherty is to be treated as a category apart, and in such
vehement terms that there can be no doubt what the ultimate outcome will be in
any matter within [the Attorney General's] jurisdiction.
The better disposition of this appeal would be to forward it to the Attorney
General and let him apply the special procedures and standards and political
considerations to this bond appeal that have enveloped every other aspect of the
proceedings relating to Mr. Doherty. It is in those terms that he must defend
himself, before the very official who has both the power to define the national
interests asserted and to judge Mr. Doherty's pleas.... That is the level on
which Mr. Doherty will have to do battle.
Id. at 9.
354. See id. at 7. The BIA stated:
While there may be a limit on the time a respondent may be detained pending
completion of deportation proceedings, we do not find it here where both the
respondent and the government have demonstrated a predilection for litiga-
tion .... [A] substantial portion of the period of his detention can fairly be
attributed to him.
Id.
355. See id. at 7-8. Specifically, the BIA stated:
[N]othing presented persuades us that there has been any meaningful reduction
since our prior order in the likelihood that [Doherty], if released, will abscond if
and when his deportation becomes imminent. [Doherty] went to great lengths
to avoid the imprisonment to which he has been sentenced. In escaping from
jail, he risked his life in a gun battle. In coming to the United States, he left his
family including mother, father, and three sisters and he left his home and his
homeland-all the community ties he had developed in his life. [His] ties in this
country are meager in comparison to those he abandoned when he fled his
homeland. In view of this history, we are unpersuaded that [he] would volunta-
rily surrender for deportation and return to a British jail out of a sense of obli-
gation to his supporters in this country or to avoid the forfeiture of someone
else's money.
Id.
356. Id. at 6.
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tutionally invalid because of its length, and he urged the court to hold
that this constitutional violation outweighed any consideration of the risk
of flight. In defense, the government argued that Doherty lacked stand-
ing to allege a constitutional violation, asserting that illegal aliens have
no substantive due process rights to liberty during deportation
proceedings.
On November 5, 1990, Judge Miriam Cedarbaum denied Doherty's
writ." 7 Rejecting the government's lack-of-standing defense as "an ex-
treme position," she first held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause does not distinguish between aliens and citizens.358 Judge
Cedarbaum then acknowledged that she had found no cases in which a
deportable alien had been held in custody for as long as Doherty. She
nevertheless concluded that, while the length of Doherty's detention was
"extremely troubling," it was not unconstitutional in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances.359
Judge Cedarbaum also rejected Doherty's claim that the length of his
detention was attributable to government delays. After reviewing the
procedural history of the case, she concluded that "substantial portions
of the period of Doherty's detention, including some portions for which
Doherty [sought] to blame the Government, [were] attributable to his
own litigation strategy, ' '3 1 and other significant periods of time "were
devoted to the argument and consideration of the difficult legal is-
sues."36 Finally, Judge Cedarbaum held that the BIA was correct in
giving very heavy weight to the risk of flight, concluding that the evi-
dence on that issue "significantly favor[ed] the Government. 362
Doherty appealed to the Second Circuit, but, on August 27, 1991, a
divided panel affirmed Judge Cedarbaum's decision.363 The majority
agreed with the district court that deportable aliens possess a substantive
due process right to liberty during deportation proceedings. It empha-
sized, however, that this right must be construed narrowly and is "cir-
cumscribed by considerations of the national interest.' ' 314 The majority
further emphasized that judicial review of alleged government interfer-
ence with this right is limited,3 65 and cautioned that governmental con-
duct that may be considered "'shocking'" when directed at a United
States citizen "may not be unconstitutional when directed at an alien." 3
357. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
358. See id, at 135.
359. Id at 139.
360. Id at 138.
361. Id at 139.
362. Id
363. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991), cer. dismissed, 112 S.
Ct. 1254 (1992).
364. Id at 209.
365. See id. at 208-09.
366. Id at 209.
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In other words, the majority found an alien's due process right to liberty
to be "significantly more qualified" than a criminal defendant's due pro-
cess right to liberty.367
In applying these standards to the facts of the Doherty Case, the
majority concluded that Doherty's detention had resulted from a proper
exercise of the Attorney General's discretion, and thus his Fifth Amend-
ment right to due process had not been violated.368 Moreover, the major-
ity agreed with the district court that Doherty was principally
responsible for the length of his litigation, did not find any invidious pur-
pose or bad faith in denying bail, and concluded that Doherty had only
himself to blame for the length of his confinement.369
In contrast, the dissent argued that the government had been just as
litigious as Doherty in its effort to achieve through deportation what it
could not achieve through extradition: Doherty's return to the United
Kingdom. 370 The dissent conceded that there was a difference between
367. Id. at 210.
368. See id. at 211. The court specifically stated the following:
Over the course of the last eight years, Doherty has exercised skillfully his
rights under the deportation statute, delaying and perhaps preventing the out-
come sought by the government. He has resisted deportation when it would
result in his return to Great Britain, agreed to deportation when it would not
result in his return, and then resumed his resistance to deportation when cir-
cumstances changed. Only in the face of the impending elimination of the polit-
ical offense exception did Doherty seek to expedite the deportation process and,
when it appeared that his destination of choice no longer offered a haven from
extradition, he sought relief from deportation, once again slowing down the
process. Although this litigation strategy is perfectly permissible, we hold that
Doherty may not rely on the extra time resulting therefrom to claim that his
prolonged detention violates substantive due process.
Id.
369. See id. at 211-12. The court specifically stated the following:
[F]rom the outset of his detention, Doherty has possessed, in effect, the key that
unlocks his prison cell. That is, if Doherty had agreed to deportation in the first
place, he would not have been detained at [the Metropolitan Correction Center]
for the past eight years .... It cannot be said that, by attributing to Doherty
primary responsibility for the delay in resolving his status, he is being "pun-
ished" for the exercise of his constitutional rights. Doherty certainly has been
afforded the full panoply of procedural due process. He has not demonstrated
the invidious purpose, bad faith or arbitrariness necessary to make out a denial
of substantive due process.
Id. at 212.
370. See id. at 212-13 (Altimari, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically stated the
following:
In some respect, the government's declaratory judgment motion embodied the
general litigation posture that the government assumed in this case-once dis-
satisfied with the result of a decision in Doherty's favor, the government
attempted to use an extraordinary, but legitimate, tool to obtain the result it
was seeking....
[T]he government [also] appealed a number of decisions which would have
allowed Doherty to be deported to the Republic of Ireland. For example, after
the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its final decision ... the government
exercised its right to appeal this decision to the Attorney General-such an
appeal is almost never taken. Once again, the government went to extraordi-
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the constitutional rights of citizens and non-citizens, but found that the
facts of the Doherty Case "clearly transcend[ed]" those differences.37'
Thus, the dissent argued for reversal of the district court's judgment and
for a remand with instructions to set appropriate bail.372
On December 27, 1991, Doherty petitioned the Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari on the bail issue. Three weeks later, however, the Supreme Court
reinstated the Thornburgh Opinion, thereby removing the last obstacle to
his deportation. One week after Doherty was returned to Northern
Ireland, the Supreme Court dismissed his pending certiorari petition.373
Nonetheless, the British government sought to defuse any concerns about
his lengthy confinement in the United States by suggesting that Doherty
might eventually receive credit for his time served in the United States.37'
Two final observations concerning Doherty's possible release on bail
should be noted. First, one author has suggested that Doherty would
never have become such a symbolic figure in the United States if he had
he been released on bail at an early stage of his case. In that author's
judgment, flight was not a realistic possibility because it would have seri-
ously damaged Doherty's credibility, his cause, and his backers.375 This
speculative theory seems to give too little weight to Doherty's two prison
escapes in Northern Ireland. Further, it does not give due regard to
Doherty's claim that he feared persecution upon his return to Northern
Ireland.
Second, in denying Doherty bail, the Second Circuit stated that his
PIRA affiliation "may constitute a more general threat to national secur-
nary lengths to preclude Doherty from being deported to the country of his
choice.
Id at 213.
371. Id at 214 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
372. See id at 213-14 (Altimari, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically stated:
I do find it shocking that we would allow the government to indefinitely pursue
a litigation strategy, which was essentially designed to circumvent an extradi-
tion decision, at the expense of an individual's right to liberty. At some time,
the government's legitimate appeals impinge on the individual's rights to such
an extent that the Due Process Clause requires us to say to the State--enough is
enough-"Thou shalt not."... I believe we have reached that moment. ...
A point is reached when all pedagogical distinctions give way to common
sense and reason and we say: enough-it is just flat out wrong to confine an
individual for eight years when he has not been charged with a crime in this
country and has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be guilty
of a "political offense."
Id
373. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 112 S. CL 1254 (1992).
374. See Craig R. Whitney, LR.A. Guerrilla is Back in a Familiar Belfast Jail, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1992, at A5. On July 30, 1992, the British Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, announced that Doherty would not be credited for
his time spent in confinement in the United States. Mr. Mayhew indicated that Doherty
would have to remain in British custody for another ten years before any parole decision
would be made. See 138 Cong. Rec. H8027-28 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (remarks of
Congressman Engel); Stiff Term for IRA Man, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1992, at A6.
375. See Dillon, supra note 39, at 210-11, 240, 245.
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ity," and thus provided "a proper basis for detention. '3 76 Yet, the Sec-
ond Circuit never made any attempt to explain this statement. To be
sure, the prospect of Doherty, out on bail, delivering lectures, and raising
funds, might have proven embarrassing to the administration in the
United States and the government in the United Kingdom. Such embar-
rassment hardly provides a constitutional basis for an eight year and
eight month detention of a deportable alien who poses no threat to indi-
vidual citizens.
CONCLUSION
The Doherty Case leaves two overall impressions. First, it demon-
strates that the American response to terrorism (i.e., politically moti-
vated violence abroad) has been spotty at best. The Carter, Reagan, and
Bush Administrations have strongly condemned such violence on many
occasions, yet have inexplicably winked at it in other instances.
As an illustration of the United States' inconsistent treatment of "ter-
rorists," one need only look to the April 1990 State Department publica-
tion which identifies both the PIRA and the African National Congress
(the "ANC") as terrorist organizations. 37 7 In June 1990, as PIRA "ter-
rorist" Joe Doherty began his seventh year of detention in an American
jail, ANC "terrorist" Nelson Mandela was invited to lunch at the White
House; Mandela used the occasion to educate President Bush as to why
the ANC's use of political violence was acceptable.378
For a further illustration, one might recall the Israeli "terrorist"
Menachem Begin, whose violent efforts in 1946 and 1947 to expel the
British from Palestine and then to push out the region's Arab occupants
caused the British to offer a 10,000 pound reward for his capture. If Mr.
Begin had been apprehended in the United States under circumstances
similar to Doherty's, it is highly implausible that the American govern-
ment would have turned him over to the British, as it did with
Doherty. 79 If there is a principled distinction to be made among these
examples, the government has yet to articulate it.
The second impression left by the Doherty Case is that human rights
violations abroad are accorded a lower priority by the United States
376. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1952)) (alien's membership in Communist Party is a men-
ace to the public interest and warrants denial of bail pending deportation), cert. dismissed,
112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
377. See U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, at 77, 84-85 (April
1990).
378. See 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1002, 1003 (June 25, 1990).
379. For a discussion of Menachem Begin's roles in planning the bombing of the King
David Hotel in July 1946, which killed or wounded 150 people, and the Deir Yassin
massacre of April 1948, which killed 250 people, see Menachem Begin, The Revolt 162-
65, 212-30 (1977); Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest 60, 85, 189 (1989); O'Brien, supra note 2,
at 268, 281-82. From 1977 until 1983, Menachem Begin served as Prime Minister of
Israel, and in 1978, he won the Nobel Peace Prize.
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when the maintenance of friendly foreign relations is at issue. In such
circumstances, the United States has often turned a blind eye toward
human rights violations that would have been vigorously and publicly
condemned had they been committed by a weaker or less important na-
tion, or had more Americans been pushing for such condemnation.3W
Obviously, diplomacy mandates that governments whisper their con-
cerns to allies, even as they shout similar concerns to their enemies. In
the case of Northern Ireland, twenty-plus years of American whispering
has produced few results. However, the Doherty Case may also have
pointed the way to a cure: the spotlight of publicity. Through skillful
legal argument, Doherty postponed for over eight years a result that, in
retrospect, seemed inevitable. Moreover, aided by his remarkable gift for
public relations and his opponents' heavy-handed litigation tactics,
Doherty used his time in the United States to maximum advantage. By
addressing the facts of his own case, he created a new, non-violent propa-
ganda front for the PIRA's war against British rule in Northern
Ireland-an educational campaign that familiarized the American public
with conditions in Northern Ireland. In the final analysis, that educa-
tional campaign may prove to be his most important legacy.
380. See Don Shannon, Bush's Policy on Human Rights Called Shortsighted, Wash.
Post, Dec. 29, 1991, at A18 (discussing the Annual Report of Human Rights Watch).
Nor is the phenomenon limited to the current administration. See Holland, supra note
19, at 129-30. In 1977, the Irish National Caucus sent accounts of the torture of Irish
prisoners in Northern Ireland jails to the [Carter administration's ] State Department,
"[b]ut the material submitted to the administration was simply ignored. When the State
Department published its annual overview of the human-rights situation worldwide,
Northern Ireland was not even mentioned." Id
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